Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought

Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought. Co-authored with Kai-yee Wong. In Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, ed. Bo Mou, Leiden: Brill (2008): 313–33.

Written with my friend and colleague, Kai-yee Wong, this paper was published in an anthology that grew out of a conference held by the ISCWP in June 2005. Although the anthology did not appear until 2008, the paper was written in 2005. The page numbers in the published version are indicated in the pdf.

Abstract: This essay applies John Searle’s account of weakness of will to explore the classical Chinese problem of weak-willed action. Searle’s discussion focuses on the shortcomings of the Western classical model of rationality in explaining weakness of will, so he naturally says little about the practical ethical problem of overcoming weak-willed action, the focus of the relevant Chinese texts. Yet his theory of action, specifically his notion of the Background, suggests a compelling approach to the practical issue, one that converges with a plausible account of the classical Chinese conception of agency. On this approach, the practical problem is due to weaknesses of the self in carrying out intentions. The key to overcoming the problem lies not in restructuring the agent’s affective states, as suggested by prominent interpreters of Chinese thought such as David Nivison, but in strengthening the agent’s Background capacities, much as we do when mastering new skills.

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