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The Mohist Dialectics

A Supplement to

The Essential Mòzí: Ethical, Political, and Dialectical Writings

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INTRODUCTORY NOTES

THE MOHIST ‘DIALECTICS’ (Mò Bìàn 墨辯) are six books of the Mòzǐ devoted to topics in metaphysics, ethics, semantics, logic, epistemology, geometry, optics, mechanics, and economics, among other subjects. Two of these books (books 40 and 41) present series of short ‘canons’ (jīng 經), or terse, often one-line pronouncements. Two other books (42 and 43) present ‘explanations’ (shuō 說), or slightly longer elaborations, explanations, or justifications, for each individual canon.

The division between the two books of canons—and the two of corresponding explanations—reflects only the break between the two bamboo-strip scrolls on which they were written, rather than any major division in their content. The translation presents the canons in the order in which they appear in the Mòzǐ, with canons from book 40 indicated by ‘A’ and those from book 41 indicated by ‘B’. The numbering system agrees with that introduced in Graham’s edition. Except in a few instances where a canon has no explanation, in the traditional text the explanations are indexed to the individual canons by one- or two-character headings corresponding to the first graph or two in the relevant canon. Following standard practise, the translation extracts the explanations from books 42 and 43 and pairs them with the canons to which they belong. Hence in the translation, the number ‘A1’ refers to both canon A1 and explanation A1. The formatting clearly indicates which part is the canon and which the explanation. The heading of each explanation is indicated by parentheses. I will refer to the canons and explanations from books 40 and 42 as ‘part A’, those from 41 and 43 as ‘part B’.

The text of the canons and explanations adopted here is a new, abridged recension based on collation and critical evaluation of emen-

dations proposed by more than a dozen Qing dynasty and modern editors.\(^2\) The base text is the Ming dynasty Dào Zàng 道藏 edition, the earliest surviving edition of the text, printed in 1445.\(^3\) Emendations to the Dào Zàng text are explained in the notes to each canon and explanation. The editions consulted in preparing the text are listed at the end of this introductory section. Of these, the works of Sūn Yìràng, Wú Yùjiāng, Liáng Qīchāo, and A. C. Graham proved especially useful.

The corrected text diverges from other recent editions, including Graham’s, in many details and is generally more conservative in emending the base text. This recension aims especially to avoid conjectural emendation—corrections to the text based solely on conjectures about its meaning, without support from variant readings, counterpart passages, contextual parallels or contrasts, or familiar, systematic instances of graphic error or graphic variation. The textual problems and the editorial methodology are summarised in the next subsections.

The text and translation are abridged. Given the aims of this book, I have omitted sections whose content is so obscure as to undermine confidence in any interpretation and sections in which textual problems make interpretation extremely tentative. Also omitted are the sections on optics and mechanics, which would require extended technical discussion that is beyond the scope of this work.

Because the canons and explanations are terse and often admit of multiple, related interpretations, the translation frequently gives two or more alternatives for key terms, separated by slashes. The aim is to give readers a fuller sense of the semantic range of the words. The result is an untidy translation, but for these highly specialised texts this

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\(^2\) This work is indebted to my colleague Hong-Ki Lam, with whom I conducted a collaborative research project in 2004–2005 at the Chinese University of Hong Kong to develop a new edition of the canons and explanations.

\(^3\) The editions and manuscripts available as evidence of the text are described in detail in Graham, Later Mohist Logic, 73–76. Wú Yūjiāng provides a complete list of variant readings in all available early versions of the text. See his 墨子校注 [Collated Annotations on Mòzī] (Beijing: Zhōnghuá Shūjù, 1993).
approach seems justifiable. The translation also includes extensive notes clarifying the significance of some of the canons and explanations.\(^4\) The final pair of dialectical texts are book 44, ‘Dà Qū 大取’, or ‘Greater Selection’, and book 45, ‘Xiǎo Qū 小取’, or ‘Lesser Selection’. The titles of these books are unrelated to their content and most likely refer to their having been compiled by salvaging two selections, one larger and one smaller, from a pile of damaged bamboo-strip scrolls.\(^5\) Both comprise multiple, independent sections. Several passages in book 44 break off in mid-sentence, indicating that in places the bamboo strips on which the texts were written were broken or lost. Graham conjectured that the ‘Greater Selection’ and ‘Lesser Selection’ represented the remnants of two essays, one on language and logic, the other on ethics, and attempted to rearrange and reconstruct the texts accordingly. However, the content of the distinct sections in these books is neither continuous nor coherent enough to justify the conclusion that they originally constituted exactly two discrete texts. The sections could have come from more than two damaged texts or from a collection of short discussions. Hence the translation presented here sets aside Graham’s reconstruction and follows the sequence of the text as it appears in the Đào Zàng edition. For convenience, I have divided the texts into numbered sections but have not rearranged the order of the text. I have inserted ellipses at locations in which sentences seem incomplete or words appear to be missing. Because of the many textual problems in the ‘Greater Selection’, I have omitted several obscure sections.


\(^5\) One passage in book 44 refers to selecting the greater of two benefits as ‘qū dà 取大’ (selecting the greater) and the lesser of two harms as ‘qū xiǎo 取小’ (selecting the lesser). The similarity between these phrases and the titles ‘Dà Qū’ and ‘Xiǎo Qū’ has led some interpreters to read the titles as ‘Selecting the Greater’ and ‘Selecting the Lesser’. However, the words ‘selecting the lesser’ have no obvious relation to any part of the content of book 45, and this interpretation parses the syntax of the titles incorrectly.
UNHAPPILY, given their historical and intellectual importance, the Mohist canons and explanations are among the most obscure and corrupt texts in all the ancient Chinese literature. The problems arise from a number of factors. One is probably the difficulty of the texts’ content. The canons and explanations are extremely terse and frequently use unfamiliar technical terminology. Ancient scribes responsible for producing new copies of the texts probably struggled to understand them and could easily have miscopied some words or sentences. Another factor is the high frequency of rare or archaic graphs, which were never updated by ancient editors who understood them. Further factors include physical damage and various textual accidents during the early transmission of the texts. At the time the canons and explanations were written, the standard writing material was thin strips of bamboo, which were bound together with silk thread so that they could be rolled up to form scrolls. The texts show evidence of numerous places where the bamboo strips they were written on broke or were dislocated. Early in the texts’ history, for example, several strips in Part B were mutilated and displaced, scrambling a block of ten canons, and at least one strip from a different text was incorporated into Part A. At some point, a long series of explanations between A22 and A39 were lost or mutilated, probably because of physical damage to the strips. A47 includes a two-graph fragment that appears to have been copied into the text from a broken strip. Lacunae are scattered throughout the texts, some perhaps due to scribal carelessness, some perhaps to damage to the writing materials.

Other problems concern the order of the canons and the divisions between individual canons and explanations. Traditional Chinese script is written in columns and read from top to bottom and right to left. In Warring States bamboo scrolls, typically each column took up one strip of bamboo. At some intermediate stage in the canons’ history—after the text had already been dislocated in a few places—they were recopied into an unusual two-row format. Rather than being written from the top to the bottom of each column, they were arranged so that canon A1 began at the top of the first column, A2 at the top of the second column, and so on until canon A49. Canon A50 was then written in the
bottom half of the first column, A51 in the bottom half of the second column, and so on. Part B of the canons was organised similarly. In the margin at the end of the first row of part A, after A49, came the instruction ‘Read this book sideways’. In at least one place, the editor who produced this two-row arrangement seems to have divided two canons incorrectly. In another, a canon is missing, either because the editor omitted it or because it was already lost. Two further canons, one in part A and one in part B, were too long to fit into only half a column, and so the editor was forced to give them two half-columns each, pushing the bottom row of each part one place out of alignment with the top row.

As if the texts had not suffered enough already, at a third, later stage in the canons’ transmission, a scribe unaware of the special two-row layout recopied them by reading straight down each column, as one would normally do when reading other bamboo-strip scrolls. The canons were thus shuffled into the sequence A1, A50, A2, A51, and so on, with the long, multi-column canons taking two sequential places. Even the marginal note to read the book horizontally was shuffled into the text, copied in between canons A97 and A98 as if it were itself one of the canons. Fortunately, the order of the explanations remained unchanged, enabling scholars to recover the original sequence of the canons. Still, the textual shuffling, along with other damage, has made it difficult in places to determine whether certain words belong to the end of one canon or the beginning of another fifty spots away.

An anonymous early editor helpfully marked each of the explanations with a heading consisting of the first one or two graphs in the corresponding canon. Apparently, these headings were written to the side of the first graph in each explanation. Eventually, a scribe misunderstood them and copied them into the text itself, sometimes as the first graph in the explanation, sometimes as the second. This blunder rendered the first sentence of many explanations nearly unintelligible, since they now included an extraneous word or two, and in many places created confusion as to where one canon or explanation ends and the next begins. Similarly, scattered throughout the explanations are what appear to have been marginal glosses or illustrations, typically beginning with the word ruò 若 (‘like…’). These too were eventually copied into the text itself, sometimes in inappropriate locations.

The text is further corrupted by numerous graphical permutations,
characters that are unintelligible in their context but visually similar to other characters that might fit intelligibly. Fortunately, in many cases this corruption is systematic. For example, it quickly becomes obvious that the pronoun 之 is often corrupted to 文 and that a scribe has frequently confused the graph 止 with 心 or 必. Distinctive Mohist terminology, such as the otherwise unknown graph 怨, is confused with more familiar words, in this case 忿.

That these problems with the text of the canons and explanations have been recognised and largely resolved is due to a series of brilliant scholarly efforts over some two hundred years. Bì Yuán 畢沅 (1730–1797) and his associate Sūn Xìngyān 孫星衍 (1753–1818) discovered how the sequence of the canons had been shuffled and began the work of restoring them to the correct order. Building on Bì’s work, along with that of Zhāng Huìyān 張惠言 (1761–1802) and Yù Yuè 俞樾 (1821–1907), Sūn Yǐràng 孫詒讓 (1848–1908) recognised many of the headings in the explanations and identified many graphic errors and systematic patterns of textual corruption. Liáng Qīchāo 梁啟超 (1873–1929) discovered that the headings of the explanations are always the first one or two graphs of the corresponding canon and that, except in a few cases where other damage has jumbled the text, all the explanations either have a heading or start with the same word as their canon. Luán Diàofǔ 魯調甫 (1889–1972) and Tán Jièfǔ 譚戒甫 (1887–1974) made breakthroughs in untangling where various blocks of text had been misplaced or lost. Extending their work, A. C. Graham (1919–1991) solved further puzzles concerning textual dislocation and made breakthroughs in understanding the canons’ grammar, terminology, and stock examples. Without these scholars’ work, the canons and explanations would be nearly unreadable.

Methodological Notes

Many modern editions of the dialectical texts are marred by two severe flaws. The first is a failure to recognise that the sequence of and divisions between the canons and explanations cannot be reconstructed plausibly without incorporating Liáng’s finding that every canon has a heading and Luán’s, Tán’s, and Graham’s findings about systematic
textual dislocation during the three stages of the canons’ history.\textsuperscript{6} The second is the practise of emending the text according to piecemeal, conjectural interpretations rather than disciplined, systematic hypotheses. Conjectural emendation—emendation based simply on what a particular editor thinks ‘makes sense’—must be avoided, lest emendation degenerate into simply rewriting the text as one thinks best.

In light of these points, the version of the text presented here has been emended according to the following guidelines.

1. The main key to the divisions between individual canons and explanations is the headings. The present edition is based on the hypothesis that every explanation has a heading, usually the first or second graph in the explanation, unless the heading has been lost due to mutilation. Any interpretation or emendation of individual canons and explanations must proceed from a plausible hypothesis about their headings and the divisions between them.

2. Emendation can be justified only if there is a plausible explanation of how the text became corrupt. This explanation along with the emended reading must explain the text more simply and completely than the null hypothesis that the base text is correct.

3. Emendation may be strongly justified if needed to restore coherence between a canon and its explanation, between parallel or contrasting parts of a canon or explanation, or between counterpart passages in closely related canons or explanations. Absent such corroborating phrases or passages, emendation should be undertaken with caution and will often be tentative.

4. If the base text is unintelligible, emendation may be justified on grounds of systematic or repeated corruption of graphically similar characters, such as 文 and 之 or 但 and 俱.

5. If the base text is unintelligible, emendation on grounds of graphic error—confusion between graphically similar characters—may be justified, but only if the characters in question are indeed easily confused in archaic script.

6. If the base text is unintelligible, transposition, deletion, or insertion of graphs may be justified if the faulty reading can be explained by

\textsuperscript{6} These findings are summarised in Graham, *Later Mohist Logic*, 87–94.
familiar scribal errors such as dittography, haplography, or transposition.

7. Emendation cannot assume graphic standardization or consistency throughout the texts.

8. Emendation based on purported sound loans for other words usually written with unrelated graphs is implausible unless well attested. For instance, taking *míng* (‘name’) in A32 as a loan for *min* (‘people’) is implausible.

These guidelines are not intended to provide an algorithm for justifying or rejecting emendations. Nor need they be treated as absolute. Their aim is rather to function as a practical, negotiable baseline against which to consider the justification for proposed emendations.

**References**


Liáng Qīchāo 梁啟超. 墨經校詮 [Collation and Interpretation of the Mohist Canon]. Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1923.


Tán Jīefū 譚戒甫. 墨辯發微 [Detailed Explications of the Mohist
Introductory Notes


A1

Canon: A reason/cause\(^9\) is what must be obtained before something is completed/brought about.

Explanation: (Reason/cause.) Minor reason/cause—having it, something is not surely so; lacking it, something surely is not so. As to a unit/part, like having a tip. Major reason/cause—having it, something surely is so. Like coming into view [to an observer] completing seeing.\(^{10}\)

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A2

Canon: A unit/part is a division from a whole.

Explanation: (Unit/part.) Like one of two or the tip of a measured foot.\(^{11}\)

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\(^7\) The text could be faulty here but is intelligible without emendation.

\(^8\) Emending 有之必無然 to 有之必然 on the hypothesis that a redundant 無 was added by mistaken parallelism with the explanation of a minor cause.

\(^9\) The word gù 故 refers to both reasons and causes.

\(^{10}\) A minor reason/cause is similar to a necessary but not sufficient condition; a major reason/cause is similar to a sufficient condition. Any unit/part has a tip (a dimensionless starting point), but the tip alone is not sufficient to constitute the unit/part. Something coming into one’s view is sufficient for one to see it.

\(^{11}\) See A61. A pair of discrete items can count as a whole or aggregate (jiān 兼); either member of the pair can count as a unit/part (tǐ 體). A part of a continuous whole,
A3

經: 知, 材也。
經說: 知材。知也者, 所以知也而必知。若明。
Canon: The knowing is the capacity.\(^{12}\)
Explanation: (Knowing, capacity.) As to the knowing, it’s that by which we know, such that we surely know. Like eyesight.\(^{13}\)

A4

經: 慮, 求也。
經說: 慮。慮也者, 以其知有求也而不必得之。若睨。
Canon: Considering is seeking.
Explanation: (Considering.) Considering is, by means of the knowing, seeking something without necessarily getting it. Like peering.\(^{14}\)

A5

經: 知, 接也。
經說: 知。知也者, 以其知過物而能貌之。若見。
Canon. Knowing is connecting.
Explanation. (Knowing.) Knowing is, by means of the knowing, passing something and being able to describe its features. Like seeing.\(^{15}\)

such as the tip of a standard unit of length, can also count as a unit/part. Any unit/part that itself has parts can also be considered a whole—a hand is a unit/part of the body, while the fingers are units/parts of the hand.

\(^{12}\) Canons A3–A6 form a series on knowledge.

\(^{13}\) ‘The knowing’ is a cognitive capacity akin to the awareness or the understanding. It is that by which we have knowledge or awareness of things. If this capacity is functioning—if we are awake or conscious—then we must know, in the sense that we must be aware of something or other. By analogy, if we have normally functioning eyesight and are awake, with eyes open, we see something or other. We might nevertheless lack knowledge in the sense of correct judgment, as our judgments about what we are aware of could be mistaken.

\(^{14}\) ‘Considering’, or ‘thinking things through’, is depicted as an activity of cognitive ‘seeking’, analogous to trying to spy out or catch sight of something. Unlike the awareness mentioned in A3, considering can fail to obtain what is sought.

\(^{15}\) Knowing in A5 refers to using the capacity to know (introduced in A3) to acquire the ability to correctly describe something. ‘The knowing’ of A3 is analogous to the
A6

Canon: Knowledge is understanding/clarity.
Explanation: (Knowledge.) Knowledge is, by means of the knowing, discoursing on things such that one’s knowing them is obvious. Like clear sight.¹⁷

A7

Canon: Benevolence is care for units/parts.¹⁹
Explanation: (Benevolence.) As to caring about oneself, it’s not for the sake of using oneself. Not like caring about a horse.²⁰

A8

Canon: Righteousness is benefit.

capacity of eyesight; knowing in A5 is analogous to correctly seeing the features of something.

¹⁶ Emending two instances of �� to �� (graphic error, emended on grounds of coherence with the canon and with the topic of A3–A5). �� is also attested in A75 and B44.

¹⁷ Possessing knowledge or wisdom is being able to use one’s capacity for knowing (A3) to discourse on things—specifically, to sort them into kinds—in such a way that one obviously knows them in the sense explained in A5. To complete the extended analogy with vision, whereas knowing in A5 is like seeing one thing or another, knowledge in A6 is like having keen vision and thus seeing many things clearly.

¹⁸ Omitting the final three graphs, 著若明, on grounds of dittography from A6.

¹⁹ Canons A7–A14 form a series on ethical topics.

²⁰ Benevolence is not merely caring for humanity as a whole, but caring for units/parts of humanity—that is, each individual. The type of care required for benevolence is analogous to our care for ourselves. It is caring for others for their own sake, not as means to our ends, as we might care about a horse we use for work or transportation.
Explanation: (Righteousness.) In intent, one takes all the world as one’s portion, while in ability, one is able to benefit them. These are not necessarily used.\(^{21}\)

A9

經：禮，敬也。
經說：禮。貴者公，賤者名，而俱有敬僈焉。等異，論也。

Canon: Ceremonial propriety is respect.

Explanation: (Ceremonial propriety.) The noble being called ‘Sir’, the common being called by their names, in both cases there are respect and rudeness. For various ranks to be treated differently is sorting/ranking.\(^{22}\)

A10

經：行，為也。
經說：行。所為不善名，行也。所為善名，巧也。若為盜。

Canon: Conduct is acting/doing.

Explanation: (Conduct.) What one does, without applying a fine name, is conduct. What one does, applying a fine name, is deviousness. Like being a robber.\(^{23}\)

\(^{21}\) What is righteous is what benefits all the world. The righteous person intends to take all the world as the ‘portion’ or ‘share’ that he or she seeks to benefit, while being able to carry through on this intent. However, a person can qualify as righteous even if circumstances do not place the person in a position to follow through in actually benefiting all the world.

\(^{22}\) Various social ranks are treated differently, according to the appropriate way of sorting or grading them into kinds. With respect to each rank, there are more and less respectful ways of treating people.

\(^{23}\) The explanation is obscure, and the translation is tentative. A passage in ‘Heaven’s Intent’ (§28.3) uses the phrase ‘fine name’ in the context of applying terms of approbation to morally worthy conduct. The explanation might be implying that ‘conduct’ (xíng 行) refers to action as described without applying terms of praise, whereas reporting one’s action in laudatory terms is devious. The point of the closing analogy is unclear; perhaps it alludes to misrepresenting robbery by giving it a fine name, as when a warlike ruler who conquers another state claims to be righteously bringing good order to the world.
A11
經：實，榮也。
經說：實。其志氣之見也，使人知己。不若金聲玉服。
Canon: Sincerity is honour/display.
Explanation: (Sincerity.) The display of one’s intent and breath (qi) makes others know one. Not like metal tinkling or jade-embellished garments.

A12
經：忠，以為利而強低也。
經說：……
Canon: Loyalty is, taking something to be beneficial, strongly…
Explanation: [Omitted.]

A13
經：孝，利親也。
經說：孝。以親為芬而能能利親。不必得。
Canon: Filial devotion is benefiting parents.
Explanation: (Filial devotion.) Taking one’s parents as one’s portion, in ability, one is able to benefit one’s parents. One does not necessarily succeed.

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24 Emending 使人知己 to 使人知己 (graphic error).
25 The graph rendered ‘sincerity’, shí 真 (‘full, solid’), may originally have read chéng 種, ‘integrity’. The canon can be interpreted as stating that sincerity is honour, or, in line with the explanation, that it is the display of one’s genuine attitudes. According to the explanation, sincerity involves an expression or display of intent and qi (breath, spirit) that enables others to know one. This manifestation of inward attitudes is unlike the tinkling of metal ornaments or look of jade jewelry, which may be only a hollow, outward show.
26 The correct reading or interpretation of the next graph, 低, is obscure.
27 The filial take their parents as the ‘portion’ or ‘share’ that they seek to benefit, while indeed being able to benefit them. However, people can be filially devoted even if circumstances prevent them from successfully benefiting their parents.
A14
經：信，言合於意也。
經說：……
Canon: Trustworthiness is statements matching with thought/inten-
tion.
Explanation: [Omitted.]

A15–A18 [Omitted.]

A19
經：任，士損己而益所為也。
經說：任。為身之所惡以成人之所急。
Canon: Bearing responsibility is an officer acting to his own loss but to
the gain of those for whom he works.
Explanation: (Bearing responsibility.) He does what he himself detests
in order to bring about what others urgently need.

A20
經：勇，志之所以敢也。
經說：勇。以其敢於是也命之，不以其不敢於彼也害之。
Canon: Courage is that by which the intent dares.
Explanation: (Courage.) On the basis of their daring to do this, one
commands them; one does not, on the basis of their not daring to do
that, harm them.

A21
經：力，刑之所以奮也。
經說：力。重之謂。下與重，奮也。
Canon: Strength is that by which the body/form exerts itself.

28 The textual problems associated with these four canons on virtues such as shame,
conscientiousness, honesty, and self-discipline are too thorny to attempt a translation
here. Canons A19 and A20, on responsibility and courage, may be part of the same
series.
29 Emending 舊 to 奮 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
Explanation: (Strength.) It refers to weight. Lifting weight from below is exertion.\(^3\)

**A22**

經：生，刑與知處也。
經說：……
Canon: Life is body/form located together with the knowing.\(^3\)
Explanation: [Omitted.]\(^3\)

**A23**

經：臥，知無知也。
經說：（闕。）
Canon: Sleep is the knowing having no knowing.\(^3\)
Explanation: (None.)

**A24**

經：夢，臥而以為然也。
經說：（闕。）
Canon: Dreaming is sleeping and taking things to be so.\(^3\)
Explanation: (None.)

**A25**

經：平，知無欲惡也。
經說：……
Canon: Calm is the knowing not desiring or detesting anything.

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\(^3\) Canons A21 to A25 form a series on physiological and psychological concepts.

\(^3\) Reading 與 as 舉.

\(^3\) ‘The knowing’ is the capacity introduced in A3. Life is explained as the joint presence of a physical form and the capacity for knowing. This account either overlooks plant life or attributes knowing to it.

\(^3\) Many of the explanations from A22 to A39 are damaged or missing.

\(^3\) When one is asleep, the capacity for knowing or awareness (canon A3) does not know or is not aware of anything—it does not connect with or contact anything (A5).

\(^3\) The dreamer takes things to be thus and so, although in fact they may not be so.
Explanation: [Omitted.]

A26
經：利，所得而喜也。
經說：利，得是而喜，則是利也。其害也非是也。
Canon: Benefit is what one is pleased to get.
Explanation: (Benefit.) If one is pleased to get this, then this is benefit. The harm is not this.

A27
經：害，所得而惡也。
經說：害，得是而惡，則是害也。其利也非是也。
Canon: Harm is what one detests getting.
Explanation: (Harm.) If one detests getting this, then this is harm. The benefit is not this.

A28
經：治，求得也。
經說：治，事治矣，人有治南北。
Canon: Order/control/governance is getting what is sought.
Explanation: (Order.) Our affairs having been put in order, others also put in order north and south.\(^{36}\)

A29
經：譽，明美也。
經說：……
Canon: To praise is to clarify the beautiful/admirable.
Explanation: [Omitted.]

A30
經：誅，明惡也。

\(^{36}\) The text here may be damaged or incomplete, and the point is obscure.
Canon: To condemn is to clarify the ugly/detestable.
Explanation: [Omitted.]

A31
經：舉，擬實也。
經說：舉。告以之名舉彼實也。故……若石者也[?].……以若名者也[?].
Canon: To mention/cite/bring up is to emulate objects.
Explanation: (Mention/cite/bring up.) To inform is to use this name to mention that object. So...for what is similar to stone [...] ...use a similar name [?].

A32
經：言，出舉也。
經說：言。言也者，諸口能之出貌者也。貌若畫虎也，言也。謂言，猶石，致也。

37 Following ūn in reading 舉 as 舉.
38 Emending 以文名 to 以之名 on grounds of systematic corruption of 之 to 文.
39 The explanation to A31 is corrupt, and it is unclear where it ends and the explanation to A32 begins. There appears to be a lacuna in the text, very likely following the graph 故 ('so'). Two fragments of what may be the damaged explanation appear to have been copied into the explanations to A33 (若石者也) and A34 (以若名者也). The translation tentatively moves them to A31. Possibly these two fragments originally belonged together, as the only graph separating them is the heading to the missing explanation for A34.
40 In early texts, the verb nǐ 擬 followed by a direct object typically refers to emulating or imitating that object. According to A31, then, in using a name to mention something, we are emulating or modeling that thing by means of the name, which functions as a model for the thing referred to. In the case of names of kinds, which apply to things because of their similarity to other things of that kind, using the name as a model informs listeners that the thing is similar to other things of that kind.
41 ‘Objects’ (shí 實, ‘reality’, ‘stuff’) is the standard term in early Chinese logical and semantic theories for the things that names refer to. Shi can refer to persons and animals, inanimate objects, kinds, facts, or situations. It can be used as a countable or uncountable noun. The underlying or core connotation associated with shi is that of being solid or full; it can be helpful to think of shi as ‘stuff’.
Canon: To state is to utter mentions.  
Explanation: (To state.) Stating is the uttering of features of which all speakers are capable. Describing features is like drawing a tiger, but it is a statement. Saying statements—like ‘stone’—is communicating.

A33
經：且，言且然也。  
經說：且。自前曰且，自後曰已。方然亦且。
Canon: About to/will states what is about to be so.  
Explanation: (About to/will.) From beforehand, we say ‘about to’. From afterwards, we say ‘already’. Just as it is so is also ‘about to’.

A34
經：君，臣萌通約也。  
經說：（關。）
Canon: The ruler is the connecting pact between ministers and the people.  
Explanation: (None.)

A35
經：功，利民也。  
經說：功。不待時。若衣裘。  
Canon: Achievement/merit is benefiting the people.

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42 Inserting the missing heading 言，presumably lost in the lacuna between explanations A31 and A32 or accidentally deleted because it duplicates the first word of the explanation.
43 Following Graham, emending two instances of 民 to 兒, interpreted as a variant of 貌, on grounds of scribal misreading of an unfamiliar graph. This emendation is partly conjectural but seems the best explanation of three incongruous uses of 民 here, in A47, and in A71. 兒 is preserved as a variant of 貌 in explanation A48 and in the ‘Greater Selection’ in the Wú manuscript edition of the Mòzǐ.
44 To speak or to state something is to use a series of words to mention objects, as explained in A31. It is thus to ‘utter mentions’.
45 Transposing 且言 to 言且.
46 Following Šun in reading 萌 as 民. A34–38 form a series on political concepts.
47 Omitting the duplicated sentence.
Explanation: (Achievement/merit.) It does not depend on the timing. Like clothing.\textsuperscript{48}

**A36**

經：賞，上報下之功也。

經說：賞。上報下之功也。\textsuperscript{49}

Canon: Reward is superiors repaying subordinates’ achievement/merit.

Explanation: (Reward.) Superiors repaying subordinates’ achievement/merit.\textsuperscript{50}

**A37**

經：罪，犯禁也。

經說：罪。不在禁，惟害無罪。\textsuperscript{51}

Canon: Crime is violating prohibitions.

Explanation: (Crime.) If not included in a prohibition, even if it is harmful, there is no crime.

**A38**

經：罰，上報下之罪也。

經說：罰。上報下之罪也。

Canon: Punishment is superiors repaying subordinates' crimes.

Explanation: (Punishment.) Superiors repaying subordinates’ crimes.\textsuperscript{52}

**A39**

經：同，異而俱於之一也。

\textsuperscript{48} The explanation is obscure and may be incomplete.
\textsuperscript{49} Moving the explanation here from the end of A37, where it does not cohere with the surrounding text.
\textsuperscript{50} The explanation may be damaged, as it merely repeats the canon.
\textsuperscript{51} Omitting the final two graphs, 殆姑, possibly a fragment of the damaged explanation of A36.
\textsuperscript{52} The explanation merely repeats the canon.
The Canon: The same is being different yet both being one in relation to something.\textsuperscript{53}

Explanation: (Same.) They are two people yet both see this pillar. Like serving a ruler.\textsuperscript{54}

A40

經：久，彌異時也。  
經說：久。今古含旦莫。\textsuperscript{55}

Canon: Duration is pervading different times.

Explanation: (Duration.) Present and past contain morning and evening.

A41

經：宇，\textsuperscript{56} 彌異所也。  
經說：宇。東西蒙南北。\textsuperscript{57}

Canon: Space is pervading different places.

Explanation: (Space.) East and west cover south and north.

A42

經：窮，或有前不容尺也。  
經說：窮。或不容尺，有窮。莫不容尺，無窮也。\textsuperscript{58}

Canon: A limit is there being somewhere where, going forward, there is no room for a measured foot.

\textsuperscript{53} A39–A51 form a series devoted to logical and metaphysical concepts.

\textsuperscript{54} Two different people can be the same in seeing the same pillar or serving the same ruler.

\textsuperscript{55} Transposing 今久 to 久今 (restoring the heading), emending 今 to 含 and 旦 to 旦 (graphic error), and reading 莫 as 暮.

\textsuperscript{56} Emending 守 to 字 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).

\textsuperscript{57} Emending 家 to 蒙 (graphic error).

\textsuperscript{58} Marking off standard units of length with a ruler, we come to a place with insufficient space to mark off another length.
Explanation: (Limit.) If somewhere there is no room for a measured foot, there is a limit. If everywhere there is room for a measured foot, there is no limit.

A43
經：盡，莫不然也。
經說：盡。俱止動。59
Canon: All/completely/covering is none are not so.
Explanation: (All/completely/covering.) All stop moving.

A44
經：始，當時也。
經說：始。時，或有久，或無久。始當無久。
Canon: Starting is coinciding with the time.
Explanation: (Starting.) As to time, some has duration, some is durationless. Starting coincides with the durationless.60

A45
經：化，徵易也。
經說：化。若竃為鶉。
Canon: Transformation is the characteristics being exchanged.
Explanation: (Transformation.) Like a frog becoming a quail.

A46
經：損，偏去也。
經說：損。偏也者，兼之體也。61 其體或去或存，62 謂其存者損。
Canon: Loss/decrease is part being removed.

59 Emending 但 to 俱 (systematic corruption) and retaining 動 in A43 rather than transposing it with the heading of A44.
60 The ‘durationless’ is an instant. References to time may be to parts of it that have duration or that are instantaneous. ‘Starting’ refers to the instant at which some period of time begins.
61 Emending 禮 to 體 (graphic error, corrected from the next sentence).
62 Inserting a second 或 for parallelism.
Explanation: (Loss/decrease.) Part is a unit/part of a whole. Some of its units/parts being removed and some remaining, we say the remaining ones have suffered a loss/decrease.

Canon A47

經：僞穀秈……
經說：僞。晦貌也。

Canon: To circle around...

Explanation: (To circle.) Its features form a curve.

Canon A48

經：塵，易也。
經說：塵。區穴……貌常。

Canon: To rotate is to change [direction?].

Explanation: (To rotate.) A demarcated hollow…the features are constant [?].

Canon A49

經：動，或徙也。
經說：……

Canon: Movement is some part moving.

Explanation: [Omitted.]

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63 Canon A47 can be divided into two parts, A and B. Part A consists of two apparently misplaced graphs, 大益, with no context and no obvious connection to the text preceding or following them. They are omitted here.

64 The text may be faulty here, as the final 也 is missing.

65 Following Graham in emending 民 to 貌, as explained in the note to A32 and by comparison with the explanation of A48, and in reading 昧 as gōu 句, ‘curve’. Given the textual problems, the translation is tentative.

66 The translation is tentative, as meaning of the binome 稈秈 is obscure.

67 Emending 廞 here and in the explanation to 廞 (graphic error), attested as a variant of 稈.

68 The translation is highly tentative and omits an obscure phrase, possibly a parenthetical gloss, from the middle of the explanation. The text might refer to the rotation of a circular object.

69 Emending 從 to 徒 (graphic error).
Canon: Staying/stopping/settling is with duration.
Explanation: (Staying/stopping/settling.) Durationless non-staying, something fits ‘ox’ and ‘non-horse’. Like a man passing a pillar. Non-staying with duration, something fits ‘horse’ and ‘non-horse’. Like a man passing over a bridge.

Canon: Surely/definitely/must is unending.
Explanation: (Surely/definitely/must.) …Like younger brother and elder brother, one being so and one being not so—these are what is

70 Alternatively, ‘durationless non-staying is when something fits “oxen are not horses”…Non-staying with duration is when something fits “horses are not horses”.’

71 All ‘staying’ or ‘being fixed’ in something has duration. There are two types of ‘non-staying’: non-staying that is durationless, or instantaneous, and non-staying that persists for some duration. Non-staying that is instantaneous is illustrated by the relation between oxen and ‘non-horse’, which like the term ‘ox’ can ‘stay’ or be ‘fixed’ in oxen. Since staying requires duration, if we consider only a durationless instant, the term ‘non-horse’ does not stay in oxen. However, for any duration beyond an instant, ‘non-horse’ does stay in oxen, since oxen are not horses. Non-staying with duration is illustrated by the relation between horses and ‘non-horse’. ‘Non-horse’ never stays in horses, since they are not non-horses and ‘horses are non-horses’ is a contradiction. To help explain the idea of a durationless instant, the text gives the example of a person (or, according to some interpreters, an arrow) passing a pillar—an event of very short duration, although not actually instantaneous. This event contrasts with walking over a bridge, which has a longer duration.
surely the case and what is not surely the case. This or not is surely the case.\textsuperscript{72}

\textbf{A52}

經：平，同高也。
經說：（闕。）
Canon: Level/flat is the same height.\textsuperscript{73}
Explanation: (None.)

\textbf{A53}

經：同長，以斧相盡也。\textsuperscript{74}
經說：同。楗與狂之同長也正。\textsuperscript{75}
Canon: The same length is, when aligned straight, covering each other.
Explanation: (Same.) The same lengths of the door-bar and door-frame are straight.

\textbf{A54}

經：中，同長也。
經說：中。是自往，相若也。
Canon: Centre is the same length.\textsuperscript{76}
Explanation: (Centre.) Setting out from this, [the distance] is equal.

\textsuperscript{72} The first sentence of the explanation is too obscure to justify translation. The example of younger or elder brother illustrates the notion of being ‘surely the case’ in that for any pair of brothers, one must be elder, one younger. One thing being so, the other not so illustrates being ‘not surely the case’. Of two horses, for example, it is not necessarily the case that one is black and the other not black. Both might be black or neither. The example of ‘this or not’ being surely the case alludes to a version of the law of excluded middle. For any kind of thing, such as horses, it is surely the case that any one animal is either ‘this’ (a horse) or not.

\textsuperscript{73} Canons A52–A69 form a series on geometry.

\textsuperscript{74} Reading 斧 as 正 (graphic variant).

\textsuperscript{75} Emending 捷 to 棟 (graphic error), reading 狂 as 框 (graphic variant), and emending 心 to 正 (systematic corruption).

\textsuperscript{76} The point seems to be that the centre is the location from which the length in two or more directions is the same.
A55

經：厚，有所大也。
經說：厚。惟無厚無所大。\(^{77}\)

Canon: Thickness/dimension is having size.
Explanation: (Thickness/dimension.) Only the dimensionless has no size.\(^{78}\)

A56

經：日中，申南也。\(^{79}\)
經說：（闕。）

Canon: The sun at the centre (noon) is directly south.
Explanation: (None.)

A57

經：直，參也。
經說：（闕。）

Canon: Straight is in alignment.
Explanation: (None.)

A58

經：圃，一中同長也。
經說：圃。規寫支也。

Canon: Circular is from one centre, the same lengths.
Explanation: (Circular.) The compass draws…\(^{80}\)

A59

經：方，柱隅四讎也。
經說：方。矩見支也。

\(^{77}\) Tentatively inserting 厚 without grounds of haplography. Without the emendation, the text reads ‘just having no size’, which seems nonsensical.

\(^{78}\) The ‘dimensionless’ refers to a geometric point.

\(^{79}\) Reading 申 as 申 (graphic variant).

\(^{80}\) The meaning of the next graph, 支, is obscure.
The Canons and Explanations

Canon: Square is four sides and angles balancing [?].
Explanation: (Square.) The set square shows...

A60
経：倍，為二也。
經說：倍。二，尺與尺倂去一。Canon: Doubling is making two.
Explanation: (Doubling.) Two is measured foot and measured foot both departing from one.

A61
經：端，體之無厚而最前者也。
經說：端。是無同也。
Canon: A tip is what, of a unit/part, is without thickness/dimension and is furthest front.
Explanation: (Tip.) This is not the same as anything.

A62
經：有間，不及中也。
經說：有間。謂夾之者也。
Canon: Having an interval/gap is not reaching the centre.
Explanation: (Having an interval/gap.) It refers to it being flanked.

A63
經：間，不及旁也。

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81 The translation is tentative, as the meaning of 譯 is obscure.
82 The meaning of the next graph, 歯, is obscure.
83 Emending 但 to 俱 (systematic corruption).
84 The two foot lengths both depart from one central point, in opposite directions without overlapping, so the total length is two feet.
85 Emending 無序 to 無厚 (graphic error).
86 The tip does not overlap anything, so it is not the same as anything (?). The explanation is obscure and may be damaged.
87 Inserting 不及 (parallelism with A63).
88 Emending 間 to 間 (graphic error).
The Canons and Explanations

Canon: An interval is not reaching the sides.
Explanation: (Interval.) It refers to the flanked….

A64

經：間。間者也。
經說：間。虛也者，兩木之間，謂其無木者也。
Canon: A lintel [?] is the interval being empty.
Explanation: (Lintel.) [?] As to empty, of the interval between two pieces of wood, it refers to where there is no wood.

A65

經：盈，莫不有也。
經說：盈。無盈無厚。於尺無所往而不得二。
Canon: To fill/filled is nowhere not present.
Explanation: (To fill/filled.) What does not fill is dimensionless. Along a measured foot, there is nowhere you can go and not find two.

A66

經：堅白，不相外也。
經說：堅。異處不相盈。相非是相外也。
Canon: Hard-white is not excluding each other.

---

89 Emending 間 to 間 (graphic error).
90 The remainder of the explanation is obscure.
91 The meaning of the graph 間 is obscure and the translation is speculative. Possibly the graph refers to a header or lintel running across the top of two columns and thus corresponding to the gap between them.
92 Omitting one instance of 得 (dittography).
93 If a measured foot is filled by something, then anywhere along it we find ‘two’, the measured length and the object or stuff filling it.
94 ‘Hard-white’ or ‘as hard is to white’ appears to have been a technical term for features that can be compresent or mutually pervasive, as color and shape or color and texture are. A stone can be both hard and white in the same location at the same time.
Explanation: (Hard.) Different locations do not fill each other. Not each other, this is excluding each other.\(^95\)

A67

經：攝，相得也。
經說：攝。尺與尺俱不盡，端與端俱盡，\(^96\) 尺與端或盡或不盡。\(^97\) 堅白之攝相盡，體攝不相盡。\(^98\)

Canon: Touching/coinciding is obtaining each other.
Explanation: (Touching/coinciding.) Of a measured foot and a measured foot, neither fully covers the other. Of a tip and a tip, both fully cover each other. Of a measured foot and a tip, one is fully covered and one is not fully covered. Hard and white in coinciding fully cover each other. Units/parts in coinciding do not fully cover each other.\(^99\)

A68

經：仳，\(^100\) 有以相攝，有不相攝也。
經說：仳。兩有端而後可。

Canon: Side by side/measured against each other is having part that coincides with each other and part that does not coincide with each other.
Explanation: (Side by side.) It is possible only if the two have [the same?] tip.\(^101\)

Hard and white are thus not mutually exclusive. By contrast, a stone cannot be both hard and soft or both black and white in the same place at the same time.
\(^95\) If two things are not one another—as white and black are not one another—then they exclude one another. Something’s being white excludes its being black.
\(^96\) Emending 端無端但盡 to 端與端俱盡 on grounds of graphic error and systematic corruption.
\(^97\) Inserting 端 in 尺與端 (parallelism with preceding sentences).
\(^98\) Omitting a final 端 from the end of the sentence (dittoography).
\(^99\) Two sequential measured foot lengths touch at their tips and so coincide at only one point, not their entire length. A tip is a dimensionless point, so two tips can fully coincide. A tip that touches a measured foot does so only at the tip of the foot, so the tip is fully covered but the foot is not. Features such as texture and color can fully coincide, as when every part of a stone is both hard and white, but units/parts cannot, just as the tip of a measured foot does not cover the whole foot.
\(^100\) Emending 似 to 仳 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).
A69

The translation is tentative. Normally, 佻 would refer to laying things side by side to compare them, as the different pipes of a panpipe are arranged side by side. Here, however, the term seems to refer specifically to measuring against each other two different, overlapping lengths lying along the same line, starting from the same point. Part of the longer length coincides with the shorter one and part extends beyond it. This relation between two lengths contrasts with that described in A69.

102 Emending 擬 to 擵 on grounds of dittography.

103 Emending 無厚而厚 to 無厚而后 (parallelism with A68).

104 By contrast with the overlapping lengths of A68, this canon describes two adjacent lengths along the same line. The endpoint of the first is the starting point of the second, so the adjacent lengths do not coincide but meet at only one point. As the explanation states, this relation is possible only because the endpoint and starting point are dimensionless.

105 Alternatively, a model is what something is like and thereby is so. To determine whether something is httpClient, we compare it to a model (httpClient) for httpClient to see whether they are similar. If they are, the thing is 'so', namely httpClient. To determine whether something is circular, for example, we compare it to a circular object, check it with a compass, or gauge it against the thought or intention associated with a circle (such as the thought that a circle is nowhere straight—A98—or is a line everywhere equidistant from a centrepoint—A58). See too A71. Canons A70–A74 form a series presenting major concepts in dialectics or argumentation, including models, similarity, explanation, distinctions, and disputation or distinction-drawing.

106 Reading 員 as 圓.
A71
经：亻，所然也。
经说：亻，然也者，貌若法也。⑩7
Canon: The match/duplicate is wherein it’s so.⑩8
Explanation: (Match/duplicate.) Being so is the features being like the model.

A72
经：説，所以明也。
经说：（闕。）
Canon: Explanations are that by which one clarifies/understands.⑩9
Explanation: (None.)

A73
经：彼，不可兩不可也。⑩10
经说：彼。凡牛棬非牛，兩也。無以，非也。
Canon: As to that/other, it’s impermissible for both to be impermissible.⑩11

⑩7 Following Graham in emending 民若法 to 兒若法, taking 兒 to be a variant of貌. See A32 and A47. See too §44.22.
⑩8 Alternatively, it is the aspect or feature of something that is so. Since the surrounding canons treat technical terms relevant to disputation, we would expect A71 to do so as well. Instead, its first graph is 亻 ('duplicate', 'second'), a word that has already appeared in A15, where it may be a variant for 耳 ('shame'), and is never used again in the dialectical texts. Thus 亻 may be an error or an obscure variant for another graph more pertinent to argumentation. Unfortunately, if this is indeed the case, there is little or no evidence for any hypothesis about the identity of the original graph. Graham conjectures it was 因 (criterion, basis), written with a ‘person’ radical ⺒, a proposal that coheres well with the use of 因 in contexts such as canon A97. However, the conjectured graph occurs nowhere else in the canons—not even in A97—and so the case for this emendation is weak. Moreover, known archaic graphs for 耳 do not closely resemble those for 因. Another possibility is that the graph could have been 件 or 伍, graphs that in A98, B58, and B76 are associated with the notion of things matching up or aligning with each other as counterparts.
⑩9 In Mohist logic, ‘explanations’ (shuō 説) are the analogue of what we would call an argument, a justification, or a piece of reasoning. See §45.1b.
⑩10 Emending 攸 to 彼 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).
Explanation: (That/other.) In all cases, demarcating oxen from non-oxen makes two.\textsuperscript{112} If something lacks the basis, it is not it.\textsuperscript{113}

A74
經：辯，爭彼也。\textsuperscript{114} 辯勝，當也。
經說：辯。或謂之牛，或謂之非牛，是爭彼也。是不俱當。不俱當，必或不當。不若當犬。

Canon: Disputation/argument/distinction-drawing is contending over that/other. Winning in disputation is fitting.

Explanation: (Disputation/argument/distinction-drawing.) One calls it ‘ox’, one calls it ‘non-ox’; this is contending over that/other. These do not both fit. Not both fitting, surely one does not fit. Not like fitting ‘hound’.\textsuperscript{115}

A75
經：為，窮知而偽於欲也。

\textsuperscript{111} For any two terms that stand in the relation of ‘this’ versus ‘that/other’, such as ‘oxen’ and ‘non-oxen’, it cannot be the case that when asserted of something, both are impermissible (or, equivalently, that neither is permissible). ‘Permissible’ refers to it being possible to correctly assert a term of something without violating logical and semantic norms.

\textsuperscript{112} Reading 樞 as 區.

\textsuperscript{113} The ‘basis’ (yǐ 以) refers to the features by which we distinguish what is some kind of thing from what is not, such as the features that distinguish oxen from non-oxen. This is the same word that in A86 is translated ‘that by which’ things are the same.

\textsuperscript{114} Emending 攸 to 彼 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).

\textsuperscript{115} ‘Disputation’ is biàn 辯, the early Chinese term for dialectical discussion, debate, or argumentation, which is seen as centring on the activity of drawing distinctions. Disputation is understood as contending over which of two contradictory terms applies to something—whether the thing is ‘this’ or ‘that/other’. A disputation is won by the side who asserts a term that ‘fits’ the thing under consideration. The explanation gives an example of disputing whether some animal is an ox or not. Implicitly applying the law of non-contradiction, the explanation states that the terms ‘ox’ and ‘non-ox’ cannot ‘both fit’ the animal. Applying a version of the law of excluded middle, it then points out that exactly one of the terms ‘ox’ and ‘non-ox’ must fit. This case is unlike that of the terms ‘dog’ and ‘hound’, both of which can fit the same animal. See too B35.
Canon: To act for the sake of/to take as an end is to weigh one’s desires, having reached the limit of one’s knowledge.

Explanation: (Act for the sake of/have as an end.) Desiring to cut off one’s finger, if one’s knowledge does not know the harm, this is one’s knowledge being at fault. If, one’s knowledge considering it and overlooking none of the harm in it, one still desires to cut it off, then one removes it. This is like eating dried meat. The benefit or harm of the flavor being unknown, if one desires it and tastes the flavor, this is not taking what one is unsure about as a basis for stopping what one desires.

The benefit or harm of what is beyond the wall being unknowable in advance, supposing that by going there one gets money, then if one does not go there, this is taking what one is unsure about as a basis for stopping what one desires.

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116 Emending 慎文 to 慎之 (systematic corruption).
117 Emending 力 to 刀 (graphic error).
118 Emending 食蒲 to 食膩 (parallelism with preceding sentences).
119 Emending 所為與不所為 to 所為與所不為 (coherence with preceding sentences).
120 What one takes as ends or acts for the sake of is determined not only by one’s knowledge but by what one desires. One might act for the sake of cutting off one’s finger even if fully informed about the harm involved.
121 The dried meat has a distinctive flavor that we are unsure we will like. Having reached the limit of our knowledge about the flavor, we still desire to try it, and we proceed to act toward that end. This is a case in which the limits of our knowledge, and the ensuing uncertainty, do not change our ends—our desire to try the meat. We are similarly unsure about whether a trip beyond the wall will be profitable, as we might encounter robbers or other hazards. If we decide not to go, this is a case in which the limits of our knowledge about the benefits and harms leads us to ‘stop’ our original desire for money.
Observing the pattern of ‘acting for the sake of something is weighing one’s desires, having reached the limit of one’s knowledge’, eating the dried meat is not knowledge, and cutting off one’s finger is not ignorance. When what one acts for the sake of and what one does not act for the sake of render each other unsure, this is failing to plan.

**A76**
経：已。成，亡。
經說：已。為衣，成也。治病，亡也。
Canon: To end/finish. To complete, to eliminate.\(^{122}\)
Explanation: (End/finish.) Of making a coat, to complete. Of curing an illness, to eliminate.

**A77**
経：使。謂，故。
經說：使。令，謂也。\(^{123}\) 必不成。濕，故也。必待所為之成也。
Canon: To employ/cause. To say. The cause.\(^{124}\)
Explanation: (Employ/cause.) To order is to say. It is not necessarily completed/brought about.\(^{125}\) Dampness is a cause. It depends on the completion of what it brings about.\(^{126}\)

**A78**
経：名。達，類，私。
經說：名。物，達也。有實，必待之名也。\(^{127}\) 命之馬，類也。若實也者，必以是名也。命之臧，私也。是名也止於是實也。聲出口，俱有名，若姓字。\(^{128}\)

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\(^{122}\) Canons A76–A87 list different types or aspects of various things or words. Here we have two respects in which things may end or finish.

\(^{123}\) Omitting a duplicated 謂 (dittoigraphy).

\(^{124}\) One can employ people or cause them to act by telling them to do something. A physical cause can also cause something to happen.

\(^{125}\) An order is not necessarily carried out successfully.

\(^{126}\) Whatever is caused, such as an illness, must come about before the cause, such as dampness, can be identified as such.

\(^{127}\) Emending 必待文多 to 必待之名 (systematic corruption, graphic error).
Canon: Names. All-reaching, kind, personal.\textsuperscript{129}

Explanation: Names. ‘Thing’ is an all-reaching name. Any object must take this name. Naming it ‘horse’ is a kind name. For what is similar to the object, one must use this name. Naming him ‘John’ is a personal name. This name stops in this object.\textsuperscript{130} When sounds are uttered by speakers, they all consist of names.\textsuperscript{131} Like surname and style-name.

A79

經：謂。移，舉，加。

經説：謂。\textsuperscript{112} 灑狗犬，命也。狗，犬，舉也。叱狗，加也。

Canon: Saying/asserting. Transferring, mentioning, applying.\textsuperscript{133}

Explanation: (Saying/asserting.) Linking ‘dog’ and ‘hound’ is naming.\textsuperscript{134} ‘Dog’, ‘hound’ is mentioning. Scolding a dog is applying.\textsuperscript{135}

A80

經：知。聽，説，親。名，實，合，為。

經説：知。傳受之，聞也。方不靡，説也。身觀焉，親也。所謂，實也。名實耦，合也。志行，為也。

\textsuperscript{128} Emending 宇 to 字 (graphic error).

\textsuperscript{129} Three types of names. Canons A78–A79 treat the use of names or words. See too A31–32.

\textsuperscript{130} There may be an implied contrast between personal names, which ‘stop’ in one thing, and kind names, which ‘proceed’ to all things of the kind. See B72.

\textsuperscript{131} That is, speech consists of names.

\textsuperscript{132} Transposing 聰 and 灑 (restoring the heading).

\textsuperscript{133} Three types or aspects of speech.

\textsuperscript{134} Reading 灑 as 瑣. It is unclear why the explanation refers to ‘naming’ while the canon refers to ‘transferring’. Possibly this is a scribal error, the more common word 命 being substituted for the uncommon technical term 移. Possibly in this context the two terms are synonymous.

\textsuperscript{135} ‘Naming’ or ‘transferring’ is linking two words together, as when we say ‘Dogs are hounds’. Mentioning or ‘bringing up’ is using a name such as ‘dog’ or ‘hound’ to talk about something. (See A31–32.) ‘Applying’ is using a term of approval or disapproval of something, as when we scold a dog by calling him ‘bad’. In the Triads, ‘applying’ is used to refer to applying terms of praise to the sage-kings and condemnation to the tyrants.

\textsuperscript{136} Emending 閱 to 閱 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).
Canon: Knowing. By hearsay, by explanation, personal.\textsuperscript{137} Names, objects, matching, acting.\textsuperscript{138} Explanation: (Knowing.) Receiving it when passed on is ‘by hearsay’. Distance does not obstruct is ‘by explanation’.\textsuperscript{139} Observing it oneself is ‘personal’. That by which we say/assert is names. What we say/assert about is objects. Names and objects mating is matching.\textsuperscript{140} Proceeding with intent is acting.

A81
經：聞，傳，親。\textsuperscript{141}
經說：聞，或告之，傳也。身觀焉，親也。
Canon: Hearing. Passed along, in person.\textsuperscript{142}
Explanation: (Hearing.) Someone informs one of it is ‘passed on’. Observing it oneself is ‘personal’.

A82
經：見，體，盡。\textsuperscript{143}
經說：見，特者，體也。二者，盡也。
Canon: Seeing. Units/parts, all.\textsuperscript{144}
Explanation: (Seeing.) Only one is a unit/part. Two are all.

\textsuperscript{137} These are three sources of knowledge. On the latter two, see B70.
\textsuperscript{138} These are four objects or kinds of knowledge. One may know names, objects, how to match the two, and how to act. On knowledge, see too A3–A6.
\textsuperscript{139} Reading 阻 as a variant of 障. The example is obscure. The point may be that distance is no obstacle to obtaining knowledge by explanation. According to B70, an example of such knowledge is knowing the color of an unseen object in another room when told it is the same color as an object one can see. Location would be irrelevant to such knowledge.
\textsuperscript{140} That is, names are correctly matched with their standard referents.
\textsuperscript{141} Emending 傳 to 傳 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation and A80).
\textsuperscript{142} Hearing something or hearing about it may be either first-hand or second-hand.
\textsuperscript{143} Tentatively emending 時 to 特 (graphic error?). The emendation and translation are highly tentative.
\textsuperscript{144} Seeing something may be seeing part (as when seeing one member of a pair) or all (as when seeing both members of the pair).
A83
经：合。缶，宜，必。
经说：合。145 與立，146 反中，志工，正也。藏之为，宜也。非彼必不有，必也。圣者，用而勿必。必也者，可勿疑。仌者，147 两而勿偏。
Canon: Matching/uniting. Exact/direct, appropriate/fitting, surely/definitely.148
Explanation: (Matching/uniting.) Standing side by side, the opposite or coinciding, intent and achievement—these are exact/direct.149 What John is deemed to be—this is fitting/appropriate. Without that, it surely does not exist—this is surely/definitely. As to the sages, use them but do not treat them as definite/for sure. As to what is definite/for sure, it is permissible to not doubt. Converses, apply both without being one-sided.150

A84
经：欲。缶，權利，且。惡。缶，權害。
经说：（闕。）
Canon: Desire/want/be about to. Direct/exact,151 weighing benefits, about to. Detesting. Direct/exact, weighing harms.152
Explanation: (None.)

145 Emending 古 to 合 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
146 Emending 兵 to 與 (graphic error).
147 Tentatively emending 仌 to 仌, as suggested by Graham, on grounds of graphic error and conceptual coherence with B30 and B72.
148 Three respects in which things may match or conform.
149 Reading 仌 as 正.
150 The explanation presents several difficult textual and interpretive problems and the translation is tentative. Regarding the ‘exact’, see canon A98. Regarding the ‘appropriate’ or ‘fitting’, see A96.
151 Reading 仌 as 正.
152 The canon lists two respects in which one can desire or dislike something: either directly (as when we simply want something) or after evaluating benefits and harms (as when we do not want something but prefer it as the lesser of two harms, at least one of which is unavoidable). The third item listed for desire, ‘about to’, refers to the grammatical use of the graph 欲 in Classical Chinese to indicate future action.
The Canons and Explanations

A85

經：為。存，亡，易，蕩，治，化。

經說：……

Canon: Make/do/become/deem. Preserve, eliminate, exchange, dissolve, order/manage, transform.\(^{153}\)

Explanation: [Omitted.]

A86

經：同。重，體，合，類。

經說：同。二名一實，重同也。不外於兼，體同也。俱處於室，合同也。有以同，類同也。

Canon: Same. Identity/overlap/doubling, part, united, kind.\(^{154}\)

Explanation: (Same.) Two names for one object is the same in being identical/overlapping/doubling. Not being external to a whole is the same in being parts [of the same thing]. Both together in a room is the same in being united. Having that by which they’re the same is the same in being the same kind.

A87

經：異。二，不體，\(^{155}\) 不合，不類。

經說：異。二必異，二也。不連屬，不體也。不同所，不合也。不有同，不類也。

Canon: Different. Two, not parts, not united, not of a kind.

Explanation: (Different.) Two surely being different is being two. Not connected or belonging is not being parts. Not being in the same place is not being united. Not having something the same is being different kinds.

\(^{153}\) The canon gives six respects in which the verb \(wèi\) 為 can be used. The explanation gives examples for each of the six, but several of these raise difficult textual problems.

\(^{154}\) A86 presents four respects in which things can be considered ‘the same’, A87 four corresponding respects in which things can be different.

\(^{155}\) Inserting 不 (corrected from the explanation).
A88–A92 [Omitted.]156

A93
經：諸，不一利用。
經說：諸，超域員止也。相從相去，先知是可。五色，長短，前後，輕重。援執。
Canon: Agreement is not one/identical in benefit and use.157
Explanation: (Agreement.) When going beyond the wall, the circle stops. Of what follows from or excludes each other, knowing beforehand that something is ‘this’ is permissible/possible. The five colours, long and short, before and after, light and heavy—cite what is held.

A94
經：服執……巧轉則求其故。159

156 Canon A88 has extensive textual problems. Canons 89–92 are four sentences, all lacking corresponding explanations, which are unlike all the other canons in format. They appear to be the content of a single bamboo strip that was mistakenly incorporated into the text from a different source.

157 Canons A93 to B1, and possibly B2, appear to form a series giving practical advice about how to proceed in disputation (biàn), explained in A74 as disputing what is ‘that’ versus ‘this’, such as non-oxen versus oxen. These canons present many interpretive challenges, beginning with the details of A93. The canon and explanation are obscure and the interpretation is provisional. The point seems to be that in disputation, the two sides’ agreement may have different consequences, and thus be useful in different ways, depending on what is agreed. The explanation seems to present three types of cases. One is terms such as ‘circle’, whose application ‘stops’ in circular objects. Agreement that something is a circle settles the object’s shape. The second is terms that follow from or exclude each other. The text gives no example, but perhaps it is referring to pairs of terms such as ‘ox’ and ‘non-ox’ or ‘ox’ and ‘horse’. In the case of such pairs, agreement about which of the two is ‘this/right’ with respect to the object under consideration is enough for us to judge what is ‘this’ or ‘not’. The third is terms that are relative to context. To dispute whether something is long or short, for example, we need to know what standard of length the opponent is applying. In such cases, we can agree on a relevant standard by citing a claim the opponent holds.

158 Reading 員 as 圓.

159 Omitting three graphs. The correct reading of the first, 說, is obscure, while the two graphs 音利 that follow it appear to be a marginal pronunciation gloss accidentally incorporated into the text.
The Canons and Explanations

Canon: Submit to what is held... if there is a devious turn, then seek the reason for it.

Explanation: (Submit.) If it is difficult to establish a statement, yet one must establish it... then seek the model by which [the opponent?] holds [his assertion?].

A95

Canon: If the model is the same, then observe what is the same in it.

Explanation: (Model.) Select what is the same and observe devious turns.

A96

Canon: If the model is different, then observe what is appropriate in it.

Explanation: (Model.) Select this and choose that, ask about reasons and observe what is appropriate. On the basis of a person’s having something black or something not black, settle ‘black person’, and on

160 Omitting the graph 九, the correct reading of which is obscure.
161 Textual problems render the translation extremely tentative. A relatively clear implication is that disputers should seek to identify the grounds or model on the basis of which an opponent maintains some assertion.
162 Two disputers are arguing over whether something is correctly deemed x or non-x. One side proposes a model—an exemplar—of x (see A70). If the model is the same as the thing under discussion, observe what is the same and watch for cunning shifts in how the opponent applies the term ‘x’.
163 Reading 傳 as 轉.
164 Emending 心 to 止 (systematic corruption).
the basis of one’s caring about people or not caring about people, settle ‘caring about people’. Of these, which is appropriate?\(^{165}\)

**A97**

經：止因，以別道。  
經說：止。彼舉然者以為此其然也，則舉不然者而問之。若聖人有非而不非。  
Canon: Settle the basis in order to separate ways.\(^{167}\)

Explanation: (Settle/stop.) If the other side mentions/cites what is so as grounds for taking this one to be so, then mention/cite what is not so and ask about it. Like the sage having features that are not/wrong without not being a sage.\(^{168}\)

**A98**

經：缶無非。  
經說：正。……有說過五諾，若員無直，無說用五諾……。  
Canon: Exact is having nothing that is not it.\(^{170}\)

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\(^{165}\) If the model is not exactly the same as the thing under discussion, pick out various features of the thing and ask about the reasons for deeming something \(x\) in order to determine which features are appropriate for comparing to the model and thus judging whether the thing counts as \(x\). For example, is ‘black person’ applied on the basis of hair color or skin color? If a person cares about some people but not all, does she qualify as ‘caring about people’, according to the doctrine of inclusive care? (It is unclear why the text uses ‘black person’ as an example and whether it is referring to a person of African descent or a person whose skin is dark from the sun.)  

\(^{166}\) Emending 心 to 止 (systematic corruption, corrected from canon).  

\(^{167}\) Of the various ways of distinguishing what is or is not \(x\), fix the basis or grounds relevant in the context under discussion. For example, the basis might be the form or shape of the thing (what determines whether it is an ox or a horse) or its place of origin (a Qin horse versus a Chu horse). It might be skin color (what determines whether a person is a ‘black person’). Or it might be whether a person’s caring about others is all-inclusive or partly exclusive (what determines whether the person practises inclusive care).  

\(^{168}\) The point of the canon is that certain features are the basis by which to distinguish whether something is \(x\) or not. As an illustration, not all of a sage’s features must be ‘this/right’. Some may be ‘not’ (thus falling short of sageliness?) without disqualifying the sage from being a sage.  

\(^{169}\) Reading 笈 as 正.
Explanation: (Exact.) …When there is an explanation [to support doing so], one goes beyond the agreement that the object matches [the model]—like a circle\(^{171}\) being nowhere straight—and when there is no explanation [to support doing so], one uses the agreement.\(^{172}\)…

B1

經：止類，以行人。說在同。
經說：止。彼以此其然也說是其然也。我以此其不然也疑是其然也。

Canon: Settle the kind in order to let the other proceed.\(^{172}\) Explained by: sameness.\(^{174}\)

Explanation: (Settle/stop.) The other side takes something being so of this one as grounds for explaining/contending that this kind is so. I take

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\(^{170}\) Canon A83 implies that things can match a model either exactly or by what is ‘appropriate/fitting’. A96 indicated that appropriate/fitting refers to the relevant part of something, as when skin color is used to judge whether a person is a black person or not. Presumably, the point of A98 is that something matches a model exactly when it has no features that do not match the model.

\(^{171}\) Reading 員 as 圆.

\(^{172}\) Interpretation of the explanation is conjectural because the meaning of the phrase 五諾 is obscure. I tentatively follow Graham in reading 五 as 伍, equivalent to 件, ‘matching up as counterparts’, and I take 諾 to refer, as implied in A93, to an agreement between two sides about how to apply some term in disputation. Since the canon seems to concern cases in which something matches a model exactly, I provisionally interpret 五諾 to refer to agreement between two sides that something matches a model exactly. The point of the explanation might then be that if two sides agree that an object matches the model, they apply this agreement in continuing their disputation. However, they can also go beyond the agreement if an explanation (a justification) is available to support further assertions that follow from the agreement, as the assertion that a thing is nowhere straight follows from the agreement that it matches the model for a circle.

\(^{173}\) The graph 人 (‘others’) may be faulty, so the translation is tentative. Following Sun, many editors emend to 之 ‘it’. A likely hypothesis is that the text refers to settling what kind of object the other party is referring to, so as to allow the other’s use of kind terms to ‘proceed’ to refer to all members of the kind. The aim would be to determine whether the terms are used in a semantically and logically ‘permissible’ way.

\(^{174}\) Beginning with B1, most canons end with the formula ‘explained by…’, which summarises the theme of the corresponding explanation.
something being not so of this one as grounds for doubting this kind is so.\footnote{With reference to a particular exemplar, the two sides discuss which features are ‘the same’ among all members of the kind. They thus ‘settle’ what the kind under discussion is. The translation takes 此 ‘this (here)’ to refer the exemplar and 是 ‘this (kind)’ to refer to the kind of thing it is supposed to be an exemplar of.}

B2

經：謂……推類之難。\footnote{There appears to be a lacuna in the text between canon B2 and B42, the canon that immediately precedes it. (For an explanation of why B2 follows on B42, see the Introductory Notes to this supplement.) B42 ends in the middle of a sentence, while B2 contains no graph corresponding to any candidate for a heading to its explanation. Liáng Qíchāo argued plausibly that the explanation preserves the original heading, which is 謂. We thus place 謂 at the head of the canon, although we cannot know how many other missing graphs, if any, followed it.} 說在之\footnote{The text of the explanatory phrase seems faulty, as it is unlikely to begin with the bare particle 之. One hypothesis, adopted by Wú Yùjiāng and others, is that the word 項, ‘kind’, has been dropped from between 在 and 之 and so the text refers to the larger or smaller scope of some kind. A simpler hypothesis, proposed by Graham, is that 之 is an instance of a systematic graphic error for 止, ‘stop/settle’, and so the text refers to settling how wide the scope of the kind is. The interpretive consequences of the two hypotheses are similar.} 大小物盡。\footnote{We transpose 物盡 here from the head of B3 on grounds of coherence with the explanation.}

經說：謂。四足，獸與？生，鳥與？物盡與大小也。此然是必然，則俱為䴉。

Canon: Calling/asserting/saying…the difficulty of extending kinds. Explained by: [settling the scope of the kind as?] larger or smaller and things all being so.\footnote{Predication and disputation were regarded as based on analogically ‘extending’ to new cases our judgment as to what is or is not relevantly similar to a model or an exemplar (see A70) and thus is the same kind of thing. The process of extending similarity judgments is fraught with difficulty, as members of the same kind may not be the same in every respect, while members of different kinds may not be different in every respect. The text of the canon is so obscure that interpretation must be tentative, but it appears to offer two reasons for difficulty in extending kinds. First, some features, but not all, are shared by every thing of a kind. Second, because kinds may be larger or smaller in scope, two things may be similar in both falling under one kind without being similar in falling under another.}

\begin{itemize}
\item With reference to a particular exemplar, the two sides discuss which features are ‘the same’ among all members of the kind. They thus ‘settle’ what the kind under discussion is. The translation takes 此 ‘this (here)’ to refer the exemplar and 是 ‘this (kind)’ to refer to the kind of thing it is supposed to be an exemplar of.
\item There appears to be a lacuna in the text between canon B2 and B42, the canon that immediately precedes it. (For an explanation of why B2 follows on B42, see the Introductory Notes to this supplement.) B42 ends in the middle of a sentence, while B2 contains no graph corresponding to any candidate for a heading to its explanation. Liáng Qíchāo argued plausibly that the explanation preserves the original heading, which is 謂. We thus place 謂 at the head of the canon, although we cannot know how many other missing graphs, if any, followed it.
\item The text of the explanatory phrase seems faulty, as it is unlikely to begin with the bare particle 之. One hypothesis, adopted by Wú Yùjiāng and others, is that the word 項, ‘kind’, has been dropped from between 在 and 之 and so the text refers to the larger or smaller scope of some kind. A simpler hypothesis, proposed by Graham, is that 之 is an instance of a systematic graphic error for 止, ‘stop/settle’, and so the text refers to settling how wide the scope of the kind is. The interpretive consequences of the two hypotheses are similar.
\item We transpose 物盡 here from the head of B3 on grounds of coherence with the explanation.
\item Predication and disputation were regarded as based on analogically ‘extending’ to new cases our judgment as to what is or is not relevantly similar to a model or an exemplar (see A70) and thus is the same kind of thing. The process of extending similarity judgments is fraught with difficulty, as members of the same kind may not be the same in every respect, while members of different kinds may not be different in every respect. The text of the canon is so obscure that interpretation must be tentative, but it appears to offer two reasons for difficulty in extending kinds. First, some features, but not all, are shared by every thing of a kind. Second, because kinds may be larger or smaller in scope, two things may be similar in both falling under one kind without being similar in falling under another.
\end{itemize}
The Canons and Explanations

Explanation: (Calling/asserting/saying.) If four footed, is it a beast? If a living thing, is it a bird? Things all being so and [the scope being] larger or smaller.\(^{180}\) If, this one being so, this kind is surely so, then all are milu deer.\(^{181}\)

B3 [Omitted.]\(^{182}\)

B4

經：不可偏去而二。說在見與見，\(^{183}\)一與二，與與脩。\(^{184}\)

經說：不。見見離。一二不相盈。廣與壑白。

Canon: They cannot be partially removed yet are two.\(^{185}\) Explained by: seeing and coming into view, one and two, breadth and length.

Explanation: (Not.) Seeing and coming into view are separate [?]. One and two do not fill each other. Breadth and length are hard−white.\(^{186}\)

\(^{180}\) ‘Beast’ refers specifically to four−footed animals, so it provides an example in which a single, identical feature is shared by every member of a kind. Every four−footed thing is a ‘beast’ and vice versa. Birds are living things, but not every living thing is a bird. One cannot invariably generalise from features of living things, a kind with a larger scope, to features of birds, a kind with a smaller scope, or vice versa.

\(^{181}\) One cannot invariably generalise from features of an exemplar to claims about an entire kind, as it is not obvious from the exemplar which features are shared by all members of the kind. The milu deer is traditionally said to possesses a mixture of features similar to those of other animals—antlers like a deer, face like a horse, hooves like an ox, tail like a donkey—without actually being like any of these other kinds. (Hence its Chinese nickname, ‘sìbúxiàng 四不象’ or ‘four unalikes’.) The point of the closing metaphor may be that if all features of all particular exemplars were so of each kind they belong to, then all kinds would be a mishmash, as the milu is.

\(^{182}\) The many textual and interpretive problems in B3 put it beyond the scope of this discussion.

\(^{183}\) Emending 見與見 to 見與見 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation). As Graham suggests, possibly 俱 is an error for a graph originally written 僅.

\(^{184}\) Emending 循 to 僅 in both the canon and the explanation, taking this to be a graphic error on grounds of the contrast with 廣.

\(^{185}\) Typically, if something ‘is two’, it has two parts, one of which can be removed from the other. The canon addresses cases in which something is ‘two’ yet has no part that can be removed.

\(^{186}\) Only the third example is clear: breadth and length are inseparable, as the hardness and whiteness of a hard, white stone are. So although breadth and length are two distinct features, neither can be removed from the other. The other examples are
B5 [Omitted.]

B6

經：異類不比，說在量。
經說：異。木與夜孰長，智與粟孰多，爵親行賈四者孰貴，藻與
霍孰高。……

Canon: Different kinds are not comparable. Explained by: measuring/amount.\textsuperscript{187}

Explanation: (Different.) Wood and night, which is longer? Knowledge and grain, which is more? Noble rank, parents, conduct, or a price, which is more valuable? A milu deer or a crane,\textsuperscript{188} which is higher?…

B7

經：偏去莫加少。說在故。
經說：偏。俱一無變。

Canon: Part being removed, there is no reduction. Explained by: the reason/cause.

Explanation: (Part.) There is no change in their being together as one.\textsuperscript{189}

B8

經：假必誚，說在不然。

obscure and the translation is tentative. Coming into view and seeing are distinct, but we cannot see a thing without it coming into view [?]. One and two do not wholly overlap, and thus are not not identical, but we cannot have two without also having one [?].

\textsuperscript{187} Different kinds of things may be incommensurable, as they may lack any shared standard of measurement. For example, the length of a piece of wood (a physical dimension) is a different kind of length from the length of the night (a temporal one).

\textsuperscript{188} Reading 霍 as 鶴.

\textsuperscript{189} The text is obscure and any interpretation is tentative. B12 uses ‘together as one’ to refer to oxen and horses—two different kinds of animals—being ‘one’ in having four feet. B7 may refer to a case in which, for example, the oxen and horses are removed from each other, but there is no reduction in the group of animals that are four-footed. If, as B12 suggests, the Mohists employ a mereological ontology, the implication may be that a mereological whole need not be spatially contiguous. Part can be removed without changing the relation of the items as ‘together as one’ in sharing some feature.
Canon: Borrowing [names] surely leads to perversity/contradiction.\textsuperscript{190} Explained by: not being so.

Explanation: (Borrowing.) In borrowing [names], the thing must be not [the kind normally referred to by that name], only then do we borrow [a name]. Borrowing ‘crane’ for dogs, it’s like being surnamed ‘Crane’.\textsuperscript{191}

B9

Canon: That by which things are so, and that by which we know them, and that by which we make others know them are not necessarily the same. Explained by: illness.

Explanation: (Things.) Something injures it is it’s being so. Seeing it is knowing. Informing them is making them know.

B10

Canon: Doubt. Saying in one, in other, in such, through, over.

\textsuperscript{190} Two frequently used terms of semantic and logical evaluation in the canons are \textit{kě} 可, ‘permissible’ or ‘admissible’, and \textit{bèi} 悱, ‘pervasive’, ‘confused’, or ‘contradictory’. Assertions or patterns of word use that are ‘permissible’ are those that observe relevant semantic and logical norms, among them semantic and logical consistency. Assertions that are not permissible are ‘pervasive’.

\textsuperscript{191} A ‘borrowed’ name is a name (presumably a kind name or general term) used ad hoc to refer to something it does not normally denote, as when a speaker for some reason refers to a dog or dogs as ‘cranes’. By definition, things referred to by a borrowed name are ‘not so’, or not part of the normal extension of that name. The text suggests that such unorthodox uses of names are similar to having a surname that in other contexts functions as a general term. For example, we can refer to the members of a family as the ‘Cranes’ without assuming or implying they are actually a group of birds. Nevertheless, B8 contends that borrowed names inevitably generate perversity or contradiction, since in the end the objects of which they are used are ‘not so’ or ‘not this’—they are actually not similar to the kind of object associated with that name. See too B72.

\textsuperscript{192} Emending 吉 to 告 (graphic error).
Canon: Doubt. Explained by: accident, following, encountering, passing.

Explanation: (Doubt.) Encountering fog, one takes a person to be an ox; someone staying in a cottage is cold in the summer—accident.

Lifting something light or dropping something heavy is not having strength; shaving wood along the grain is not skill—like stone and feathers—following.

Whether the fighter’s collapse was from drinking wine or from the noon sun, this cannot be known—encountering.

Is it knowledge? Or is it taking what has already ended to be so?—having passed.

193 Emending 蓼 to 逢 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
194 Emending 橫 to 循 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
195 Emending 日 to 日 (graphic error).
196 Emending 愚 to 遇 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
197 Emending 愚 to 過 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).
198 These are four types of potential sources of doubt. The four amount to accidental circumstances, inconclusive evidence, coincidental causes or causal overdetermination, and transience. Interpretation of the details in the explanation is tentative.
199 Reading 務 as 霧.
200 Accidental, unexpected circumstances such as a dense fog or unseasonable weather can be grounds for doubting one’s judgment of what one sees or whether one will be warm enough.
201 Following along with things provides insufficient evidence as to whether one can perform a task and thus gives grounds for doubt. That one can perform an easy task such as lifting a light weight or shaving along the grain is insufficient grounds to confirm one is strong or skilled. The parenthetical illustration ‘like stone and feathers’ seems to refer to the first of the two examples, lifting something light and dropping something heavy.
202 ‘Encountering’ seems to refer to multiple, coincidental factors and thus to causal overdetermination as a source of doubt. Different factors could each explain the fighter’s collapse. Since we cannot know which was decisive, we have grounds to doubt claims that one or the other was.
203 ‘Passing’ refers to transience as a source of doubt. Circumstances may change, rendering what we correctly took to be the case no longer so.
B11

Canon: United together or one thing, in one case compound, in the other not. \(^{205}\) Explained by: demarcating.\(^{206}\)

Explanation: (None.)

B12

Canon: Demarcated things form one unit/part. \(^{208}\) Explained by: together as one and being this.

Explanation: (Demarcated.) ‘Together as one’ is like oxen and horses being four-footed. ‘Being this’ is fitting ‘ox’ or ‘horse’.

Any group of things demarcated from other things can be regarded as a single unit/part, a compound whole.

Different kinds of things can be grouped together and treated as one, as oxen and horses are one in being four-footed. Things can also be demarcated from other things on the grounds that they are ‘this’, or the same kind, as when we separate oxen from other animals or horses from other animals. We can count oxen and horses as two kinds of things, or we can group them together and treat them as one whole. Classical Chinese nouns typically do not mark number, so the same word, ㄏ, can refer to each of the five individual fingers on a hand or to all the fingers as one. Instead of conceiving of demarcated groups of things as forming sets or collections, the Mohists...
B13

Canon: Space moves somewhere. Explained by: growth.
Explanation: (Space.) In growing one moves yet there is a place one is located in space.

B14

Canon: Space and duration are not hard-white. Explained by… [missing text].
Explanation: (Space.) South and north are present both in the morning and in the evening. Space moves with duration.

B15

conceive of them as forming larger or smaller parts and wholes. Canon B12 suggests that the Mohists likely employ a mereological ontology.

Emending 徙 to 徒 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).
Transposing 長 and 宇 (restoring the heading).
Canons B13 through B16, on space and time, are challenging to interpret, and the translation is accordingly tentative. The gist of B13 seems to be that space or extension moves along with things within it as they endure, since as things grow and move they remain located in space.

Emending 且 to 然 (graphic error, parallelism with 莫, read as 莫).
This canon presents the crux of the Mohist conception of space and time, which they conceptualise as duration. Space and duration, they contend, are not ‘as-hard-to-white’, or mutually pervasive (see A66). The reason is that at any instant, all of space is present but not all of duration is. Things that are ‘as-hard-to-white’ must ‘fill each other’ or be everywhere compresent within the region where they are located. Since not all of duration is always and everywhere present, duration and space are not mutually pervasive in the required sense. Obviously, however, spatial relations such as north versus south are present at different times. The Mohist explanation is that space moves with duration, so it is present at one instant and then present again at later instants.
The Canons and Explanations

Canon: The durationless and space are hard-white. Explained by: the cause/basis.

Explanation: (Durationless.) When hard combines with white they must fill each other.\textsuperscript{215}

B16
經：在諸其所然，未然者。\textsuperscript{216} 說在於是。
經說：在。堯善治，自今在諸古也。自古在之今則堯不能治也。
Canon: Locating it where it is so or yet to be so. Explained by: at this [time].

Explanation: (Locating.) Yao is good at governing—this is from the present standpoint locating it in the past.\textsuperscript{217} If from a past standpoint one located it in the present, then Yao is not able to govern.\textsuperscript{218}

B17–B29. [Omitted.]\textsuperscript{219}

B30
經：買無貴。說在仿其實。
經說：買。刀錠相為買。刀輕則錠不貴，刀重則錠不易。王刀無變，錠有變，歲變錠則歲變刀。若霦子。
Canon: In buying, there is no such thing as too expensive. Explained by: the converse of the price.\textsuperscript{220}

\[\text{215}\] Duration is not mutually pervasive with space, but the durationless or instantaneous is, because it and space 'fill each other'. They are present together everywhere, albeit only for an instant.

\[\text{216}\] Transposing 為者然 to 為然者.

\[\text{217}\] Compare B53.

\[\text{218}\] Perhaps because he would no longer be present, or perhaps because his methods of government would no longer be applicable (?).

\[\text{219}\] This long series of canons on optics and mechanics presents interpretive issues that are beyond the scope of this book.

\[\text{220}\] Canons B30–31 are two historically remarkable discussions of economics, expressing a grasp of how supply and demand determine prices that anticipates discussions in Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), Ibn Taymiyyah (1263–1328), and John Locke (1632–1704) by well over a millennium. A comparable early Western source may be Xenophon of Athens (430–354 BC), although Xenophon may not articulate the relations between supply and demand as clearly as the Mohists do.
Explanation: (Buying.) Coin and grain are each other’s price. If the coin is light, then the grain is not expensive; if the coin is heavy, then the grain is not exchanged.\textsuperscript{221} The king’s coin not altering but the grain for sale altering, if the harvest alters the grain for sale, the harvest alters the coin.\textsuperscript{222} Like selling off children.\textsuperscript{223}

B31

経：貿宜則鬻。説在盡。

經説：貿。盡也者，盡去其所以不鬻也。\textsuperscript{224} 其所以不鬻去，則鬻倌貿也。宜不宜倌欲不欲。若敗邦霑室嫁子。

Canon: The price being appropriate, it sells. Explained by: all.

Explanation: (Price.) ‘All’ is completely removing that by which it doesn’t sell.\textsuperscript{225} Removing that by which it doesn’t sell, it sells for exactly the right price.\textsuperscript{226} Whether the price is appropriate or not corresponds exactly to whether people desire it or not. Like the people of a defeated state selling off houses and marrying off daughters.

B32

經：無說而懼。説在弗必。\textsuperscript{227}

經説：無。子在軍，不必其死生。聞戰亦不必其生。前也不懼，今也懼。

Canon: Without an explanation, one fears. Explained by: it not being sure.

Explanation: (Without.) One’s son serving in the army, one cannot take it as sure whether he is dead or alive. Hearing of a battle, again one

\textsuperscript{221} If the amount of coin asked by the seller is light, the grain is not expensive; if the seller demands a heavy price, the buyer refuses the exchange.
\textsuperscript{222} By changing the supply of grain for sale, the harvest changes the value of the king’s coin.
\textsuperscript{223} The final parenthetical remark seems out of place and may belong with the parenthetical remark at the end of B31.
\textsuperscript{224} Inserting 所 on grounds of parallelism with the next clause.
\textsuperscript{225} That is, removing all reasons it does not sell, including an excessively high price.
\textsuperscript{226} Alternatively, ‘selling sets the right price’. Reading 倌 as 正.
\textsuperscript{227} Emending 必 to 必 (systematic corruption, corrected from the explanation).
cannot take it as sure that he is alive. If previously one did not fear, now one fears.

B33 [Omitted.]

B34
Canon: It’s perverse to hold that knowing whether one knows it or not is enough for practical use. Explained by: lacking the basis.
Explanation: (Knowledge.) When discoursing on it, if it’s not the case that one knows it, one lacks the basis.

B35
Canon: Saying that in disputation there is no winning surely does not fit the facts. Explained by: disputation.
Explanation: (Saying/asserting.) The things something is called are either the same or different. In a case when they’re the same, one side calls it ‘dog’, the other calls it ‘hound’; in a case when they’re different,
one side calls it ‘ox’, the other calls it ‘horse’. Both not winning, this is not disputation. Disputation is when one side calls it ‘this’, the other calls it ‘not’, and the one that fits wins.

B36

經：無不讓也不可。說在始。
經說：無。讓者酒未讓，始也。不可讓也。
Canon: Deferring in everything is impermissible. Explained by: the start.
Explanation: (Nothing.) The start is the time before the deferring person yields the wine to the other person. It cannot be deferred.

B37

經：於一有知焉，有不知焉。說在存。
經說：於。石一也，堅白二也而在石。故有智焉，有不智焉，可。

231 The terms the two sides assert of something may refer to the same things or to different things. ‘Dog’ and ‘hound’ apply to the same animals (‘dog’ and ‘hound’ are the Mohists’ standard example of two names for the same thing). ‘Horse’ and ‘ox’ apply to different animals. In both sorts of cases, it is possible that neither of the terms fits the object under consideration, which might be neither a dog, nor a horse, nor an ox.

232 Canon B35 may be a response to a passage in book 2 of the Zhuangzi that questions whether either side can ever definitively win a distinction-drawing disputation (biàn): ‘Suppose you and I were to dispute, and you win over me, I do not win over you. Are you indeed right and am I indeed wrong?’ The Mohist response is that cases in which the terms the two sides assert of something fail to fit it are not ‘disputation’, properly speaking (see A74). Disputation consists in disputing which of two opposite terms—x or non-x—fits the thing under consideration. Logically, by the laws of excluded middle and non-contradiction, exactly one of the terms must fit and thus one side must ‘win’.

233 Deference is a prominent virtue in Ruist ethics. Canon B36 argues that one cannot consistently practise deference in all situations. The explanation is obscure, but the idea may be that the deferring person must take the initiative to start the process of yielding the wine to others, allowing them to drink first. The deferring person must take this first step and cannot defer it. So one cannot defer in everything. Compare the argument in this canon with those of B71, B77, and B79.
Canon: In one thing, there is something known and there is something not known. Explained by: being present in it.

Explanation: (In.) The stone is one. Hard and white are two that are located in the stone. So it is permissible that there be something known in it and something not known in it.  

B38 [Omitted.]

B39

經：所知而弗能指。說在春也，逃臣，狗犬，遺者。235
經說：所，春也，其執固不可指也。236 逃臣，不智其處。狗犬，不智其名也。遺者，巧弗能兩也。
Canon: What one knows but cannot point to.237 Explained by: spring, a runaway servant, dogs and hounds, something missing.

Explanation: (What.) Spring—it's tendencies inherently cannot be pointed out. A runaway servant—not knowing his location. Dogs and hounds—not knowing their name. What is missing—cleverness cannot make them two.

B40

經：知狗而自謂不知犬，過也。說在重。

234 To know something about a thing is not to know everything about it. It is possible to know some aspects of a thing (such as the kind of thing it is, or its color) while not knowing others (such as its texture). The canon may be aimed at deflecting the sophism that since knowing about the hardness or whiteness of a stone is different from knowing about the stone, the hardness or whiteness and the stone are different things.

235 Emending 質 to 遺 (graphic variant, corrected from the explanation).

236 Emending 執 to 質 (graphic error).

237 The canon refutes the view that to know something is to be able to point it out. Spring, a season, is not something that can be pointed to. One can know a runaway servant but be unable to point him out because his location is unknown. Knowing about dogs is knowing about hounds, but someone who knows only the name ‘dog’ will know about hounds without being able to point them out. In disputation, if two things, such as oxen and horses, do not form two opposing kinds, as oxen and non-oxen do, one can know this without being able to point to the missing alternatives.
Canon: Knowing dogs while oneself saying one doesn’t know hounds is an error. Explained by: identity/overlap/doubling.
Explanation: (Knowing.) If knowing dogs is identical to/overlaps with knowing hounds, then it’s an error. If not identical/overlapping, then it's not an error.

B41

Canon: Connect the thought/intention and only then reply. Explained by: not knowing what he refers to.
Explanation. (Connect.) The questioner says, ‘Do you know borogoves?’ Respond to him, saying, ‘What does “borogove” refer to?’ If

238 ‘Dog’ and ‘hound’ are the standard example of two names for the same object (see A86). (The exact relation between the extension of the two terms is unclear. One possibility is that ‘hound’ referred to mature canines, ‘dog’ to pups. Both are mentioned in the Mòzǐ as being slaughtered for their meat and as being offered as sacrifices. However, only hounds, not dogs, appear in typical lists of animals fattened for sacrifice to Heaven.) If knowing dogs is identical to knowing hounds, then it is a mistake to say one knows dogs but not hounds. Perhaps, if one does not know the two names refer to the same animals, then knowing hounds is not identical to knowing dogs; in this case, it would not be an error to claim to know one but not the other. See B54.

239 As Graham suggests, following Sun, the graph 施 here may be a corruption of some familiar graph followed by 也. The point is to specify that the unknown name just introduced refers to something known to the listener.

240 The last seven graphs of the explanation are corrupt, and the entire second half, after 且 (‘moreover’) may be faulty.

241 By identifying what a speaker’s words refer to, we can understand the thought or intention the speaker expresses. The text is not presenting the Lockean view that words have meaning because they are the outward signs of ideas in the head, which provide their content. Rather, the Mohist view is that words can be used to communicate thoughts or intentions—what the speaker has in mind—once both speaker and hearer know what they refer to. See §45.1b.

242 The text uses an unknown, nonce graph that we are expected not to recognise.
he says, “Borogoves are birds”, then you know them. If you do not ask what “borogove” refers to and directly respond that you don’t know them, this is an error. Moreover, in responding you must respond to the timing of the question, as when the response is long. Among responses there are deep and shallow…

B42 [Omitted.] 243

B43

Canon: The five processes have no regular pattern of overcoming each other. 244 Explained by: what fits the situation.

Explanation: (Five.) …When fire melts metal, it’s that the fire is larger; when metal outlasts the charcoal, it’s that the amount of metal is greater….

B44

Canon: Whether lacking desires and dislikes is an advantage or a loss. Explained by: what fits the situation.

243 The text of this canon is badly damaged.

244 Canon B43 refers to the early proto-scientific doctrine of the five processes or phases (sometimes called the five elements) and the cyclical relation between them. The canon rejects the prevailing view that the five supposedly overcome each other according to a regular sequence—wood overcoming earth by parting it, earth overcoming water by damming it, water overcoming fire by extinguishing it, fire overcoming metal by melting it, metal overcoming wood by chopping it. The text of the explanation is damaged, but the intact fragment indicates that which phase overcomes which depends on the particular circumstances. A large, long-burning fire will melt metal, but a large amount of metal will outlast a smaller fire. This rejection of the hasty generalizations offered by a simplistic, abstract model is informative as to the Mohists’ implicit philosophy of natural science.

245 Reading 悉 as 難.
Explanati
on: (Lacking.) Desires and dislikes injure life and reduce one’s lifespan—if one takes this as grounds to advocate reducing connections to things, who is this caring about? Eating too much, one desires not to have some of it, as it can injure one. Like how wine affects people. Yet if wise people’s care is directed at benefiting others, then although wise they do not control it.246

B45
經：損而不害。說在餘。
經說：損。飽者去餘，適足不害，能害飽。若傷癘之無脾也。且有損而後益。若虐病之於虐也。
Canon: There being a loss poses no obstacle. Explained by: surplus.
Explanation: (Loss.) Those who’ve eaten their fill discarding the surplus poses no obstacle to their having enough, though it could interfere with their being full [?].248 Like an injured milu deer missing a haunch.249 Moreover, there are cases of gaining an advantage only after first suffering a loss. Like how severe malaria affects malaria.250

B46
經：知而不以五路。說在久。

246 Several passages in the Dàodéjīng, such as sections 3 and 37, advocate reducing or eliminating desires. The antiwar activists Sòng Xíng 宋錫 and Yin Wén 尹文 contended that people’s genuine desires are few and shallow. The Mohist response is that in some situations, as when avoiding excess food or alcohol, it may be advantageous not to desire something. In others, as when one cares about the benefit of other people, it may be better not to control such affective attitudes. The word translated ‘wise’ is zhì, the same word used in A6 to refer to knowledge. Intriguingly, this canon seems to treat ài ‘care’ as an affective attitude akin to desires and aversions.
247 Omitting a duplicated 之 (dittography).
248 The last clause is confusing and the translation is tentative.
249 Taking 脾 as equivalent to 脾. The point of this remark is obscure. It may be that, despite its loss, a milu deer missing a haunch remains a milu [?].
250 Suffering from malaria (a loss) can lead to immunity to malaria (a gain).
Canon: Knowing but not by means of the five routes. Explained by: duration.
Explanation: (Knowing.) The knower sees by means of the eye and the eye sees by means of the fire but the fire does not see. If one could know only by means of the five routes, then after a duration knowledge would cease to fit the facts. Seeing by means of the eye is like seeing by means of the fire.\textsuperscript{252}

B47

Canon: Fire is hot.\textsuperscript{255}
Explanation: (Fire.) If we say fire is hot, it’s not taking the fire’s heat to be something we possess. Like looking at the sun.

B48

Canon: Knowing what one doesn’t know. Explained by: using the name to select it.

\textsuperscript{251} Transposing the first two graphs 智者 here from B45, where they were misplaced when the parenthetical remark in B45 about malaria was written into the text in the wrong place.

\textsuperscript{252} The five routes are the five senses. The senses alone are not the only means of possessing knowledge, because knowledge endures after we have passed things and no longer perceive them. See A5. The explanation implies that the Mohists might affirm ‘the eye does not see’, one of the sophisms listed in book 33 of the Zhuangzi.

\textsuperscript{253} Emending 必 to 火 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).

\textsuperscript{254} Emending 日 to 日 (graphic error).

\textsuperscript{255} ‘Fire is not hot’ is among the sophisms listed in book 33 of the Zhuangzi.

\textsuperscript{256} Emending 所以 to 所 (corrected from the explanation).
Explanation: (Knowing.) If we mix what someone knows and what he doesn’t know and ask him, then he must say, ‘This is what I know; this is what I don’t know’. Being able both to select some things and to reject others, this is knowing both of them.\textsuperscript{257}

B49

経：無不必待有。説在所謂。
經說：無。若無焉，則有之而後無。無天陷，則無之而無。
Explanation: (Absence.) If there is none of it, first there was some and then not. As to there being no cases of the sky falling, there were none and there are none.\textsuperscript{258}

B50 [Omitted.]

B51

経：且然不可正，而不害用工。説在宜。
經說：且。且然必然，\textsuperscript{259} 且已必已，且用工而後已者，必用工後已。
Canon: What is about to be so cannot be corrected, yet this poses no obstacle to applying effort. Explained by: what fits the situation.
Explanation: (About to be.) What is about to be so must be so; what is about to end must end; as to what is about to end only after applying effort, it must end only after applying effort.\textsuperscript{260}

\textsuperscript{257} The canon demystifies the seemingly contradictory idea that one can know what one doesn’t know by explaining that it requires only that one be able to verbally identify things one doesn’t know.

\textsuperscript{258} The canon may be criticizing the doctrine, found in section 2 of the \textit{Dàodéjīng}, that \textit{yǒu} 有 and \textit{wú} 無 (existence and non-existence, presence and absence, something and nothing) are interdependent, such that they arise together and each cannot exist without the other. The Mohist response is that whether absence or non-existence depends on presence or existence is determined by what we are talking about. In the case of something originally present and now gone, absence depends on presence. In the case of something that never existed in the first place, it does not.

\textsuperscript{259} Inserting 然 after 且 by parallelism with the next clause.

\textsuperscript{260}
B52 [Omitted.]

B53

經：堯之義也，生於今而處於古而異時。說在所義二。

經說：堯。……霍，或名視人，或實視人。舉友富商也，是以名視人也。指是見也，是以實視人也。堯之義也，是聲也於今，所義之實處於古。……

Canon: The sage-king Yao’s being an exemplar arises in the present yet is located in the past, these being different times. Explained by: what’s taken as an exemplar being two.

Explanation: (Yao.) …cranes, in some cases one uses names to show people, in some cases one uses objects to show people. Mentioning/citing one’s friend as a wealthy merchant, this is using names to show people. Pointing to this as a crane, this is using objects to show people. Yao’s being an exemplar, this spoken sound is in the present, while the object taken as an exemplar is located in the past…

B54

經：狗犬也，而殺狗非殺犬也可。說在重。

經說：狗。狗犬也。謂之殺犬可。若兩牌。

260 This canon contributes to the Mohist rebuttal of fatalism. Logically, the Mohists acknowledge that what is about to be so or about to end must be so or must end, and hence these events cannot be changed. Yet what is about to be so or about to end might include events that will happen only if we exert effort. So the logical point about time does not entail that human effort is futile.

261 Compare B16.

262 Following Graham in reading 義 as 儀, ‘standard’ or ‘exemplar’.

263 Some text appears to be missing from the beginning of the explanation.

264 Reading 譲 as 霍, equivalent to 鶴.

265 How can Yao, who lived long ago, serve as a moral paragon today? Because by using ‘names’ to ‘mention’ objects we can ‘show’ others things that are not present, as when we mention our friend as an example of a wealthy merchant. Although we can no longer physically point to Yao or his exemplary deeds, we can ‘use names to show people’ about him, what we say being in the present. What’s taken as an exemplar is thus ‘two’, Yao himself and the ‘names’ we use to speak of him.

266 Reading the last graph as equivalent to 牌.
Canon: Dogs are hounds, yet ‘killing dogs is not killing hounds’ is permissible. Explained by: identity/overlap/doubling.

Explanation: (Dogs.) Dogs are hounds. Calling it ‘killing hounds’ is permissible. Like two haunches.267

B55, B56 [Omitted.]

B57

經：以楹268 為搏，於以為先知也。269 說在意。
經說：以。楹之搏也，見之其於意也不易，先智意相也。若楹輕於秋，其於意也洋然。

Canon: Taking pillars to be round, in what one takes it to be one knows beforehand. Explained by: the thought/intention.

Explanation: (Taking.) The pillars’ being round, on seeing them, they’re unchanged from the thought, because we know beforehand the

267 ‘Dogs’ and ‘hounds’ are the standard example of two names for the same object, a relation the Mohists call ‘overlap’ or ‘doubling’ (A86, B40). ‘Permissible’ refers to assertions that could be semantically and logically correct in some situation. The content of B54 seems clear enough, but the reasoning is not, since the text seems to allow that two contradictory assertions could both be permissible. One interpretation might be that a speaker unaware that dogs are hounds could permissibly assert that killing dogs is not killing hounds, while a speaker who knows dogs are hounds could permissibly assert that killing dogs is killing hounds. Another possibility is that, although ‘dog’ and ‘hound’ were both names for canines, in some contexts ‘killing hounds’ and ‘killing dogs’ were indeed considered two distinct kinds of actions. (Perhaps ‘killing dogs’ was butchering common breeds for their meat, ‘killing hounds’ sacrificing rare breeds to the spirits. Compare §45.2c.) The parenthetical example is obscure, beyond the obvious point that haunches are two objects that can also be regarded as one object.

268 Emending 楹 to 楹 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).

269 Following Graham in emending 無知 to 先知, by coherence with 先智 in the explanation and on the assumption that 無 was written 无, a graph easily confused with 先. In B73, we find 无習 corrupted to 先習, here we hypothesise that 先知 was corrupted to 无知. The reading in the explanation is likely to be correct because the point of the preceding sentence is that we know in advance what a round pillar looks like.
form that is intended/thought. If the pillars are lighter than catalpa wood,\textsuperscript{270} this feature is indeterminate in the thought/intention.\textsuperscript{271}

**B58**

經：推之意未可知。說在可用，過仵。\textsuperscript{272}

經說：椎。段\textsuperscript{272} 錾俱事於履，可用也。成繡履過椎，與成椎過繡履同，過仵\textsuperscript{273} 也。

Canon: The thought/intention of hammers\textsuperscript{274} can’t be known in advance. Explained by: being usable, going beyond a match.

Explanation: (Hammer.) Anvil and hammer\textsuperscript{275} both being used to work on shoes—this is ‘being usable’. Completing embroidered shoes goes beyond the hammer, just as completing a hammer goes beyond embroidered shoes—this is ‘going beyond a match’.\textsuperscript{276}

\textsuperscript{270} Reading 秋 as 椋.

\textsuperscript{271} Canon B41 contended that before answering a question, we should first ‘connect’ our thought or intention with that of the questioner. If asked whether we know of \textit{x}, we must first confirm what the questioner is referring to by ‘\textit{x}’. B57 explains that because our thought/intention of something may specify some of its features, we can know of these in advance of perceiving the thing. For example, if we deem pillars round, then from our thought or intention of a pillar—from what we deem it to be like—we know a pillar’s shape before seeing it, as the thought fixes the shape beforehand. However, the thought fixes only the relevant features of a thing, not all its features. The thought of a round pillar fixes its shape but not its weight or material. These remain indeterminate in the thought, so we do not know them beforehand.

\textsuperscript{272} Transposing 段 and 椋 (restoring the heading) and emending 段 to 段 (graphic error), equivalent to 鏯.

\textsuperscript{273} Emending 件 to 件 (graphic error, corrected from the canon).

\textsuperscript{274} Reading 椋 as 椋.

\textsuperscript{275} Reading 錾 as 椋.

\textsuperscript{276} Canon and explanation B58 are difficult but are included here to help fill out the Mohist conception of thought/intention (\textit{yì}). This canon extends the topic of B57 with a contrasting example. B57 indicates that since we deem pillars round, our thought or intention specifies their shape while leaving features such as their weight indeterminate. B58 seems to imply that the thought of a hammer is similarly indeterminate. What speakers intend—what they have in mind—by ‘hammer’ can’t be known in advance of their indicating a specific type of hammer. The canon and explanation give two reasons for this claim. Both are obscure, so our interpretation is strictly tentative. First, the features of hammers are determined by their being usable for some purpose. A cobbler’s hammer is unlike a sledgehammer. Until the purpose is
Canon: If one hoes only by half at a time, then one doesn’t move.277 
Explained by: the tip/starting point.
Explanation: (Not.) Advancing by hoeing half is taking from the front. If we take from the front, the centre doesn’t make half; it is still the starting point.278 If we take from the front and back, the starting point is the centre.279 If hoeing must be by half, there being nothing remaining that isn’t half, one cannot hoe.

specified, we don’t know what a speaker has in mind by ‘hammer’. Second, unlike the example of a circle or square, there is no single model—nor any single purpose—that all hammers match up with exactly. Producing embroidered shoes obviously ‘goes beyond’ hammers in that it requires other tools as well; conversely, the Mohists contend, hammers also ‘go beyond’ shoemaking in that they too have other uses. Shoemaking and hammers do not ‘match up as mates or counterparts’ (wǔ 伴). The same goes for other types of hammers. So, unlike ‘circle’ or ‘square’, what someone intends by ‘hammer’ is not knowable without obtaining further details about the hammer in question.

277 The canon refers to a paradox of motion similar to Zeno’s dichotomy or racetrack paradox. If we can move only in steps of one half the distance to be traveled, then—depending on how the paradox is formulated—either we can never reach our endpoint (since at each step, half of the distance remains to be covered) or never leave our starting point (since at each step, before reaching the halfway point, we must first cover half the distance there). In the scenario considered here, the hoeing of some length of a field proceeds only in steps of one half at a time. A related sophism is included among the claims of the disputers in book 33 of the Zhuāngzī.

278 Originally the centre was halfway along the length. Since we have now hoed the front half, the point that was originally centre is now the tip—the starting point—of the remaining length.

279 If we hoe both half the length in front of us and half the length behind us, we are already taking the centre as our starting point. We would then have two remaining lengths, one in front and one behind.
B63
Canon: Space, in advancing there’s no getting nearer to it. Explained by: covering/spreading.
Explanation: (Space.) Demarcating it, one cannot mention/cite only one part—that is space. Someone advancing through it first covers the near and then covers the far. 282

B64
Canon: Traveling a distance takes up duration. Explained by: at first and later.
Explanation: (Traveling.) Someone traveling must first be near and only later far. Far or near is distance. At first and later is duration. People traveling a distance must take up duration.

B65
Canon: One way that is consistent with all, if one way is consistent. 286 Say in this way.
Canon: The relating to each other of things that are one with a model is complete. Like the matching each other of squares. Explained by: squares.

Explanation: (One.) The square features being complete, each being like the model but different, some wood and some stone, poses no obstacle to their square shape matching each other. The features being complete—like square—things are each so.

B66

Canon: By wild mentioning/citing, one cannot know differences. Explained by: having.

Explanation: (Wild.) Although oxen and horses are different, it is impermissible to use oxen having teeth and horses having tails to explain that oxen are not horses. These they both have; it’s not that one side has them and one side lacks them. To say, ‘Oxen and horses are not of a kind’, and appeal to oxen having horns and horses lacking horns, in this the kinds are [indeed] not the same. [But] if you mention/cite oxen having horns and horses lacking horns, and take this to be [how] the

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286 Emending \召\ to \合\ (graphic error).
287 Emending \合\ to \台\ (graphic error).
288 For things to count as being similar and thus of the same kind, only the relevant features of the things must match the model (\法\) for that kind. Other aspects of the things are irrelevant, as the material something is made of is irrelevant with respect to its shape being square.
289 Transposing 牛\ and\ 狂\ (restoring the heading).
290 Reading 惟\ as \是\.
291 Emending \之\ to \牛\ (graphic error).
kinds are not the same, this is wild mentioning/citing, like oxen having teeth and horses having tails.  

B67

經：不可牛馬之非牛與可之同。說在兼。
經說：不。或非牛而非牛也可，則或非牛或牛而牛也可。故曰「牛馬非牛也」未可、「牛馬牛也」未可，則或或或不可而曰「牛馬牛也未可」亦不可。且牛不二馬不二而牛馬二，則牛不非牛馬非馬無難。

Canon. Deeming impermissible oxen-and-horses’ being non-oxen and deeming it permissible are the same.  

Explanation. (Not.) If it’s permissible that, some being non-oxen, they are non-oxen, then it's permissible that, some being non-oxen and some oxen, they are oxen. Therefore, if saying ‘oxen-and-horses are non-oxen’ is not permissible and ‘oxen-and-horses are oxen’ is not permissible, then treating one [of those two claims] as permissible and the other as impermissible and so saying ‘oxen-and-horses are oxen’
is not permissible’ is also impermissible. Moreover, if, oxen not being two and horses not being two, oxen-and-horses are two, then without oxen being non-oxen or horses being non-horses, there’s no difficulty in oxen-and-horses being non-oxen and non-horses.

B68

經：彼此彼此與彼此同。此在異。

經說：彼。正名者彼此彼此可。彼彼止於彼，此此止於此，彼此不可。彼且此也，彼此亦可。彼此止於彼此，若是而彼此也，則彼亦且此此[亦且彼?]也。

Canon: Reversing ‘that’ and ‘this’ is the same as deeming them ‘that’ and ‘this’. Explained by: difference.

Explanation: (That.) For those who correct names to reverse ‘that’ and ‘this’ is permissible. If their deeming that ‘that’ stops in that or this ‘this’ stops in this, reversing ‘that’ and ‘this’ is impermissible.

If that is to be ‘this’, reversing ‘that’ and ‘this’ is indeed permissible. ‘That’

296 Emending two instances of 彼 to 彼 (graphic error, corrected from the explanation).

297 The text appears to be faulty. Either the final instance of 此 should be omitted, as in the Wú manuscript version, or perhaps the graphs 亦且彼 should be inserted after 此.

298 The translation of this canon and explanation is highly tentative, and alternative interpretations are plausible. The gist seems to be that how we use the pair of contrasting indexical pronouns ‘that’ and ‘this’—what we refer to by them—can be reversed, provided the difference they mark between things is preserved. Having distinguished two different things as ‘that’ and ‘this’, we have equivalent grounds for swapping the indexicals and instead referring to the things as ‘this’ and ‘that’. As long as both indexicals switch their referents as a pair, they continue to indicate the difference between the referents. I take the text to be using the phrase 彼此 (that/this) in several instances as a technical term for reversing the referents of ‘that’ and ‘this’. Compare B68 with B72.

299 If they insist that the indexical ‘that’ always refers to that thing (as a proper noun does; see A78) or ‘this’ always refers to this thing, and one or both of the two cannot be changed, then it is impermissible to deem this thing ‘that’.

and ‘this’ stopping in that and this, if in this case they are reversed, then that is also about to be this [and this is also about to be that (?)].

B69 [Omitted.]

B70

經：聞所不知若所知，則兩知之。說在告。

經說：聞。在外者所知也，在室者所不知也。或曰「在室者之色若是其色。」是所不智若所智也。猶白若黑也誰勝。是若其色也。若白者必白。今也智其色之若白也，故智其白也。夫名以所明正所不智，不以所不智疑所明。若以尺度所不智長。外親智也，室中說智也。

Canon: Hearing that what you don’t know is like what you know, you know both. Explaining by: informing.

Explanation: (Hearing.) What’s outside is what one knows; what’s in the room is what one doesn’t know. Someone says, ‘The colour of the one in the room is like the colour of this’. This is what one doesn’t know being like what one knows. It is like, ‘white or black, which fits? This is like its colour’. What is like white must be white. Now knowing its colour is like white, thus one knows it’s white. As to names, one uses what people understand to correct what they don’t know, not what they don’t know to cast doubt on what they understand. It’s like using a measured foot to measure a length one doesn’t know.

Outside is personal knowledge, in the room is knowledge by explanation.

300 It is impermissible—it violates norms of use—to hold the reference of one of ‘that’ or ‘this’ fixed and switch the reference of the other. Either both must switch or both must be held fixed.

301 Tentatively inserting 所知也在室者 between 在外者 and 所不知 to cohere with the point of the following sentences (omission due to haplography).

302 Suppose someone does not know a thing’s length. If we show her a ruler and indicate that the thing is one foot long, then she knows the length. Analogously, suppose she doesn’t know what colour the thing is. If we tell her it is white, then she knows the colour. Words are like measuring tools or models (A31).

303 On these two sources of knowledge, see A80.
B71

Canon: Deeming statements all perverse is perverse. Explained by: his statement.

Explanation: (Deeming.) Perverse is impermissible. If this person’s statement is permissible—this is not perverse—then this is there being [some statement that’s] permissible. If this person’s statement is impermissible, then deeming it to fit the facts is surely injudicious.

B72

Canon: Taking it to be just what I call it. If it’s not the name, this is impermissible. Explained by: the converse.

Explanation: (Being.) It’s permissible/possible to call this ‘crane’, but still it’s not a crane. Calling both that and this ‘this’ is impermissible.

One making assertions mustn’t take things to be whatever he calls them. If the other nevertheless takes it to be whatever he calls it, then my calling does not proceed. If the other does not take it to be what he calls it, then it does not proceed.

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304 Emending 出之 (graphic error, parallelism with the next sentence).
305 B71 refutes the view that all statements are perverse, a claim perhaps motivated by the thought that all statements fail to adequately guide us in following the way (dào). (Ideas roughly resembling this view can be found in the Dàodéjīng and Zhuāngzǐ.) The Mohist argument is structured as a dilemma: the claim that all statements are perverse is itself either perverse or not. If it is, it can be ignored, since taking it to fit the facts would be injudicious. If it is not, then it itself is an example of a statement that is not perverse, so it is self-refuting. Compare B77 and B79.
306 See B68.
307 We can call dogs ‘cranes’, perhaps as a ‘borrowed name’ (see B8), perhaps as a given name. Still, they are not cranes. We cannot arbitrarily declare that two things normally referred to by converse terms, such as cranes and non-crane, are both to be
B73

經：無窮不害兼。說在盈否。
經說：無。南者有窮，則可盡。無窮則不可盡。有窮無窮未可智，
則可盡不可盡未可智。^308 人之盈之否未可智，^309 人之可盡不可盡
亦未可智，而必人之可愛也誄。
人若不盈無窮，^310 則人有窮也。盡有窮無難。盈無窮則無窮盡也。
盡無窮無難。^311

Canon: The limitless/infinite poses no obstacle to all-inclusiveness.\(^312\)

Explained by: filling or not.

Explanation: (Lacking.) [Objection:] If the south has a limit, then it can
be covered. If it is limitless/infinite, then it can’t be covered. Whether
it has a limit or not can’t yet be known, so whether it can be covered or
not can’t yet be known. Whether or not people fill it can’t yet be
known, and whether or not people can all be covered also can’t yet be
known, so it is perverse to take it as sure that it’s possible to care for all
people.\(^313\)

referred to by one of the terms. If another speaker insists on taking things to be what-
ever he calls them, then my calling them by their usual name will not ‘proceed’ in
consistently picking out all and only things of the same kind. If the other speaker
doesn’t insist that the thing is indeed whatever he calls it—if, for example, he is
merely using ‘Crane’ as a given name for a dog without suggesting that the dog is
actually a kind of bird—then this is a one-off use that does not ‘proceed’ to other
cases. B72 may be rebutting the view, associated with book two of the Zhuàngzì,
that the distinctions underlying the use of names are radically conventional, such that we
can take things to be whatever we call them, revising how we distinguish similarities
between things as we go.

^308 Omitting the duplicated 不可盡 (dittography).
^309 Omitting the graphs 而必 after 智 (dittography from the next sentence).
^310 Emending 先窮 to 无窮, equivalent to 無窮 (graphic error).
^311 Adopting the variant 盡其窮 that appears in three editions of the canons and
then, on the hypothesis that 其 was written 其, emending 其 to 无 (graphic
error), equivalent to 無.
^312 Canons B73, B74, and B75 form a series addressing potential logical problems
facing the ethical doctrine of inclusive care.
^313 The Mohists advocate all-inclusive care that covers all people, so they must hold
that it is possible to care about all people. The objection is that it is perverse to assume
for certain that it is possible to care about everyone, since we cannot know whether the
[Reply:] If people do not fill the limitless, then people have a limit. Covering all of what has a limit presents no difficulty. If people do fill the limitless, then the limitless can all be covered. Covering all of the limitless presents no difficulty.

**B74**

経：不知其數而知其盡也，說在問者。314

經說：不。二智其數，「惡智愛民之盡之也？」315 或者遺乎其問也。盡問人，則盡愛其所問。若不智其數而智愛之盡之也。316

Canon: Not knowing their number yet knowing they are all covered. Explained by: the one who asks.

Explanation: (Not.) Not knowing their number,317 if one asks ‘how do we know one’s caring about the people covers them all?’ some have been left out of what one asks about. If asking about people covers them all, then caring about the people asked about covers them all.318 It’s like not knowing their number yet knowing that caring about them covers them all. There is no difficulty.

**B75**

経：不知其所處不害愛之。說在喪子者。

經說：（關。）

Canon: Not knowing where they are located poses no obstacle to caring about them. Explained by: someone who has lost a child.319

totality of humanity can all be ‘covered’ or not. The Mohists respond with the quick dilemma that follows.

314 Emending 明 to ẩn (coherence with the explanation).
315 Emending 文 to 之 (systematic corruption).
316 Emending 文 to 之 (systematic corruption).
317 Reading 二 as a ditto mark for 不.
318 If we don’t know the number of people who are to be cared about, can our inclusive care cover them all? The Mohist response is that since our question about them covers them all, our caring attitude can indeed cover them all.
319 Just as not knowing whether humanity is infinite or not knowing how many people there are do not present obstacles to caring about everyone, the Mohists claim that not
Explanation: (None.)

B76

經：仁義之為外內也詩。說在忤顔。

經說：仁。仁愛也，義利也。愛利此也，所愛所利彼也。愛利不相為外內，所愛利亦不相為外內。其為仁內也義外也，舉愛與所利也。是狂舉也。若左目出，右目入。

Canon: Benevolence and righteousness being deemed external and internal is perverse. Explained by: matching up on a face.

B77

經：學之益也。說在誹者。

knowing where people are located presents no obstacle. A parent who has lost a child cares about the child without knowing the child’s location.

320 Emending 內 to 孺, taken to be a variant of 訳. The graph 內 is very likely to be an error by ditography, but the emendation to 訳 is conjectural.

321 Mencius 6A:4 depicts Gāozǐ advocating the view that benevolence is ‘internal’ and righteousness ‘external’.

322 As Graham suggests, this phrase may allude to the eye analogy in the explanation. Wǔ 件 refers to comparable objects aligning or matching up with each other.

323 On ‘wild’ citing, see B66. The items cited do not reliably reflect actual differences or similarities between two things.

324 We can describe the eyes as looking out on things or taking things in, but we cannot defensibly claim that one eye looks out while the other takes in. Caring and benefiting can be considered ‘external’ insofar as their recipients are others, or they can be considered ‘internal’ insofar as the caring and beneficient attitudes are ours. But we cannot defensibly claim that one is internal and the other external. Like the eyes, they must be treated in parallel, one being the match or counterpart of the other.
The Canon

Canon: The advantages of learning/study. Explained by: those who reject it.

Explanation. (Learning/study.) They take it that others don’t know that learning/study is of no advantage, so they inform them. This is making them know that learning/study is of no advantage. This is teaching. If they take learning/study to be of no advantage, then teaching is perverse.326

B78

Canon: Whether rejection is permissible is not determined by how many or few there are. Explained by: it being rejectable.

Explanation: (Rejection.) In sorting out whether rejection is permissible, if there are good grounds to support rejecting it, then even if there are many rejections, one’s rejecting it is right. If the grounds do not support rejecting it, then even if there are few rejections, it is wrong. Now if one asserts that it’s impermissible for there to be many rejections, this is like using long to sort out short.329

325 Omitting the 也 following 学. As the text stands, the 也 is redundant, but how the error occurred and whether the 也 signals a lacuna are open questions.
326 The text may be responding to ideas such as those presented in sections 19 and 20 of the Daodejing, which advocate renouncing learning and discarding wisdom. The Mohists hold that to teach that learning is of no advantage is self-contradictory. Proponents advocate such a view only because they consider learning it beneficial. Compare this canon with B71 and B79.
327 Transposing 論 and 謂 (restoring the heading).
328 Emending 謂 to 非 (corrected from the canon, parallelism with next sentence).
329 The translation is tentative. The gist seems to be that whether a view should be rejected depends on the grounds for rejection, not on how many instances of rejecting it there are. This sort of case is unlike a relative comparison of short and long. If we
B79

經：非誹者誹。誹在弗非。

經說：誹。不非己之誹也，不非誹。非可非也，不可非也，是不非誹也。

Canon: Rejecting rejection is perverse. Explained by: not rejecting it.

Explanation: (Rejection.) Not rejecting one’s own rejection, this is not rejecting rejection. Whether one’s rejecting something can be rejected or not, [either way] this is not rejecting rejection.

B80

經：物甚不甚，誹在若是。

經說：物。甚長甚短，莫長於是，莫短於是。是之是也，非是也者，莫甚於是。

Canon: Whether things are extreme. Explained by: like this.

Explanation: (Things.) The extreme in length, the extreme in shortness—none are longer than this, none are shorter than this. As to this being this, other than this, nothing is more extreme than this.

are sorting out what is short and what long, and too many items of different lengths are deemed ‘short’, perhaps some of them should be relabeled ‘long’.

330 Emending 誹 to 誹 (graphic error).

331 Transposing 不 and 誹 (restoring the heading). Presumably the heading here should be 誹 rather than 誹.

332 B79 seems directed at a view, perhaps loosely associated with remarks in book 2 of the Zhuangzi, that one can adopt the comprehensively tolerant stance of ‘rejecting all rejections’, or ceasing to deny or reject anything. The Mohist contention is that such a view is perverse or contradictory, since one cannot reject one’s own rejection of views that do reject rival positions. Compare B71.

333 If one’s rejection of something stands, then one cannot consistently reject the activity of rejecting things. Conversely, if one’s rejection does not stand, then the rejection itself is rejected, so again one cannot consistently reject the activity of rejecting things.

334 Emending 物甚 to 物甚 (graphic error).

335 Terms that express relative concepts, such as ‘long’ or ‘short’, admit of judgments of degree. Something can be the longest or the shortest. Terms that express whether something counts as a member of a certain kind do not admit of judgments of degree. Something either is or is not ‘this’; no member of the kind is more extremely ‘this’ than any other.
The Canon and Explanations

B81
經：取下以求上也。說在澤。
經說：取。高下以善不善為度。不若山澤。處下善於處上，下所謂上也。
Canon: Selecting [what is] below in order to seek being above. Explained by: marshes.
Explanation: (Selecting.) High and low are measured by whether they are good or not good. Not like mountains and marshes. If dwelling below is better than dwelling above, then below is actually above.\textsuperscript{336}

B82 [Omitted.]

\textsuperscript{336} Reading 請 as 情. ‘Above’ and ‘below’ carry the connotation of ‘superior’ and ‘subordinate’, so the last clause can also be read, ‘subordinate is actually superior’. B81 may be responding to ideas such as those in section 61 of the Dàodéjīng, which advocate achieving success by seeking a subordinate position. The explanation contends that when ‘above’ and ‘below’ are used as evaluative terms—unlike when they are used to describe features of the physical landscape—whatever is considered good thereby counts as ‘above’ or ‘superior’. Hence those who advocate adopting what is normally considered an inferior or a lower position are in fact treating it as the superior, and thus higher, position.
HEAVEN CARES about people less than the sage cares about people. It benefits people more than the sage benefits people. Great men care about commoners less than commoners care about great men. They benefit commoners more than commoners benefit great men. (44/1–2)

44.1

Deeming John one’s kin and caring about him is not caring about one’s kin. Deeming John one’s kin and benefiting him is not benefiting one’s kin. Deeming music beneficial to one’s son and desiring it for him is caring about one’s son. Deeming music beneficial to one’s son and seeking it for him is not benefiting one’s son. (44/2–4)

337 Alternatively, these two sentences could also be interpreted as ‘caring about John on the grounds that he is one’s kin is not caring about one’s kin; benefiting John on the ground that he is one’s kin is not benefiting one’s kin’. The point may be that inclusive care permits care and benefit for kin without this care and benefit counting as selfishly benefiting one’s own.

338 Because according to the Mohists music is not beneficial.
Among what are taken as units/parts, weighing the light and heavy is called weighing. Weighing the wrong such that it comes out right and condemning the wrong such that it comes out wrong are ‘by weighing’ and ‘exact’.

Cutting off a finger to save a wrist is selecting the greater among benefits or selecting the lesser among harms. Selecting the lesser among harms is not selecting harm; it is selecting benefit. What one selects is something controlled by others. When one encounters robbers, cutting off one’s finger to save one’s life is benefit. One’s encountering robbers is harm.

The passage describes two types of practical judgments, which it labels ‘weighing’ and ‘exact’. The first is when, weighing relevant factors, we judge that something normally deemed wrong is nevertheless the least harmful course of action in a particular situation and so counts as right. The second is when, after considering something normally condemned as wrong, we reaffirm that in our situation it is indeed wrong. Compare canon A84.

The passage alludes to a scenario in which a traveler is waylaid by robbers, who force him to choose between sacrificing his finger or his hand, in one example, and between his finger and his life, in another. Consistent with the Mohist ethical dào, one decides what to do by weighing benefits and harms. Sacrificing one’s finger is a harm, but in a situation that forces one to choose either a lighter or a heavier harm, selecting the lighter harm counts as selecting the greater benefit.

The sentence appears to break off after the word ‘wrist/arm’, perhaps because the bamboo strip on which it was written broke at this point. The first sentence of §44.3b could be the second half of this sentence. However, given the context and further textual damage in ensuing sections, it seems more likely that the fragment ‘selecting the lesser among harms’ in §44.3c is part of the remainder of this sentence. §44.5 also seems to belong to the same discussion as §44.3a.
44.3b
...... / 利於天下相若，無擇也；死生利若一，無擇也。殺一人以存天下，非殺一人以利天下也。殺已以存天下，是殺已以利天下。 / ..... 
… / If the benefit to the world is equal, there are no grounds for choosing one over the other. Life and death—if the benefit is the same, there are no grounds for choosing one over the other. Killing one person to save the world is not killing one person to benefit the world. Killing oneself to save the world, this is killing oneself to benefit the world. / ... (44/7–8)

44.3c
...... / 於事為之中而權輕重之謂求，求為之，非 / ..... / 害之中取小 / ..... / 求為義非為義也。 
… / Among affairs and conduct, weighing the light and heavy is called seeking. Seeking to do something is not / ... / selecting the lesser among harms / ... / Seeking to be righteous is not being righteous. (44/8–9)

…

44.5
利之中取大，非不得已也；害之中取小，不得已也。所未有而取焉，是利之中取大也；於所既有而棄焉，是害之中取小也。
Selecting the greater among benefits is not something one is forced to do. Selecting the lesser among harms is something one is forced to do. Selecting from among what doesn’t exist yet, this is selecting the greater among benefits. Relinquishing from among what already exists, this is selecting the lesser among harms. (44/12–13)

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343 This section appears to be assembled from three disjoint fragments.
344 One chooses the least harmful alternative only when forced to do so. Otherwise, we avoid harm altogether.
345 When choosing an end to pursue, one chooses what is most beneficial. When forced to give something up, one chooses the sacrifice that entails the least harm. This section appears to belong with §44.3a above.
44.6

Benefiting more those whom righteousness permits benefiting more and less those whom righteousness permits benefiting less is called ‘relation ranking’. The virtuous in conduct, rulers, the elderly, and parents—these are those one benefits more. Benefiting the elderly more, one does not benefit the young less. If the kinship is closer, benefit more; if the kinship is more distant, benefit less. No matter how distant the kinship, it still falls within the scope of righteousness. If the kinship is close, do not treat them according to their conduct but do observe their conduct. (44/13–15)

...

44.8

Caring about people/others does not exclude oneself; oneself is among those cared about. Oneself being among those cared about, care is applied to oneself. Caring about oneself according to relation ranking is caring about people/others. (44/17)

...

44.10

......有厚薄而毋倫列之興利，為己。......

346 Mohist ethics does not ask us to treat everyone equally. According to the norms of righteousness—norms that, according to the Mohists, best promote the benefit of all—we are permitted to do more for those with whom we have certain special relationships. This doctrine is called ‘relation ranking’.

347 The phrase ài rén 愛人 connotes both caring about others and caring about people. This section indicates that the moral ideal of all-inclusively caring about people is not selflessly altruistic. It includes caring about oneself, as part of the doctrine of relation ranking.
Promoting benefit to a greater or lesser extent without promoting benefit according to relation ranking is acting for oneself.\(^{348}\) (44/20)

\[\text{44.12}\]

......厚不外己，愛無厚薄。......

...Benefiting more does not exclude oneself. As to care, there is neither more nor less... (44/21–22)

\[\text{44.13}\]

有有於秦馬，有有於馬也，智來者之馬也。

For there to be some Qin horse is for there to be some horse. This is knowing the horse of someone coming.\(^{349}\) (44/22–23)

\[\text{44.14}\]

愛眾世與愛寡世相若，\(^{350}\) 兼愛之有相若。愛世世與愛後世，一若今之世人也。

Care about a heavily populated era and care about a scarcely populated one are equal; to inclusively care about them is for it to be equal. Care about a previous era and care about a later one are identical to care about people of the present era. (44/23–24)

\[\text{44.15}\]

鬼，非人也；兄之鬼，兄也。

People’s ghosts are not people. One’s brother’s ghost is one’s brother. (44/24)

\(^{348}\) By Mohist ethics, one should act for all, not only for oneself. If one benefits others more or less according to the norms of relation ranking, presumably this counts as acting for all. Violating those norms is acting for oneself.

\(^{349}\) If someone rides a Qin horse away from the state of Qin, by §44.22 it may no longer be a Qin horse, but it remains a horse. To know someone is coming on a Qin horse is to know they are coming on a horse. By implication, this fragment rejects Gōngsūn Lóng’s notorious claim that a white horse is not a horse.

\(^{350}\) Following Sūn in emending 愛眾世 to 愛眾世 on grounds of dittography.
44.18
小園之圍，與大園之圍同。不至尺之不至也，與不至千里之不至，不異。 小園之圍，與大園之圍同。不至尺之不至也，與不至千里之不至，不異。
The round of a small round thing is the same as the round of a large round thing. The not reaching of not reaching a measured foot and the not reaching of not reaching a thousand li are not different. As to their not reaching being the same, it refers to far and near. (44/26–27)

44.19
……意楹，非意木也，意是楹之木也。意指之人也，非意人也。意獲也，乃意楹也。志功不可以相從也。……
……Thinking of a pillar is not thinking of wood; it is thinking of the wood of this pillar. Thinking of a person’s finger is not thinking of a person. Thinking of one’s hunting catch is thinking of game. Intent and achievement cannot be taken to follow from each other… (44/27–28)

44.22
……名實。名實不必名。苟是石也白，敗是石也，盡與白同。是石也唯大，不與大同。是有便謂焉也。
……names and objects. As to names and objects, one does not treat names as surely applying [to objects].

351 Following Sün in emending the unintelligible 方至尺之不至也，與不至鐘之至 to 不至尺之不至也，與不至千里之不至.
352 Alternatively, emending 名 to 合, this sentence can be interpreted as ‘names and objects do not necessarily match’.
big, it is not all the same as big. In these cases, there is something that determines what to call it.

As to things named on the basis of shape and features, one must know this is such-and-such, only then can one know such-and-such. As to things that cannot be named on the basis of shape and features, even if one does not know this is such-and-such, it’s possible to know such-and-such. All things named on the basis of residence or movement, if they have entered among them, they are all this. If they leave, on that basis they are not. As to all things named on the basis of residence or movement, such as district and village names, ‘Qi’ and ‘Jing’, these are all such things. As to all things named on the basis of shape and features, such as mountains, hills, houses, and shrines, these are all such things.

44.23

......重同，具同，連同，同類之同，同名之同。
　丘同，鰓同，是之同，然之同，同根之同。
　有非之異，有不然之異。
　有其異也，為其同也，為其同也異。
　一日乃是而然，二日乃是非而然，三曰遷，四日強。

...The same in being identical/doubled, the same in being together, the same in being connected, the same in being the same kind—the same in taking the same name.

353 Names do not apply to their referents under all conditions. If a large white stone is broken up, the name ‘white’ continues to apply to the bits, but the name ‘large’ no longer applies.
354 Horses are an example of things named on the basis of their form or shape (xíng 形) and their looks or surface features (mào 貌). To know horses, one must know that this animal at hand is a horse. A person who does not know that ‘horse’ refers to this kind of animal does not know horses.
355 Things originating from the state of Qin are an example of something not named on the basis of shape or features. We can know that something is a Qin thing even if we do not know what exactly it is.
356 If something resides in Qin, it counts as ‘this’ with respect to the name ‘Qin’—it is a Qin object. If it departs from Qin, it no longer takes the name ‘Qin’.
357 The names of two states.
The same in being segregated together, the same in being associated, the same in being this, the same in being so—the same in having the same root.

There is being different in being not-this and there is being different in being not-so.

There are differences that are deemed the same and what is deemed the same that is different.\(^{358}\)

The first is called this and so; the second is called this and not-so; the third is called shifting; the fourth is called forced. (44/36–39)

44.25

The caring about others that is caring about Jane is produced by considering Jane’s benefit, not by considering John’s benefit. Yet the caring about others that is caring about John is just the caring about others that is caring about Jane. If the world benefited from eliminating care about them, one could not eliminate it…Though as high-ranking as the Son of Heaven, he benefits others no more than a commoner does.

Two sons serving their parents, one encounters good fortune, one encounters misfortune; their parents being equal, it’s not that the first son’s conduct is more advantageous. External circumstances cannot make our benefit to parents greater.

If by John’s death the world were harmed, we would look after John a myriad times more, but our caring about John would not be greater.\(^{359}\) (44/42–46)

\(^{358}\) The translation is tentative.

\(^{359}\) The translation of the entire section is tentative.
44.26

Tall people’s being the same as short people is their features being the same, so they are the same. A finger’s being a person and a head’s being a person are different. The parts of a person’s body are not one in their features, so they are different. A jiāng sword and a tīng sword are different. Swords are named on the basis of shape and features. Their shape is not the same, so they are different.

The wood of willow-wood and the wood of peach-wood are the same.

All things not named on the basis of citing amount or number, if they are smashed, they are all this thing. So a person’s finger is not a person, but this person’s finger is this person. One side of a square is not a square, but one side of a square piece of wood is that square piece of wood. (44/46–49)

44.27

......[夫辭] 以故生，以理長，以類行也者。立辭而不明於其所生，忘也。今人非道無所行，唯有強股肱，而不明於道，其困也，可立而待也。夫辭以類行者也，立辭而不明於其類，則必困矣。故......

......[Expressions?] arise on the basis of reasons, develop on the basis of patterns, and proceed on the basis of kinds. To establish expressions without understanding what they arise from is reckless. Now without dào people have nothing to proceed by. Even if they have strong

360 Emending 異 to 與 (graphic error).
361 This point is illustrated by the example of the stone in §44.21. This paragraph and §44.21 may originally have belonged together.
362 This section appears to be preceded by a lacuna, and the first sentence lacks a subject. A dangling instance of the word ‘expressions’ in an earlier section (omitted here) is a likely candidate for the subject of this sentence.
363 Compare section §45.1e.
364 Reading 妄 for 忘.
legs, without understanding *dào* they are sure to run into difficulty. Now as to expressions proceeding on the basis of kinds, if one establishes expressions without understanding the relevant kinds, one will surely have difficulty.365 So…366 (44/49–51)

44.28366

......聖人也，為天下也......或壽或卒，其利天下也相若368 ......愛之相若，擇而殺其一人.....凡興利除害也.....不為己之可學也.....愛人非為譽也.....愛人之親，若愛其親.....兼愛相若，一愛相若.....

…The sage acts for the sake of the world...One long-lived, one short-lived, their benefit to the world is equal...Caring about them equally, select and kill one person among them...All cases of promoting benefit and eliminating harm...That not acting for one's own sake can be learned...Caring about others is not for praise...Caring about others’ parents as one cares about one’s parents...Inclusive care for all is equal, care for each one is equal… (44/52–57)
BOOK 45
THE ‘LESSER SELECTION’

45.1a

夫辯者，將以明是非之分，審治亂之紀；明同異之處，察名實之理；處利害，決嫌疑。焉摹略萬物之然，論求群言之比。

As to disputation,\(^{369}\) by it we clarify the divisions between what is this and not and judge the guidelines of order and disorder; clarify places of sameness and difference and examine the patterns of names and objects; settle benefit and harm and resolve doubt. Only then can we lay out what is so of the myriad things and sort out parallels in groups of statements. (45/1–2)

45.1b

以名舉實，以辭抒意，以說出故，以類取，以類予。有諸己不非諸人，無諸己不求諸人。

By names, mention objects. By expressions, put across thoughts. By explanations, present reasons.\(^{370}\) Select and propose on the basis of kinds.\(^{371}\) Having it oneself, one doesn’t condemn it in others. Lacking it oneself, one doesn’t seek it in others.\(^{372}\) (45/2–3)

\(^{369}\) ‘Disputation’ (biàn 辯, see canon A74) refers to discourse—often competitive—concerning how to draw distinctions correctly. Alternative translations include ‘dialectics’, ‘distinguishing’, and ‘distinction-drawing’.

\(^{370}\) These three units of disputation or discourse are explained functionally rather than structurally. Names are used to mention or refer to things. Expressions are strings of names used to express thoughts. These could be phrases, sentences, or series of sentences. ‘Explanations’ are pieces of discourse that explain the reasons for the expressions one asserts.

\(^{371}\) Assertions are accepted or rejected on the basis of whether they reflect the correct distinctions between kinds.

\(^{372}\) A basic rule of consistency and fairness.
45.1c

或也者，不盡也。假者，今不然也。效者，為之法也，所效者所以為之法也。故中效，則是也；不中效，則非也。此效也。

Some is not all. Supposing is when it’s now not so. Emulating is making a model for it. What’s emulated is what’s made the model for it. So if something matches in emulating, it’s this/right. If it doesn’t match in emulating, it’s not. This is emulating. (45/3–4)

45.1d

辟也者，舉也。物而以明之也。侔也者，比辭而俱行也。援也者，曰「子然，我奚獨不可以然也？」推也者，以其所不取之同於其所取者，予之也。是猶謂也者，同也。吾豈謂也者，異也。

Analogy is mentioning other things and using them to clarify it. ‘Parallel’ is placing expressions side by side and jointly proceeding. ‘Pulling’ is saying, ‘You are so, how is it that I alone cannot be so?’ ‘Pushing’ is, on the basis that what they don’t accept is the same as what they do accept, proposing it. ‘This is like what’s been said’ is being the same. ‘How could I say that?’ is being different. (45/4–6)

45.1e

夫物有以同而不率遂同。辟之侔也，有所至而正。其然也，有所然也。其然也同。其所然不必同。其取之也，有所以取之。

This section introduces three concepts relevant to disputation. ‘Some’ and ‘all’ refer to quantification. ‘Supposing’ probably refers to giving conditional or counterfactual examples. ‘Emulating’ a model determines whether something is ‘this/right’ or not.

45.1e

夫物有以同而不率遂同。辟之侔也，有所至而正。其然也，有所然也。其然也同。其所然不必同。其取之也，有所以取之。其所取之也同。其所以取之不必同。是故辟、侔、援、推之辭，
Things have respects in which they are the same, yet it doesn’t follow that they are completely the same. Parallels between expressions are correct only up to a point. When things are so, there is that by which they are so. Their being so is the same, but that by which they are so isn’t necessarily the same. When people accept things, there is that by which they accept them. Their accepting them is the same, but that by which they accept them isn’t necessarily the same. Thus expressions in analogies, paralleling, pulling, and pushing become different as they proceed, become dangerous as they change direction, fail when taken too far, and leave their roots as they flow, and so one cannot fail to be cautious and cannot invariably use them. So statements have many methods, separate kinds have different reasons/causes, and so one cannot look at only one side.\(^\text{378}\) (45/7–10)

45.2a

夫物或乃是而然，或是而不然，或不是而然，\(^\text{379}\) 或一周而不周，或是一而一非也。

As to things, some are this and so, some are this but not so, some are not this but so, some are in one case comprehensive and in one case not comprehensive,\(^\text{380}\) some are in one case this and in one case not.\(^\text{381}\) (45/10–11)

\(^{378}\) Compare section §44.27. The four methods of disputation introduced in §45.1d are all based on analogical reasoning and judgment. (1) Analogy is grounded in similarities between things. (2) ‘Paralleling’ is based on syntactic similarities between utterances. (3) ‘Pulling’ is based on similarities between an opponent’s previous explanation or assertion and one’s own. (4) ‘Pushing’ is based on similarity between what the opponent accepts and what one now asserts. Since analogical reasoning and judgment are not invariably reliable, there are a plurality of ways in which the methods can break down and yield incorrect results. Disputers must be cautious and carefully examine the various reasons underlying how to distinguish kinds correctly.

\(^{379}\) Inserting 或不是而然 to designate the type of case corresponding to the examples in §45.2d.

\(^{380}\) Emending two instances of 害 to 周 (corrected from the text in §45.2e).

\(^{381}\) Omitting twenty-two graphs mistakenly inserted here by ditography from the end of §45.1e.
45.2b

White horses are horses; riding white horses is riding horses. Black horses are horses; riding black horses is riding horses. Jane is a person; caring about Jane is caring about people. John is a person; caring about John is caring about people.

These are cases of ‘this and so’.\(^{382}\) (45/12–13)

45.2c

Jane’s parents are people; Jane’s serving her parents isn’t serving people.\(^{388}\) Her brother is a handsome man; caring about her brother isn’t

\(^{382}\) In each example, with respect to the more general kind mentioned, the less general kind or the individuals mentioned are ‘this’, or members of that kind. (White horses are ‘this’ with respect to horses.) As to the action mentioned, performing that action on the less general kind qualifies as a case of performing it on the more general kind, so the action is ‘so’ with respect to performing it on the more general kind. (Riding white horses is ‘so’ with respect to riding horses.) Each example is thus a case of ‘this and so’.

\(^{383}\) Emending 视 to 親 (graphic error).

\(^{384}\) Emending two instances of 入 to 入 (graphic error).

\(^{385}\) Emending 無難難無難矣 to 無難矣 (dittography).

\(^{386}\) Transposing 故 也 and reading the latter as 他 (corrected from §45.2d).

\(^{387}\) Emending 態 to 然 (corrected from preceding text).

\(^{388}\) ‘Serving people’ refers to being employed as a servant. Since §20.3 uses ‘serving someone’ to refer to marriage, an alternative translation is ‘Jane’s serving her parents isn’t getting married’.
caring about a handsome man. Carts are wood; riding carts isn’t riding wood. Boats are wood; entering boats isn’t entering wood. Robber—people are people; there being many robbers isn’t there being many people. There being no robbers isn’t there being no people.389

How do we clarify it? Detesting there being many robbers isn’t detesting there being many people. Desiring there be no robbers isn’t desiring there be no people. All the world accompany each other in together deeming these right. If it’s like this, then although robber—people are people, caring about robbers isn’t caring about people, not caring about robbers isn’t not caring about people, and killing robber—people isn’t killing people. There’s no difficulty in this. These cases and those previous ones are the same kind. The world accepts those without condemning themselves; the Mohists accept these but the world condemns them. Is there any other reason for it than what’s called ‘clogged up inside and closed off outside’, such that their hearts have no space within? They are clogged up inside and cannot be released.

These are cases of ‘this but not so’. (45/13–19)

45.2d

These examples are cases of ‘this but not so’ (see the last line of the section). Although the things mentioned are indeed members of the kinds mentioned, performing the action mentioned on those things does not count as a case of performing it on those kinds. Jane’s brother is a handsome man, but caring about her brother (fraternal affection) is not a case of caring about a handsome man (sexual attraction). Analogously, the Mohists will argue, although robbers are people, killing them (capital punishment for banditry) is not killing people (murder). Compare B54.

389  These examples are cases of ‘this but not so’ (see the last line of the section). Although the things mentioned are indeed members of the kinds mentioned, performing the action mentioned on those things does not count as a case of performing it on those kinds. Jane’s brother is a handsome man, but caring about her brother (fraternal affection) is not a case of caring about a handsome man (sexual attraction). Analogously, the Mohists will argue, although robbers are people, killing them (capital punishment for banditry) is not killing people (murder). Compare B54.

390  Inserting 書也好讀書 (parallelism with the ensuing text).

391  Emending 且鬥雞 to 鬥雞 (faulty parallelism).

392  Emending 壽天也 to 止且天止天也 (parallelism with preceding examples).

393  Inserting 類 (parallelism with §45.2c).
Moreover, reading books isn’t books; liking reading books is liking books. Cockfights aren’t gamecocks; liking cockfighting is liking gamecocks. Being about to fall into a well isn’t falling into a well; stopping someone about to fall into a well is stopping someone from falling into a well. Being about to go out the door isn’t going out the door; stopping someone about to go out the door is stopping someone from going out the door.

If it’s like this, then being about to die young isn’t dying young; stopping someone from being about to die young is stopping someone from dying young. Holding there is fate isn’t fate; condemning holding there is fate is condemning fate. There’s no difficulty in this. These cases and those previous ones are the same kind. The world accepts those without condemning themselves; the Mohists accept these but the world condemns them for a crime. Is there any other reason for it than what’s called ‘clogged up inside and closed off outside’, such that their hearts have no space within? They are clogged up inside and cannot be released.

These are cases of ‘not this but so’. (45/19–23)

45.2e

Caring about people requires comprehensively caring about people and only then does it count as caring about people. Not caring about people doesn’t require comprehensively not caring about people; if one doesn’t
comprehensively care about them, on this basis one counts as not caring about people.\textsuperscript{398}

Riding horses doesn’t require comprehensively riding horses and only then counts as riding horses; if one rides any horse, on this basis one counts as riding horses. When it comes to not riding horses, it requires comprehensively not riding horses and only then counts as not riding horses.

These are examples of ‘in one case comprehensive and in one case not comprehensive’. (45/23–25)

\textsuperscript{45.2f}

居於國，則為居國；有一宅於國，而不為有國。
桃之實，桃也；棘之實，非棘也。
問人之病，問人也；惡人之病，非惡人也。
人之鬼，非人也；兄之鬼，兄也。祭人之鬼，\textsuperscript{399} 非祭人也；祭兄之鬼，乃祭兄也。
之馬之目盼則為之馬盼；\textsuperscript{400} 之馬之目大，而不謂之馬大。
之牛之毛黃，則謂之牛黃；之牛之毛眾，而不謂之牛眾。
一馬，馬也；二馬，馬也。馬四足者，一馬而四足也，非兩馬而四足也。\textsuperscript{401} 馬或白者，\textsuperscript{402} 二馬而或白也，非一馬而或白。

此乃一而一非者也。

If one lives within a state, then one counts as living in the state. Owning a house within a state, one doesn’t count as owning the state.

The fruit of peach trees is peaches, but the fruit of brambles isn’t brambles.

Asking about a person’s illness is asking about a person; detesting a person’s illness isn’t detesting a person.

\textsuperscript{398} To count as inclusively caring about people, one must care about all of them. Excluding even one person from our care entails failing to ‘care for people’, in the Mohist sense. To count as riding horses, one need ride only one; to count as not riding horses, one mustn’t ride any.

\textsuperscript{399} Inserting 人 before 之鬼 (corrected from preceding sentences).

\textsuperscript{400} Emending two instances of 盼 to 盼 (graphic error).

\textsuperscript{401} Omitting 一馬馬也 on grounds of dittography from the previous sentence.

\textsuperscript{402} Emending 自 to 白 (graphic error).
A person’s ghost isn’t a person; your elder brother’s ghost is your elder brother. Sacrificing to a person’s ghost isn’t sacrificing to a person; sacrificing to your elder brother’s ghost is sacrificing to your elder brother.

If this horse’s eyes are blind, we say this horse is blind. This horse’s eyes are big, but we don’t say this horse is big.

If this ox’s hair is brown, we say this ox is brown. This ox’s hairs being many, we don’t say this ox is many.

One horse is horse. Two horses are horse. Horses have four feet—this is one horse and four feet, not two horses and four feet. Horses, some white—this is two horses with one being white, not one horse with part being white.

These are examples of ‘in one case this and in one case not’. (45/25–30)

403 Reading 為 as 謂 (parallelism with next sentence).