A Path with No End:  
Skill and Dao in Mozi and Zhuangzi  

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1. Introduction  

How does skill relate to dao, the ethically apt path and its performance? Two early Chinese ‘masters’ anthologies that make prominent use of craft metaphors imply profoundly contrasting answers to this question.  

For the Mozi 墨子, a key to following dao is to set forth explicit models or standards for guiding and checking performance. By learning to consistently apply the right standards, we can develop the skill needed to follow the dao of the sage-kings reliably, just as a carpenter uses a set square to produce square corners or a wheelwright uses a wing compass to fashion round wheels. Following dao—and thus the ethical life—is strongly analogous to the performance of skills. Like an artisan’s craft, dao has a fixed end that can be explicitly articulated.  

A sharply contrasting stance is implied by the renowned skill exemplar Cook Ding in the Zhuangzi 莊子. Praised for how his every movement in carving up cattle is perfectly attuned, yielding a display of skill matching that of an exquisite dance or musical performance, Ding responds that what he actually cares about is dao, which is ‘advanced beyond skill’. Intriguingly, most of what Ding says in explaining this point pertains to how he developed and performs his craft and overcomes new challenges. The implication is that the process of acquiring, performing, and extending skills exemplifies dao, yet there is something more to dao than skill.  

What is this something more? A skill is the ability to competently perform a task with a specified end. In the Zhuangzi, a key difference between skill and dao, I will suggest, is that dao is unlike skill in having no fixed, predetermined ends. Dao is a general, open-ended process, one that is continually shifting and transforming. We can never fully master dao, nor even know exactly where it will lead, as the nature of dao is such that we must regularly find creative ways of extending it as we proceed along it.  

Nevertheless, discussions in the Zhuangzi make clear that a distinction obtains between adept and poor performance of dao. Accordingly, there must be factors by which to distinguish more from less fitting paths or ends to pursue and more from less adroit ways of pursuing them. Here again, dao is closely intertwined with skill, as evaluations of dao performance resemble assessments of skill, couched in terms of how effective, successful, competent, or adroit one’s activity is. If dao has no fixed ends, however, by what criteria can we assess whether some course of activity amounts to an effective or adroit performance of dao? A plausible Zhuangist answer, I propose, is that particular contexts themselves yield
provisional grounds for such evaluations. These grounds can then be revised or replaced in response to developing circumstances and continuing performance of dao. The resulting approach to understanding and living the good life, I will suggest, can informatively be labeled an ethics of dao and de 德 (virtue), referring to the path we follow and the capacities by which we follow it.

The upshot for the relation between skill and ethics is that in both Mohist and Zhuangist thought, a comparison with skills is helpful to understanding the theory and practise of ethics. For the Mohists, the ethical dao is strongly analogous to a skill. In the Zhuangzi, skilled performances may exemplify dao, but the flourishing practise of dao goes beyond skill, because unlike skills, dao has no fixed, determinate ends or boundaries.

2. Dao, Models, and Skill in Mozi

The Mozi is a collection of writings by anonymous hands presenting the thought of Mo Di 墨翟 (fl. ca. 430 BC) and his followers, who formed one of early China’s most prominent social and philosophical movements. The Mohists presented China’s first systematic ethical and political theories, which are grounded in their distinctive brand of communitarian consequentialism.

As the Mohists and other pre-Han texts use the word, ‘dao’ functions much like the English ‘way’. ‘Dao’ can refer to an actual method or manner of doing something, as when the Mozi speaks of the various dao by which inept rulers decrease the population (20/15). It can also refer to a normatively competent or appropriate method of doing something, as when the texts speak of the dao of making clothing (20/4) or boats and carts (20/8) and ‘the dao by which to bring order to the people and unify the masses’ (12/61). By extension, it can refer more generally to a normatively apt set of practises or way of life. The Mohists claim, for example that their ethical norm of inclusive care is ‘the dao of the sage-kings’ (16/83). In such contexts, dao overlaps what we think of as morality. For example, referring to obvious moral values, Mohist writers speak of ‘the dao of benevolence and righteousness’ (25/80).

Dao is primarily practical, not verbal. Mohist writings regularly pair it with statements or verbal teachings (yan 言), distinguishing explicit expressions or formulations of dao from dao itself. Statements can function as guidelines to direct us in following dao, and the activity of promulgating explicit teachings may be part of dao. But dao itself is the normatively apt conduct or practise (xing 行), not merely the verbal teaching that directs us toward that practise (10/27, 25/25).

1 References to Mozi cite chapter and line numbers in Hung (1966).
2 Accordingly, the Mohists hold that dao can be explicitly articulated and that it can taught, two assumptions that are rejected in the Zhuangzi, as Lisa Raphals discusses in a recent
Nevertheless, the Mohists see verbal formulations and other explicit standards as crucial in clarifying and guiding the practise of *dao*. They refer to such guidelines as ‘models’ or ‘standards’ (*fa* 法). The Mohist ethical norm of all-inclusive care for everyone is considered a ‘model’ of ‘the *dao* of the sage-kings’, for example (15/11, 16/83). The core Mohist ethical standard of promoting the benefit of all is another prominent model (32/1). One Mohist text urges that no affair of any kind can be undertaken successfully without the use of models (4/1).

In labeling guidelines such as inclusive care ‘models’, the Mohists expressly assimilate them to tools that artisans use to guide and evaluate the performance of crafts, since in Classical Chinese such tools are also called ‘models’ (*fa*). Prominent examples are the wheelwright’s wing compass and the carpenter’s set square, used to produce round wheels and square corners and to check whether a particular wheel or corner is up to standard. As one Mohist text explains, all artisans, whether expert or not, use models to ‘measure’ their work (4/4). Models do not ensure perfect performance, but they reliably help the unskilled to improve. ‘The skilled can match the models exactly. The unskilled, although they can’t match them, by relying on them in their work still surpass [what they can do by] themselves’ (4/3–4).

The craft analogies imply that practising *dao* is a matter of performing a skill. As in carpentry or wheel-making, the practise of *dao* can be clarified, guided, checked, and improved by reference to explicit models that the performer seeks to emulate. The models are not identical to *dao*, and merely applying the right model does not ensure that one follows *dao* successfully. But models facilitate the normatively apt, skilled performance that is *dao*. The right model can articulate *dao* so clearly that using it to gauge what does or doesn’t conform to *dao* is ‘like differentiating black from white’ (27/72).

The process by which models are applied to guide action underscores the skill-like character of *dao* performance. Models function as exemplars to be emulated or matched in carrying out a skilled task. In the paradigmatic cases, the carpenter uses the square to draw a line and then saws an edge that copies the line. The wheelwright uses the compass to mark the rim and then shaves the rim or adjusts the spokes until the rim matches the mark. In more abstract cases, the model might be a norm such as ‘benefiting people’. If a course of conduct conforms to the norm, we perform it; if not, we avoid it (32/1). Conceptually, the Mohists understand a model such as ‘benefit

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2 Accordingly, the Mohists hold that *dao* can be explicitly articulated and that it can taught, two assumptions that are rejected in the *Zhuangzi*, as Lisa Raphals discusses in a recent anthology on skill in *Zhuangzi* (2019: 136–37).

3 A difference between *dao* and skill is that we can refrain from performing a skill without thereby losing it, whereas we cannot refrain from conforming to *dao* without thereby being unethical. Someone who rarely rides a bicycle does not thereby lose the skill of bike riding, but someone who rarely follows *dao* loses any claim to ethical virtue. I suggest the Mohist explanation of this difference would be that *dao* is skill-like, but since it is a comprehensive way of life, we cannot refrain from engaging in it.

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people’ or ‘inclusively care for each other, in interaction benefiting each other’ (15/10–11) as a practical standard to emulate in our course of conduct, rather than a theoretical general principle from which to draw inferences about what to do.

A crucial presupposition drives the Mohist conception of dao as a practical performance, analogous to a skill, that can be guided by reference to models. The craft analogies imply that, like making wheels or houses, dao has fixed, specifiable ends. The compass and square function as clear, useful models only given the ends of producing round wheels and right-angled corners. Mohist norms such as all-inclusive care function as models of dao only given an understanding of dao as directed at the end of promoting the benefit of all, which the Mohists take to be the basic good that explains the moral values of benevolence and righteousness.

By contrast, Zhuangzi writings typically reject benevolence and righteousness as values and question whether dao has any fixed or specific ends. 4 A dao with no specifiable end is a dao for which no models can be established—a dao that transcends any one skill.

3. Cook Ding on Dao Versus Skill

The Zhuangzi is an anthology of brief texts from roughly the late fourth to the mid-second century BC presenting a range of views that later archivists grouped together under the label of ‘Daoism’. The collection is named after a figure called Zhuang Zhou 莊周, about whom little is known, but it is unclear what portion of the material, if any, can plausibly be attributed to him. The texts offer a rich medley of criss-crossing ideas and viewpoints sharing various family resemblances; they are probably best read as a compendium of intersecting and overlapping conversations or social media posts than as a systematic attempt to present a unified, integral doctrinal stance. My discussion will treat selected passages as contributions to a discourse touching on dao and its relation to skill, exploring how various ideas in this discourse relate to each other and drawing out some of their implications. In some places, the discussion will reconstruct or elaborate views in the texts; in others, I may be assembling positions that are only latent in the source material.

The most well-known discourse on skill in the Zhuangzi—Ding the butcher’s explanation of his craft—begins by distinguishing dao from skill and explaining that its chief concern is with dao, not skill. Yet the remarks that follow are almost entirely about Ding’s craft. What, then, does his discussion imply about the relation between skill and dao?

Carving up an ox for Lord Wen Hui, his master, Ding steps, leans, and slices as gracefully as if performing an elegant ritual dance to the rhythm of a symphony. Amazed, Wen Hui asks how skill (ji 技) could reach such

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4 On rejecting benevolence and righteousness, see, for example, Zhuangzi 6/84. (References to Zhuangzi cite chapter and line numbers in Hung [1956].) On a dao without fixed ends, see, for example, the passage quoted in section 6 below.
heights. Ding responds that what he cares about is dao, which is ‘more advanced than’ or ‘advanced beyond’ skill (3/5). He sketches how he developed and performs his craft, how he overcomes challenges, and the satisfaction his work brings. Wen Hui exclaims that from Ding’s remarks he has learned how to ‘nurture life’, or provide what is crucial to living well (3/12). The text thus frames the discussion as concerned with dao and living well. Ding’s remarks are presented as doubly significant, applying to the specific skill of meat carving and also to the general concern of living well.

Here, then, is a first respect in which dao applies not merely to any one skill, such as Ding’s, but to living well in general. It generalises in a way that skills do not. It is not a particular skill, but skilled work such as Ding’s can exemplify it—even bloody, filthy work slaughtering oxen and carving meat. As Guo Xiang says in his commentary, Ding’s concern is with the ‘patterns of dao’ (dao li 道理), which he ‘lodges’ (ji 寄) in his skill (Guo 1961: 119). Reflecting this concern with dao, rather than skill, Ding talks less about what he does in his work than how he does it. His focus is on the process, not the concrete technique (how he holds the knife, for example). This focus reflects the general nature of dao as understood in this context: it primarily concerns how we do what we do—the approach and manner—and only secondarily what we do—the substance or content. As we will see, however, the how shapes the what: applying the approach to dao that Ding illustrates leads us toward certain sorts of actions and away from others.

Ding’s remarks can be divided roughly into three parts (3/5–11). First he describes how he acquired his skill. As a beginner, he saw only whole oxen; as an intermediate, after three years of practise, he saw them as if already sliced up, directly perceiving the joints and seams where the knife would cut. Now, as an advanced expert, he says, ‘I meet it with my spirit, not looking with my eyes.’ He acts without a reflectively self-conscious process of observing the ox and deciding how to cut, instead moving directly on the promptings of ‘spirit’, a more fundamental, automatic mode of agency.

Next, Ding describes how he works. He carves smoothly and gracefully because he ‘complies with natural patterns (li 理)—cutting along the major gaps, being guided by the main seams, and thus working in accordance with (yin 因) what’s ‘inherently so’ in the structure of the ox. This way, he says, he never directly hits a ligament or tendon, let alone a bone. Through this approach, Ding boasts, he avoids even normal wear-and-tear on his knife, having gone a whole nineteen-year calendrical cycle without needing to sharpen it. There is space between the joints, and the knife edge has no thickness, he says, so ‘there’s always plenty of room for the blade to wander about.’

Ding then goes on to explain how, despite his high level of skill, he regularly encounters intricate, knotty situations in which the grain and gaps

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5 My interpretation here follows the Cui Zhuan and Xiang Xiu commentaries (Guo 1961: 120). For more on the role of ‘spirit’, see Fraser (2019).
are difficult to find. He cautiously prepares, slows down, focuses his vision, moves the knife subtly, and the meat suddenly comes apart. Having resolved the difficulty, he steps back and looks around in relaxed satisfaction before wiping and sheathing the knife.

What aspects of Ding’s remarks generalise, informing us about \(\text{dao}\) rather than only meat-carving? What stands out, I suggest, is that \(\text{dao}\) amounts to a process of acquiring and exercising competence in detecting and responding to ‘patterns’, finding one’s way through ‘gaps’, and regularly working through difficulties. Ding’s experience implies that this process can be deeply satisfying.

Looking more closely at his descriptions, we can expand on this characterisation. Undertaking \(\text{dao}\) involves a lengthy process of learning and internalising a way of perceiving and interacting with things. Once we have acquired some \(\text{dao}\), acting on it becomes spontaneous and automatic, something we regularly do without reflective self-consciousness. The adroit practise of \(\text{dao}\) lies in avoiding obstacles by working with the inherent grain or pattern (\(\text{li}\)) of things, according with (\(\text{yin}\)) the solid, unmovable facts about them, and so finding space through which to move. Moreover, if we can make ourselves ‘thinner’, figuratively speaking, reducing the extent to which we collide against things, we will more easily fit through the gaps and can avoid being worn down.

Crucially, \(\text{dao}\) is not simply a matter of applying practised expertise to familiar, routine cases. It also includes regularly extending existing skills by working our way through unfamiliar, difficult situations, without knowing in advance exactly how we will do so. \(\text{Dao}\) refers not only to a well-formed path and a manner of following it; it is also the spontaneous, creative process by which we find a way forward when the path is difficult or blocked.\(^6\) The recurrent experience of being pulled from our comfort zone and forced to navigate knotty, unsure terrain is another respect in which we might say that \(\text{dao}\) advances beyond skill.\(^7\) Presumably, this feature marks a sense in which \(\text{dao}\) cannot be taught or handed down to others, since each of us must find a way for ourselves. It also helps explain why Ding nowhere mentions the models (\(\text{fa}\)) that are so prominent in the Mohist conception of \(\text{dao}\) as clearly articulated and signposted by explicit, determinate standards. Since \(\text{dao}\) as Ding presents it regularly leads beyond familiar, routine cases, it draws on an uncodifiable, creative capacity for adaptation that cannot be captured by fixed, predetermined standards.\(^8\)

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\(^6\) Dan Robins (2011) emphasizes this point, which I will develop below.

\(^7\) This is Robins’s suggestion (2011). Arguably, however, skills do include a capacity to adapt to new challenges, albeit within the circumscribed field of the skill.

\(^8\) In this regard, consider the contrast between the Mohist figure of the wheelwright guiding and checking his work against the compass and the wheelwright depicted in the \(\text{Zhuangzi}\) (13/68–74), who claims that mastery in cutting wheels rests on an inexpressible, unteachable art of chipping the wood not too slowly or hastily. The two visions are not necessarily contradictory; cutting wheels could be a subtle art with results that nonetheless need to be checked against the compass. But the difference in emphasis is informative as to the two contrasting conceptions of skill and \(\text{dao}\). For further discussion of these conceptions of skill, see Raphals (2019: 133–35).
Cook Ding’s comments thus depict *dao* as a process or an approach—how to learn and proceed adeptly in some field of activity while regularly overcoming challenges. Ding’s own skill exemplifies this process, but the process itself could apply to any activity. This generality reflects another respect in which *dao* is distinct from and advances beyond skill. A skill is not just a process: skills are partly defined by their ends. Ding is a skilled meat-carver not simply because of how he approaches his work but because he produces cleanly sliced cuts of meat. Skills such as meat-carving come with inherent ends by which to evaluate performance. Ding knows he has successfully handled the knotty sections when the meat suddenly comes apart—falling, he says, ‘like a clump of earth to the ground’. The carpenter and wheelwright perform their skills well when their work matches the square or compass and they produce houses that stand firmly upright or wheels that roll smoothly. Indeed, the process of performing a skill is intelligible as such only in the context of the defining end to which the skill is directed.

By contrast, if my suggestion above is plausible, *dao* in this context is a general process without any fixed end. What factors, then, determine whether we are indeed pursuing *dao* aptly or poorly? Lord Wen Hui declares that Ding’s remarks show how to ‘nurture life’. Perhaps a criterion of apt *dao*-following is whether a person stays alive and healthy—indeed, perhaps my suggestion is mistaken, and the end of *dao* is life. However, numerous *Zhuangzi* passages indicate that the adept see life and death as two aspects of a single process, without privileging life over death (e.g., 5/30, 6/46). It seems that the Zhuangist practitioner seeks to stay healthy and alive when doing so is the obvious, fitting course but has no hesitation about accepting death when it too seems fitting. So death doesn’t necessarily reflect a failure to follow *dao* well. The point of Wen Hui’s remark is not that *dao* aims at preserving life; it is that Ding’s descriptions illustrate the process of how to live a flourishing life.

*Dao* is advanced beyond skill in applying not just to the pursuit of one or another end but to any end. Here an obvious question arises. Does the conception of *dao* as a process with no specific end cover any activity we might undertake, without constraint? Some ends are deplorable. Can a vicious but meticulous and skillful serial killer justifiably claim to follow *dao* well? Perhaps guidelines like the Mohists’ fixed, determinate ‘models’ are needed as constraints to exclude the serial killer from claiming mastery of *dao*.

The Cook Ding story implies that there are indeed constraints. Ding distinguishes a mediocre cook, who changes his knife monthly, from a good cook, who changes it annually, from Ding himself, who has gone nineteen years without dulling a blade. Clearly, there are better and worse ways of

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9 Steven Coutinho raises a pair of related questions (2019: 97). Does Zhuangist thought have the resources to distinguish skilled performances that reflect sageliness from those that do not? Has it grounds by which to disapprove of, for example, actions that harm others? As the discussion below explains, I think the *Zhuangzi* can resolve both issues.

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Arguably, the serial killer’s approach to dao is deeply defective. No matter how skillful his actions may seem, they will most likely induce retribution eventually, rendering his path a repugnant failure. But the relevant constraints, I suggest, are neither general nor fixed. They arise from the process itself, from how well, in a particular context, we conform to the natural patterns, follow the seams and gaps, accord with what’s inherently so, and avoid obstacles.

What, then, distinguishes how well a particular agent fulfills these criteria? This is a crucial question for Daoist ethical thought. How do we distinguish apt dao from injudicious dao or adept from inept dao-following in the absence of fixed standards or ends?

4. Proficiency in the Patterns

The question of what marks competence in dao arises again when we look at Zhuangzi passages that focus on dao, rather than skill. Dao itself and adept performance of dao are described in terms familiar from descriptions of skill, yet no specific, determinate criteria are given to mark the competent practise of dao.

The ‘Autumn Waters’ dialogue, for example, discusses how dao can guide conduct, explaining dao as Cook Ding does by appeal to the patterns (li 理) of things (17/46). The practical conditions we encounter are constantly changing, the text holds, with the result that concrete, action-guiding distinctions that seem appropriate in one context may need to be reversed in another. Adept performance of dao requires flexible, adaptive responses, not commitment to fixed norms, as the Mohists advocate. ‘Don’t constrain your intent, or you’ll be hobbled in following dao…don’t proceed by a single [standard], or you’ll be at odds with dao’ (17/42–43). We are to ‘embrace the myriad things’ and proceed without limits, boundaries, biases, favouritism, or any fixed direction, seeking to accord with how things ‘transform of themselves’ (17/41–47). ‘Knowing dao’ is equated with ‘attaining proficiency (da 達) in the patterns’ and thus understanding how to adapt our conduct to changing situations (17/48). The emphasis on adaptive, contextual responses to patterns resonates with how Ding conforms to the inherent features of the ox and with descriptions of other Zhuangzi skill exemplars, such as the whitewater swimmer who flows with the dao of the water (19/52–3), the artisan whose fingers transform along with things (19/62), or the woodcarver who lays his hand to work only when he can ‘see’ the finished carving latent in the inherent nature of the wood (19/58).

The prominence of the concept of ‘pattern’ or ‘grain’ (li) in ‘Autumn Waters’ and the Cook Ding story reflects the important role of this notion across the pre-Han literature. ‘Pattern’ refers to facts about how things are structured or organised, how they relate to or interact with each other, and how they develop, proceed, or transform. Conforming to patterns is thus a prerequisite for proper or successful action. Misunderstanding or
overlooking them is likely to lead to error or failure. Accordingly, following dao well lies in finding a path that aligns with the patterns; following it badly is struggling against or conflicting with the patterns. A distinctive feature of the Zhuangist approach is that the patterns are understood to be deeply contextual and continually transforming.

How do abstract descriptions of the ideal of adaptively responding to patterns translate into practice? Two Zhuangzi stories concerning social interactions illustrate such responses well. The first is a story of failed interaction, the second of a successful response.

Failure is illustrated by the story of a seabird that serendipitously landed near the capital of the landlocked state of Lu (18/33–39). Delighted by the bird’s visit—an auspicious omen—the Lord of Lu had it escorted to the ancestral temple, where he honoured it with a ritual feast and musical performance. Sadly, the bird became upset, refused to eat or drink, and soon died. Despite his good intentions, the lord only harmed the auspicious guest, because he followed customary norms for honouring a human dignitary, neglecting the reality that music and crowds would only disturb a bird, who instead needed to fly about, roost in trees, and dine on grubs and bugs. The lesson of the story is that ‘names stop at reality; what’s right is determined by what fits’ (18/39). To proceed adeptly, we must set aside labels or titles (‘names’, ming 名) associated with conventional conceptions of right and wrong and instead attend to the ‘reality’ of the situation (shi 實) and what best ‘fits’ it (shi 適), adapting our actions to the facts (such as a bird’s normal diet), rather than rigidly following codified standards (such as the ritual protocol for hosting an honoured guest). To do so, the text explains, is to ‘attain proficiency (da) in the patterns (tiao 條, a synonym of li) and preserve welfare’ (18/39). In failing to deal with the bird appropriately, the Lord of Lu ineptly disregarded the relevant patterns, with tragic results.

A contrasting, successful interaction with others is illustrated by the story of a monkey keeper who accommodated his charges by adjusting their daily menu (2/38–40). The keeper announced that the monkeys would get three nuts in the morning and four in the evening. Preferring a larger breakfast, the monkeys were angry. So the keeper reversed the allocation: everyone would have four in the morning, three in the evening. The monkeys were delighted. The keeper ‘harmonised’ (he 和) the situation by adjusting the nut distribution in a way that defused the monkeys’ anger at no cost to himself, as the total allocation remained seven nuts per day (2/39–40).

This adjustment illustrates what the text calls ‘according-shi’ (yin shi 因是), or adaptively and provisionally ‘affirming’ things or taking them to be ‘right’ (shi 是) ‘in accordance with’ (yin 因) particular circumstances (2/37)—just as Cook Ding proceeds ‘in accordance with’ (yin) what is

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10 Ontologically, then, dao might be regarded as inherent in the patterns. In some strands of Daoist thought, it may be regarded as the source of the patterns, referring to the way in which they issue forth. These fascinating aspects of dao deserve careful treatment but are beyond the scope of my discussion here, which focuses on dao as an ethical path.
‘inherently so’ in the grain of the meat. The discussion leading up to the monkey story contends that action-guiding distinctions between ‘this/right’ and ‘not/wrong’ or between ‘so’ and ‘not-so’ are determined by the dao we carry out, which ‘completes’ one among multiple potential ways of proceeding (2/33). Apart from the dao we practise, nothing is inherently right or wrong, ‘so’ or ‘not-so’. Hence if a path we undertake runs into difficulty, we are free to change direction. Grasping these points, the adept refrain from ‘imposing-shi’ (wei shi 為是), or deeming things this or that on the basis of fixed standards applied without regard for particular contexts. Instead, they ‘accommodate things in the ordinary’ (2/36). The ‘ordinary’ (yong庸) is what is useful or effective (yong用), successful (de得), and connects or proceeds in a proficient, free-flowing manner (tong通) (2/36–37). To accommodate things successfully in some context is to apply ‘according-shi’. Indeed, the adroit practise of dao lies in acting on such provisional, ‘according-shi’ attitudes without knowing one is doing so—without knowing what the appropriate responses will be, since they are discovered in the course of our activity (2/37). An implication is that, as discussed in section 3, dao is indeed exemplified by the process of working through the knotty parts without knowing in advance exactly how we will do so.

The monkey keeper’s compromise with his wards thus illustrates a general conception of dao as an adaptive response to circumstances that facilitates ongoing ‘ordinary coping’, or useful, successful, free-flowing movement along a path presented by the situation. Instead of acting on fixed standards of right and wrong, as the Mohists advocate, the idea is to respond adaptively to the ‘patterns’ operative in the context. On this view, the criteria of appropriate action are a cluster of notions such as doing what ‘fits’ or ‘accords with’ the ‘reality’ of the particular situation or what ‘attains proficiency’ (da達) in the ‘patterns’ and ‘harmonises’ with things. An apt course of action will seem ‘ordinary’ while being ‘effective’, ‘successful’, and ‘free-flowing’ or ‘proficiently connecting through’.

The overlap between this cluster of terms and descriptions of skill is striking. In effect, conduct that accords with dao is conceptualised along the lines of adept skill performance, using terms implying facility, competence, and proficiency. These terms again raise the question of what criteria distinguish apt from inapt dao-following. What makes some course of conduct ‘fitting’, ‘harmonious’, ‘successful’, or ‘free-flowing’?

11 I follow A. C. Graham (1969/70) in taking yin shi 因是 to be a set phrase because the two graphs occur together in the text four times apparently referring to the same idea. As Graham proposed, the phrase yin shi seems to contrast with wei shi 為是, which also appears four times, referring to insistently imposing some shi judgment on things.

12 The next several paragraphs draw on the discussion in Fraser (forthcoming), section 3.3.

5. The Ends of Dao

How do we evaluate how well some course of action ‘fits’ (shi 適) or ‘flows’ (tong 通) in a concrete context? Since dao in general has no fixed ends, a plausible Zhuangist answer is that particular contexts themselves provide provisional or pro tanto grounds for such evaluations. These grounds can then be revised or replaced as we go along, in response to developing circumstances and continuing performance of dao.\(^\text{14}\)

Think of our present dao as encompassing our values, interests, and ends, our capacities, and our current path and manner of activity. In any given situation, we find ourselves proceeding according to some dao. As we do so, we interact with our environment and with other agents whose dao intersects or converges with ours, both of which we must take into account if we are to proceed in a fitting, free-flowing way. Our initial dao and our relation to the context, including other agents, jointly provide starting criteria by which to evaluate how well various ways of continuing forward fit the situation, flow freely, attain harmony, preserve welfare, and so forth. A fitting path forward will accommodate our ends—and those of others we interact with—as we proceed with our dao. Our preliminary conception of good ‘fit’ (shi) or ‘success’ (de 得) may simply be to continue following our initial dao smoothly, using our existing capacities to fulfill the provisional values and ends we began with. As we proceed through concrete, changing circumstances, however, our dao may need to be modified, and with it our ends and criteria of ‘fit’. Perhaps the dao we are pursuing leads to obstacles, generates conflict, or creates frustration—all indications of a failure to accord with the patterns at hand and of poor fit between our conduct and the context. Perhaps we discover that some of the values or ends we take for granted clash with each other, such that we must modify or forgo some in order to proceed smoothly with others. Perhaps we adopt new values or ends as we extend our path. In all of these cases, we may need to refine or revise our dao, including the internal criteria by which we assess it as ‘fitting’, ‘successful’, or ‘free-flowing’.

Cases such as the monkeys and the seabird illustrate this contextual approach to evaluating ‘fitting’ or ‘free-flowing’ activity. The monkey keeper’s initial dao involved caring for the monkeys and feeding them seven nuts per day, divided among meals in a certain way. The monkeys protested, creating an obstacle to this dao and thereby indicating a failure to ‘fit’ or ‘flow freely’. For the keeper, the criteria of a fitting, successful way forward were ends such as preserving the monkeys’ welfare, calming them, and meeting the overall nut budget of seven per day. So he adjusted the allocation per meal—a relatively marginal feature of his original dao—to accommodate his charges’ preferences while still proceeding in a way consistent with other, more important features. By criteria such as allocating seven nuts per day, keeping the monkeys happy, and achieving harmony with them, his modified dao proved ‘competently free-flowing’ (tong).

\(^\text{14}\) This section draws on the discussion in Fraser (forthcoming), section 4.

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The Lord of Lu responded to the seabird’s visit according to an elaborate religious and cultural *dao* involving cosmological beliefs about auspicious omens and ritual norms concerning how to honour visiting dignitaries. Obtusely acting on this *dao* without regard for the ‘reality’ of the situation or the ‘patterns’ of avian welfare led to a disastrous outcome for both sides, as in seeking to honour the bird the lord only harmed it. By both the lord’s and the bird’s lights, a more ‘fitting’, competent path would have been for the lord to modify his original *dao* in a way that fulfilled his aim of celebrating the rare visit while also successfully nurturing the bird. Perhaps, for example, he could have moved the bird to a wetland sanctuary, affixed a commemorative marker to the tree where it landed, and conducted a ritual at the ancestral shrine.

*Zhuangzi* writings offer no specific method for finding such ‘fitting’ courses of action beyond proceeding with an open, ‘empty’ (*xu*) mind, seeking to adapt to the ‘patterns’ and ‘what’s inherently so’ without rigidly imposing any preconceived way of going on. This continual, subtle process of adjustment again reflects how *dao* is intertwined with skill. The apt *dao* is discovered by working our way through intricate, difficult spots in a skill-like manner, much as Cook Ding delicately feels his way through the knotty parts. In doing so, we draw on the tacit capacities that have brought us where we are without knowing beforehand just how we will proceed next.

Moreover, given that *dao* has no determinate end, in many cases there is unlikely to be any uniquely correct way to go on. Perhaps, reappraising his nut budget, the monkey keeper could instead have offered four nuts at both meals. Perhaps, contemplating the monkeys’ happiness, he could have set them free in a forest to find their own nuts. Perhaps, reconsidering the bird’s likely preferences, the Lord of Lu could have simply let it fly off and offered a prayer of thanks. Or perhaps, on seeing the bird, he might have realised it was simply lost and dropped his cosmic-religious interpretation of the event. The aim is not necessarily to follow the ‘correct’ *dao*, for there may be no such thing. It is to find a path that provisionally allows us to move on, balancing various ends and addressing obstacles or frustrations as best we can. The complex, dynamic nature of the ‘patterns’ of things means that any such path must be undertaken provisionally, with humility. Our initial moves through the ‘knotty’ parts may fail to fully ‘fit’ all of the relevant patterns or may ‘harmonise’ the factors in play partly but not wholly. New patterns may emerge as we go. Our actions themselves may change the situation, such that further responses are needed. A judicious *dao*-follower will remain perpetually open to adjustments in the path, aware that, insofar as *dao* can be said to have a rough, general aim, it just is the ameliorative process of continually seeking out what ‘fits’ or ‘flows’ in evolving circumstances, by standards of ‘fit’ or ‘flow’ that may themselves also evolve.

15 The notion of an open, ‘empty’ (*xu*) mind is pivotal to Zhuangist moral psychology. For more discussion, see Fraser (2014b).
So a further respect in which *dao* is like skill yet goes beyond it is that we must regularly apply our existing competence to reassess and reform our *dao* in response to changing circumstances that may jar with aspects of it as developed so far. In performing his skill, Cook Ding finds his way through the knotty parts by making fine adjustments to his knife-work. By extension, in navigating through the ‘patterns’ we encounter, we all must make fine adjustments to our *dao* to find the most fitting path we can. The result may sometimes be a rather different *dao* from what we started with.\(^{16}\)

**6. An Ethics of Dao and De**

The conception of *dao* I have been describing entails continually adjusting our provisional ends as we navigate through shifting circumstances. This view of *dao* is illustrated by a story that reevaluates the idea, prominent in some *Zhuangzi* passages, that it may be useful to oneself to be found useless by others (see, e.g., 1/42–47, 4/64–75). The story contrasts a mountain tree that grows large because woodcutters find it useless for timber with a goose that is butchered because it cannot honk (20/1–9). In the one case, being thought worthless led to health and longevity; in the other, it led to premature death. So, a student asks a fictional *Zhuangzi*, where should we settle? To live well and avoid ‘entanglement’ with things, are we better off being regarded as worthy or worthless? *Zhuangzi* suggests that neither worthiness nor worthlessness is an appropriate aim; nor indeed is a moderate course between them, seeking to avoid either worthiness or worthlessness. Instead, he suggests:

> Wander about by riding on *dao* 道 and *de* 德…without praise or criticism, now a dragon soaring in the sky, now a snake slithering along the ground, transforming together with circumstances, never committing to acting only one way, now above, now below, taking harmony as your measure. Wandering about with the source of the myriad things, letting things be things without letting them treat you as any [fixed] thing….Students, remember this! Make your home only in *dao* and *de*!\(^{17}\) (20/6–9)

Instead of following any set norm or committing to any one path or end—being useless, useful, or somewhere in between, for instance—the text advocates ‘riding along’ with *dao* and *de*, allowing ourselves to be drawn along fitting paths (*dao*) through our inherent virtue or capacity (*de*) for finding and following them. To ‘ride *dao* and *de*’ is to wander about with the flow of natural processes—the mysterious ‘source’ of things—pursuing

\(^{16}\) Echoing these observations, Wai Wai Chiu suggests that key features of skillful performance in *Zhuangzi* include fluency, fine-tuning, and freedom from previously instilled ways of proceeding (2019: 7).

\(^{17}\) An alternative interpretation, reading 鄕 as 向, is ‘Take only *dao* and *de* as your direction!’ An alternative interpretation of the preceding line is not to let oneself become enslaved to things.
no particular direction or end by which to praise or blame, proceeding now in this manner, now in that, undertaking different modes of activity without committing exclusively to any. We are to shift along with circumstances, seeking only to maintain harmony (he 和) with things as we flow along, adjusting fluidly without becoming a determinate ‘thing’ that others could aim to use. No fixed norms or ends capture the adaptive, responsive ‘transformation’ (hua 化) characteristic of employing our inward de to follow dao as we encounter it.

In light of passages such as this, I suggest that the Zhuangzi can informatively be described as presenting an ethics of dao and de.\textsuperscript{18} The central concepts in this ethics are not right and wrong or moral virtues and vices, but apt or fitting paths of conduct and the virtue, or capacity for agency, by which we follow such paths. The focus is on the path we pursue and how we pursue it—whether the path ‘flows’ or ‘connects through’ (tong 通), ‘fits’ (shi 适), and yields ‘harmony’ and whether our manner of activity displays the flexibility, resilience, and creative responsiveness needed to find and follow such a path. Conduct and character are assessed not by familiar moral norms but in terms similar to how we assess the performance of skills—how responsive we are to particular situations, how proficient we are at proceeding along a sustainable course of activity, how resilient and adaptable we are in dealing with change, challenges, and misfortune.\textsuperscript{19} To perform dao well is to find our way through a field of ‘patterns’ (li 理) freely and smoothly, with harmony and ease, while avoiding hindrance or obstruction, in a manner akin to the competent performance of an art or a skill. The good life lies in manifesting de in such performances and thereby ‘wandering’ (you 遊) through our circumstances, much as Cook Ding’s knife is said to ‘wander’ through the spaces between the joints of the ox (3/9).\textsuperscript{20} The metaphor of dao as a process of ‘wandering’ is telling: dao is not a path toward a specific end or destination, but a meandering course toward nowhere in particular.

This conception of apt conduct and the good life helps to explain the intense interest in skills in the Zhuangzi, as skilled performances offer examples of fluid, adaptive responses to changing circumstances, albeit within the fixed scope of a particular skill, with a particular end. An instructive way of understanding one salient Zhuangist ethical vision, then, is that the crux of a flourishing life lies in ‘advancing beyond skill’ by extending to life as a whole the open, ready responsiveness familiar from the performance of skills.\textsuperscript{21} The ideal—or at least the version of a Zhuangist ideal implied by whoever compiled the collection’s first chapter,

\textsuperscript{18} I elaborate on this proposal in Fraser (forthcoming), section 4, from which some remarks in this section are drawn.\textsuperscript{19} For a discussion of the moral psychology implied by these remarks, see Fraser (2014b) and (2019).\textsuperscript{20} This interpretation of the Zhuangist good life is explored in Fraser (2011) and (2014a).\textsuperscript{21} As Coutinho suggests, in a Zhuangist philosophy of skill, ‘living well’ and ‘cosmic wisdom’ are ‘manifested in practical adeptness in negotiating our environments’ (2019: 87).
‘Wandering About Freely’—is to roam without fixed ends or bounds, relying on nothing in particular and thus following no fixed standards or norms (1/21).

Consider a story from ‘Wandering About Freely’ that contrasts adept living with its opposite, clumsiness, while extending the metaphor of dao-following as carefree wandering. Zhuangzi’s friend Huizi was given the seeds of a large bottle gourd, which grew to produce gigantic, 500-litre fruit. Gourds were conventionally used as either containers or ladles. Huizi tried using the giant gourds as containers, but when he filled them with water, they collapsed, unable to hold up their own weight. So he tried cutting them open to make ladles, but they proved too large to dip into anything. Frustrated, he declared the gourds useless, he tells Zhuangzi, and smashed them (1/36–37).

Zhuangzi berates him for being clumsy (zhuo 拙) at using big things. Instead of worrying that the gourds were useless as containers or ladles, he says, why not make them into floats, climb astride, and go drifting about—that is, wandering—on rivers and lakes (1/42)? Nothing is useful or useless in itself; usefulness is always relative to some norm or end. Huizi has locked himself into trying to use the gourds according to fixed ends inapplicable to rare, gigantic fruit. His narrow-minded competence in conventional uses of regular-sized gourds renders him clumsy in finding creative uses for unusually large gourds. His mind is overgrown with brambles, remarks Zhuangzi (1/42)—obstructed, closed off to novelty, and thus inept at finding new ends to fit unusual situations. Those who ‘ride along with dao and de’, by contrast, develop a open-minded readiness to go beyond familiar ends to find creative ways to engage with their circumstances.

7. Conclusion

The Mohists explicitly compare ethical practise to performing a skill. Like a skill, dao has a determinate end, which explicit ‘models’ can guide us in pursuing, much as the compass and square guide artisans in producing round wheels and square corners. To a large extent, the ethical life for the Mohists is a matter of mastering the skill of reliably distinguishing and undertaking what is benevolent and righteous.

For a prominent strand of thought in the Zhuangzi, on the other hand, the performance of skills can exemplify how to proceed with dao, but dao itself goes beyond skill, extending to life as a whole the adaptive learning, competent performance, and problem-solving acumen displayed in skilled activity. Unlike skill, dao is a general, unbounded process with no fixed aims or purpose. In the course of this process, we find ourselves acting on contextually specified models, norms, values, and methods, but these are continually open to revision or replacement. Circumstances regularly present us with ‘knotty’ stretches, prompting us to find creative, adaptive ways of going forward that draw on but go beyond the capacities and path
we have developed so far. Indeed, I suggest, the crux of dao lies in working our way through such stretches, extending, redirecting, and refashioning our path. Unlike any skill, or indeed any activity with specified boundaries and goals, dao is a path with no end—one on which we continually make and remake our way forward.

References


