developmental systems theorists are free to concentrate on the question of how the emotional phenotype is constructed. They do not have to concern themselves with whether the emotion in question is biological, in which case they must assimilate its construction process to that of a highly entrenched morphological feature, or cultural, in which case they must treat biological factors as a uninteresting background. They are free to look at the heterogeneous construction of emotion. The social constructionist literature which I review in the next chapter need not be read in the first instance as showing that emotions have no evolutionary origins. It can also be read as a fascinating contribution to developmental psychobiology. If emotions depend critically on factors

such as cultural models of appropriate behavior, then the evolutionary questions remain to be addressed. How ancient are those models? How long ago did the human psychological phenotype come to depend on this particular source of developmental information, and how much has that resource diverged between different human groups since that originating event?

6
The Social Construction of Emotion
6.1 What Is Constructionism?

The constructionist approach is inspired by the apparent variation in emotional phenomena across cultures. This variation is of many kinds. Most radically, some cultures seem to have their own, proprietary emotions. The Japanese experience an emotion called *amae*, sometimes described as a deeply gratifying sense of childlike dependency on a person or institution (Morsbach and Tyler 1986). This is not easy to identify with any emotion experienced in Anglo-Saxon societies. Even where it seems possible to identify the same psychological condition across cultures, the wider phenomena associated with the emotion may differ greatly. If an emotion sharing cognitive and physiological elements with *amae* were found to occur in AngloSaxon society, it would be appear very different because it would not find the other social factors with which it usually interacts. Finally, an emotion may be more prominent in one culture than in another, in the sense that the emotion is experienced more often and that people use the emotion concept to articulate ideas about what constitutes a successful or unsuccessful life. Love seems to be particularly prominent emotion in our own culture. Observations of these sorts of variations give rise to the idea that emotional phenomena are part of the local culture in the same way as the local religion or system of gender relations. Although I have distinguished various ways in which emotional phenomena differ among

cultures, social constructionists have treated them all in much the same fashion. They have tried to deny that there is any essence to an emotion which can be reidentified across different social contexts (Armon-Jones 1986a). Rather than saying that the same emotion has different effects or is interpreted differently, they have claimed in every case that different cultures have different emotions.

The social constructionist program has two things to offer to a general treatment of emotional phenomena. First, it suggests that elements of the local culture such as social roles and conceptions of appropriate behavior may feed by several different routes into the construction of the emotional phenotype. These contributions can be assimilated to the program of heterogeneous constructionism which I sketched in the last chapter. I hope to show that these insights of social constructionism are perfectly compatible with what is known about the evolutionary basis of emotion. Second, the social constructionists suggest that much of what people say about their emotions is not a transparent description of their psychological processes. Certain emotional responses may be the acting out of myths about the mind in the same way that ghost possession is the acting out of metaphysical beliefs. If correct, this strongly supports my general conclusion that we will need conceptual revision in order to construct a scientific psychology of emotion.

In order to gain the benefit of the insight that certain emotions are "social constructions" it is necessary to reject attempts to water down the notion of social construction so that it applies to everything and offers no particular insights about anything. There are two very different models of the social construction of emotion in the literature. I call these the *social concept* model and the *social role* model. The social concept model is most clearly expressed by Solomon (1984), although it can found in most of the authors whose primary discipline is philosophy. Solomon begins by asserting something like the propositional attitude theory of emotion defended in his earlier work (Solomon 1977). To have an emotion is to make a certain judgment about the world. In fear, the current situation is dangerous; in love, it is romantic; in amae, it is perhaps maternal. Unlike the traditional propositional attitude theory, however, the social concept model suggests that the categories into which the world must be classified in order to produce an emotion are "cultural" rather than "natural" categories. This distinction is explained by Claire Armon-Jones: "Emotions are constituted by non-natural attitudes, these being acquired in, and explicable by reference to, specifically socio-cultural contexts . . . such attitudes and their external referents are either irreducibly, or significantly sociocultural in nature" (1986a, 36-37).

So natural and nonnatural propositional attitudes are those whose *objects* are "natural" or "cultural" respectively. I take it that the belief that

I am about to be accused of treason is an example of an attitude with a "cultural" object. The belief that I am about to be eaten might be an example of a belief with a "natural" object. Since emotions involve beliefs and desires with cultural objects, they will vary from society to society. As Solomon puts it, "Emotions are conceptual constructions, and as go the concepts, so go the emotions as well" (1984, 252); and Ratner: "The fact that adult human jealousy is constructed from social concepts means that cultures lacking these concepts should experience no jealousy. This situation characterises the Eskimo who accept extra-marital sexual relations without jealousy" (1989, 213).

The social concept model concerns itself primarily with the construction of categories of eliciting situations for emotion. It is a model of the emotions themselves only because an emotion is identified with the thought that the eliciting situation is present. The second model of social construction concerns itself more with the construction of the output side of emotion, the sequence of events that manifests an emotion. I call this the social role model of construction. A clear presentation of this model can be found in the work of the psychologist J. R. Averill. Averill defines social constructionism as the view that

an emotion is a transitory social role (a socially constituted syndrome) that includes an individual's appraisal of the situation, and is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action. (Averill 1980a, 312)

A social role is a characteristic pattern of behavior found in a particular society. The existence of such roles often appears to have a function, either for the individuals who play the role, or for the society as a whole, or for both. The role of father, for example, is both a way for a man to define his authority and responsibilities in our society and a way that a particular kind of social order is maintained. A *transitory* role is a role like "understanding friend" or "stern teacher"--a set of behaviors that a person deploys on an occasional basis, usually in a specific type of social situation. Averill suggests that "being angry" or "being in love" are also roles that people adopt in certain situations and that reflect society's conception of what is appropriate in that situation.

Another part of Averill's definition, the idea that emotions are interpreted as passions, helps make the social role idea more plausible. Emotions are normally thought to just happen, rather than being put on or

acted out. They are passions rather than actions. But according to Averill, the belief that emotions are difficult or impossible to control is a myth which helps the emotion to fulfill its various functions. Our helplessly "suffering" an emotion is part of the role we take on.

Take anger as a case in point. There is a general cultural prohibition against intentionally harming another; however, under certain circumstances . . . retaliation may be expected, and even demanded; it must, however, be carried out in such a manner that the individual does not willingly violate the general cultural norm against injuring another. Being "overcome" by anger is one way of meeting this dual standard.

(Averill 1980b, 66)

Many people find the idea that emotions are "disclaimed actions" intuitively implausible. Constructionists try to shake this intuition by describing disclaimed actions in distant cultures whose myths have no grip on us. Averill provides a particularly striking example in his discussion of a New Guinean socially constructed illness. The Gururumba people experience the state of "being a wild pig" (Newman 1964). In this state they run wild, looting articles of small value and attacking bystanders. The Gururumba think the wild-pig syndrome is caused by being bitten by the ghost of a recently dead member of the tribe. They believe that this releases impulses suppressed by society and civilization. The syndrome is treated as a disease by the tribe. The antisocial behavior is tolerated to a quite remarkable extent. The disease either runs its course or is ritually cured. Wild-pig behavior is largely restricted to males between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five. At this age men are likely to be under considerable economic pressure following the acquisition of a wife. Wild-pig behavior seems to occur when a man cannot meet his financial obligations. After a display of wild-pig behavior the individual receives special consideration with respect to these obligations. Newman convincingly explains wild-pig behavior as a device by which a man can obtain this consideration without denying the fact that the demands made on him are legitimate. The behavior is an action, but is not acknowledged as such either by the individual or by society. It is part of the wild-pig role that wild-pig behavior is involuntary.

In a recent book on multiple personality syndrome (MPS) Ian Hacking describes a form of social construction very similar to that seen in the Gururumba (Hacking 1995). According to Hacking the modern symptom-

atology of MPS evolved hand in hand with theories of the disorder. By channeling their distress into forms recognized by current theory, individuals

were able to gain social acceptance as "sick" and to receive positive feedback from therapists, support groups, and so forth. In the early days of the modern MPS epidemic individuals rarely presented with the full range of symptoms. Distressed individuals were "trained" in the production of MPS symptoms, first by expert therapists and later by a voluntary movement of laypersons. Today, with the help of literature and television talk shows, patients are able to produce the symptoms without individual tuition. MPS has become part of the local culture in countries suffering the MPS epidemic.

A similar explanation might be given of the syndrome found in a number of southeast Asian societies and referred to as *amok*. This syndrome consists of indiscriminate attacks on others and usually culminates in the killing of the person who runs *amok*. *Amok* is traditionally triggered by perceived dishonor. Cases are cited of Westerners living in Asia running *amok*, presumably by example. Once again, this can be interpreted as a disclaimed action. The man running *amok* is not pretending to be in a frenzy, but he would not be in the frenzy unless he had learned that this is an appropriate response to certain unbearable social pressures. He is acting out a social role, part of which is that he is not in control of his actions. It might be argued that a similar syndrome now exists in Western culture. Men who believe that none of their options allows them selfrespect exhibit a rather stereotypical pattern of behavior, probably derived from contemporary action films. They shoot at a large group of people, not necessarily people associated with their misfortunes, before being shot or shooting themselves. They purport to be "out of control" and are treated as such by society, yet their behavior is under the fairly precise control of a recently developed model of how one might behave in such a situation.

Averill suggests that emotions can be disclaimed actions of this sort. People display the behavior that they have learned is socially appropriate in that situation. Neither the individual nor society, however, acknowledges that this is what is happening. Instead, they represent the behavior as a natural and inevitable response to the circumstances and outside the control of the individual. Averill argues that we construct emotions because as supposedly passive, unavoidable states they obtain special privi-

leges for those who suffer them. The Gururumba's constructed spiritual disorder helps individuals cast off social ties and allows society to reduce the implicit challenge to its moral order by blaming the event on ghosts. Similarly, social ties can be cast off with the assertion that one is carried away by love without questioning the legitimacy of those ties.

Although the idea of disclaimed action is central to Averill's presentation of constructionism, the social role model need not depend on it. Averill insists at several points that a socially constructed response must be "improvised," that is, planned by the agent using their knowledge of cultural norms. But this is far too narrow a conception of how cultural norms can influence behavior. A driver's response to an intersection is presumably socially constructed, since it is an acquired behavior in which the subject attempts to conform to cultural norms for the situation. Nevertheless, it can and should be so inculcated as to be produced without conscious direction (sometimes even without its production being consciously registered by the subject). Socially constructed emotional responses may be automatic in the same way. The emotion need not be the product of a cultural model in the synchronic sense that the individual produces it in order to conform to the model. The emotion may depend on the model in the diachronic sense that the existence of the model in the culture helped shape what is now a relatively automatic reaction to certain situations. We might call this the *reinforcement* version of the social role model, as opposed to the *disclaimed action* version.

At some points, Averill seems to recognize this possibility. In response to the accusation that his account of improvisation is implausible as an account of actual mental processes preceding each emotional response, he remarks that

it is true that most people do not become emotional in order to fulfil some social obligation. But a role analysis is no more objectionable in this respect than is an analysis in terms of biologically based adaptive patterns . . . any specific episode of anger, love, . . . etc., may meet no social need. But if on the average, or over the long run, such emotional syndromes conform to social norms, then their net result will be functional within the social system (Averill 1980a, 336)

The idea in this passage seems to be that people do not deliberately produce emotions in order to obey cultural norms. Instead, the existence

-142-

of those norms creates something akin to a pattern of reinforcement which shapes people's behavior so that it conforms to the norms. So although emotions achieve various individual and societal goals, the individual need not have a plan to achieve their goals when they produce the emotion. The wider society need not have a plan to achieve *its* goals when it accepts the emotion. The goals explain the behavior only because they explain why behavior of that sort has been reinforced.

I have discussed two models of the social construction of emotion, the latter of which has two important variants. The social concept model suggests that to

have an emotion is to think of the current situation as one which is culturally appropriate to a particular emotion. The social role model suggests that having an emotion is manifesting the behavior that constitutes a culture's model of a particular emotion. The social role model has two variants, the disclaimed action version, in which the behavior is driven by a deliberate attempt to conform to a social role, and the reinforcement version. In the reinforcement version the social role is not internalized as a direct cause of behavior, but behavior is brought into conformity with it by patterns of reinforcement in the cultural environment.

6.2 Getting Constructionism Right

The social role model of the social construction of emotion is superior to the social concept model. It can incorporate all the insights of the social concept model, and that model itself turns out to be either grossly inadequate or a perverse and inconvenient way to state the social role model. Furthermore, the social concept model inevitably leads to a conflation of the various senses in which things can be socially constructed.

The insight behind the social concept model was that a key part of emotional "competence" in a culture is knowing when to emote, as well as how to emote. This idea is already present in the work of social role theorists such as Averill, who defined an emotion as "a transitory social role (a socially constituted syndrome) *that includes an individual's appraisal of the situation,* and is interpreted as a passion rather than as an action" (Averill 1980a, 312; italics added).

A social role is not just a pattern of behavior. A proper grasp of the social role of "mother" includes a conception of when maternal behavior is appropriate and an interpretation of mothering, perhaps as a natural and inevitable response to children, or perhaps as a moral duty. Emotions

-143-

resemble other social roles in these respects. So the insights of the social concept model can be incorporated into the social role model simply by including in the social role the act of believing that a suitable elicitor is present.

The inadequacy of the social concept model can be brought out with an obvious objection. The model seems to rule out the possibility that two cultures could demand different emotional responses to the same situation. Surely a culture could prescribe a complex social role, whose elements are unique to that culture, as a response to dangers or to infants? The fact that another culture has the concept "danger" or "infant" would not prove that it has the same emotion. The

social concept model makes the identity of a socially constructed emotion depend solely on the situation that elicits the emotion. This seems to gratuitously neglect many other elements. When confronted with this objection adherents of the social concept model typically deny that two cultures can share a concept unless the concept has exactly the same connotations for both cultures. If two cultures have different emotional responses to infants, then they must have different concepts of infant. They are therefore not really responding to the same situation. Thus, for example, Rom Harré asserts that two cultures cannot share the emotion of fear if one regards fear as shameful and the other praises it (1986, 10). There are many reasons to reject this view of concepts. It seems to imply a holism about meaning so extreme that it would exclude the possibility of successful communication except between doppelgängers. But there is no need to appeal to such general considerations here. In this context the holistic view of conceptual identity is merely a perverse attempt to explain the output side of emotions. The concept of the eliciting situation is supposed to determine in and of itself exactly what should be done in any situation where someone has the emotion! Whereas a social role theorist would say that fear is a social role that people produce in response to what they interpret as danger, the social concept theorist claims that fear is just the interpretation of the situation as dangerous. To account for the other aspects of emotion, the social concept theorist adds that the concept of danger is the concept of a situation where certain sorts of objects recognized as threats in our culture are present and which calls for the production of a certain range of behaviors (perhaps different ones for different objects) and for having certain sorts of thoughts about the kind of psychological state one is in. We can reject this as nothing more than poor

conceptual analysis. The concept of danger does not include a full specification of everything our culture believes about fear. That is why we can make sense of the possibility of other people having different attitudes to danger.

A related reason to reject the social concept model is that it inevitably leads to a conflation of various senses in which a mental state can be socially constructed. Notice that the social concept model argues that an emotion is the thought that a situation is of a certain type. It is because these types are social constructions that emotions are social constructions. So the primary things that are socially constructed are the categories into which the world is classified. But there are at least three important senses in which categories can be socially constructed. First, there is the trivial sense in which all concepts are socially constructed. In this sense, the concepts of electron, magnesium, and clade are social constructions, as well as the concepts of citizen, member of parliament, and licensed dog owner. None of these *concepts* can exist independently of a

community of speakers and thinkers, and each was created by a sociolinguistic process.

In the second, stronger sense, citizens, members of parliament, and licensed dog owners are social constructions while electrons, magnesium, and clades are not. The *categories* referred to in the first list are social constructions, whereas those referred to by the second list are not. The categories electron, magnesium, and clade would exist (their members would have certain properties in common) whether or not the concepts of those categories had been formulated. The elements described by the periodic table do not need the activities of a community of speakers and thinkers to make them differ in atomic weight and number. Modern systematics was not needed for evolving lineages to speciate. [1] The category of MPs, however, depends for its existence on the formulation of the concept of a member of parliament. Were it not for the sociolinguistic activities centered on this concept, the members of parliament would have nothing in common to differentiate them from nonmembers. According to Hacking the same is true of multiple personality syndrome. The potential to develop MPS could be developed very differently. Another society might make

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[1] There are, of course, many social constructionists who would deny that there are any categories of this kind, but most social constructionists about emotion seem to accept that there are.

something very different of the individuals who are now made into sufferers of MPS. That society might also make some cases of MPS into one alternative way of being and others into another alternative way of being. This way of grouping would find as much justification in the occurring phenomena as the current groupings. Hacking describes his view as *dynamic nominalism*. Dynamic nominalism differs from simple nominalism in that the members of a category do share something over and above the fact that they are members of that category. However, the fact that the members have these shared properties reflects the existence of the category and the social practices in which it is embedded (Hacking 1995).

The third sense of *socially constructed* is the sense expressed when someone remarks that a thing is "just socially constructed" and infers from this that no such thing exists. It would be natural to say this about Newman's condition of ghost possession. Ghost possession is not a category like electron which exists independently of our social practice, but neither is it like member of parliament or licensed dog owner. Most people would happily admit that the only difference between MPs and non-MPs is that we as a community treat these

people in a particular way. This realization has no effect on the social practice in which the concept of MP is embedded. But it would make all the difference in the world to the Gururumba if they believed that the only difference between wild-pig men and other men is the decision of the men to be wild pigs and the decision of the community to treat them as such. The Gururumba practice of ghost possession rests on a collective pretense that this is not the case. Socially constructed categories in this third sense are social pretenses that cannot survive the realization that they are merely our inventions. The general acceptance of Hacking's analysis of multiple personality syndrome would have a corrosive effect on the social practices of the modern MPS community. Another Western example of this third sort of social construction may be the social construction of gender. Our social practices have been transformed by the growing acceptance that traditional gender characteristics are not the inevitable effects of biological sex.

So the claim that categories are socially constructed turns out to be doubly ambiguous. In a trivial sense all concepts are socially constructed. In a more substantial sense a socially constructed category is one partly dependent on the sociolinguistic process that creates the concept of that category. Within this more substantial sense of "socially constructed" there

1. Trivial Constructionism

A Concept exist because of sociolinguistic
activity involving the concept.

2/3. Substantial Constructionism	2. Overt Construction
The category corresponding to a concept exist (its members have something in common) because of sociolinguistic activity involving the concept.	The nature of the category is, or can be, known to those who use the concept without disrupting the process by which the category is constructed.
	3. Covert Construction
	Knowledge of the nature of the category by those who use concept would disrupt the process by which the category is constructed.

6.1. Three kinds of social construction. See text for explanation.

are two very different kinds of socially constructed entities (<u>figure 6.1</u>). First, there are overt social constructions like members of parliament. It can be openly acknowledged that this category groups together individuals whose common nature is a product of the sociolinguistic process that produces the concept of a member of parliament. Second, however, there are covert social constructions like wild-pig men. These are categories that are ontologically on a par with overt social constructions but are treated by the community as if they corresponded to independent distinctions in nature. They are treated in the same way as categories like chlorine or motorneuron disease.

Averill and other advocates of the social role model think that emotions are social constructions in the third sense--covert social constructions. Emotions are a society's collective pretense that people are subject to certain natural and involuntary "passions." Solomon and other adherents of the social concept model, however, seem to think that emotions could be social constructions in the second sense--overt social constructions. Solomon argues that emotions are social constructions because "getting angry is making an indictment (whether overtly or not). It involves concepts and evaluations that are clearly learned and, in their specifics, learned only in the context of a particular society with certain kinds of ethical views and theories" (1984, 250).

His argument seems to be that emotions are social constructions be-

-147-

cause an emotion is the thought that the current situation falls into some category and that category is a social construction (second sense). An exactly parallel argument would suggest that believing someone to be an MP is a socially constructed mental state, because the category of MPs is a social construction (second sense). If this is Solomon's argument for constructionism, then he must think emotions could be overt social constructions.

Other passages suggest that Solomon is using a slightly different argument for constructionism. The passage just cited continues, "This is not to deny that one might find anger (or some similar emotion) in every society," and elsewhere Solomon does not "foreclose the probability [sic] that some emotions are specific to *all* cultures" (1984, 249; emphasis in original). The argument here seems to be that emotions are social constructions because an emotion is the thought that the current situation falls into some category and all categories are social constructions (first sense). If this is the argument, then Solomon's social constructionism is just another way of asserting that emotions are thoughts. This

is a plausible interpretation, since Solomon's earlier work on emotion centered on the claim that emotions are evaluative beliefs (Solomon 1977).

I suggest that most of what is interesting about social constructionist theory rests on the idea that emotions are covert social constructions. Both the constructionist positions I have attributed to Solomon are too weak to be interesting. If emotions are social constructions merely because they are thoughts and all concepts are social constructions, then every thought is a social construction in the same sense. An emotion has the same status as the thought that chlorine has more than one isotope. Surely the work of Averill and others points to a more interesting hypothesis than this. Even the less trivial of the two positions is pretty weak. It claims that anger is a social construction in the same sense as the thought that something is illegal or foreign. The objects of these concepts depend for their existence on the sociolinguistic practice that involves these concepts. But there is no sense here of the radical nature of Averill's proposal. People live quite happily with the idea that laws and nations are social constructions. The suggestion that love and anger are not natural and inevitable parts of human being provokes anger and denial in a large part of the population. It runs counter to the view of these emotions that many people live by. Solomon's constructionism is missing something that makes emotions vastly different

from laws or nations. It is missing the fact that emotions are interpreted as passions rather than actions.

There is a fundamental tension in the work of Solomon and other authors who have come to constructionism from the old propositional attitude theory. These authors have spent their careers denouncing the "cultural myth" that emotions are irrational, involuntary, and natural. They have claimed that when properly understood, emotion terms refer to judgments about the world, which are voluntary and subject to rational and moral standards. These same theorists now want to embrace the view that emotions are created and constituted by cultural myth making! The obvious way to combine these views would be to say that in emotion we act out the cultural myth that there are irrational, involuntary, natural states called emotions. But to say this, the adherents of the propositional attitude school would have to admit that their old conceptual analyses of what ordinary speakers mean by emotion terms were mistaken. Because they are unwilling to do this they are unable to come to terms with many social constructionist ideas. For example, one of Averill's key ideas is that emotions fulfill their social functions precisely because they are accepted as natural and involuntary.

The problems I have documented in this section can be avoided without difficulty simply by adopting the social role model. Constructionism is the view that emotions are transitory social roles that are interpreted as passions rather than as actions.

6.3 The Problem of Sincerity

The social role model of social construction claims that cultural models of emotion help to produce the emotional behaviors that conform to those models. I have argued that in some cases the role of cultural models may be diachronic. They act during the agents' development by structuring the patterns of reinforcement in the cultural environment so as to produce automatic behaviors that conform to cultural norms. Many constructionists, however, have focused on cases where the cultural model has a synchronic role in guiding behavior. According to this version, the emotional response is produced "strategically" with the intention of extracting a suitable response from others. But the emotional response is interpreted by the agent and their community as natural and involuntary. The action is "disclaimed." Such a theory owes a more precise account of "disclaimed

action." It must avoid the trivializing conclusion that these cases are merely ones where someone pretends to have an emotion. I approach this problem by asking when, on a constructionist account, a disclaimed action emotion is sincere.

The obvious way to make a disclaimed action seem sincere is to say that the agent is not aware of what they are doing. The plan behind the emotional response is unconscious. There are obvious parallels with the medical category of "abnormal illness behaviors" in which the strategic purpose of the "symptoms" is not consciously available to the patient. But constructionist theorists have been hostile to the idea of unconscious states. They have followed the example of Jean-Paul Sartre in suggesting that people know why they produce emotions, but deceive themselves about this. The difference between self-deceit and deceit of others serves to distinguish socially constructed emotions from mere pretenses of emotion. Self-deceit is then explained in a way that does not involve unconscious processes. In this section I will show that this rejection of unconscious processes is a mistake. No adequate account of either disclaimed action or self-deceit is possible without the use of unconscious processes. In any case, the constructionist hostility to unconscious processes is unwarranted. The notion of unconscious information processing is ubiquitous in modern cognitive science and the traditional philosophical arguments against this notion are fatuous.

Sartre's (1962) theory of emotions has had a major influence on many social constructionists. In Sartre's asocial form of constructionism emotions are disclaimed actions, but they are explained in terms of individual psychodynamics rather than the surrounding social order. Sartre claims that emotions are actions that we perform in order to obtain psychological rewards, primarily the avoidance of stress. He describes emotion as "magical consciousness." In becoming emotional we return to a way of confronting the world which we adopted as helpless children. Instead of confronting the world as it is and taking appropriate action we distort or annihilate our perception of it. So when a person faints in terror, their aim is to remove the object of terror from their consciousness. The whole essence of emotion is self-deceit. People are emotional about what they cannot face up to and being emotional consists precisely in not facing up to things.

Most people deny that whenever they have an emotion they go through the psychodynamic processes described by Sartre. This denial is often

pretty convincing. So Sartre owes us an account of why people do not seem to recall the thoughts he attributes to them. The obvious response would be that the thoughts are unconscious, but Sartre sees positing an unconscious as just one more way to escape from the conclusion that we live our lives in a state of self-deceit and "bad faith." Instead, he offers an account which is supposed to avoid the need for unconscious processes. This appears to be seminal for later constructionist rejections of the unconscious (Warner 1986; Harré 1988). Sartre begins with a version of the wellknown distinction between having a thought and thinking that you have that thought. A moment ago I was conscious of being on an airplane. Now, having chosen this as an example, I have an additional state--I am conscious that I am conscious of being on an airplane. As well as thinking that I am on an airplane, I am thinking that I am thinking "I am on an airplane." The first thought is a representation of a state of affairs and may function to guide my behavior. The second is a representation of the state of affairs of my having the first representation. These sorts of representations are sometimes called first- and second-order mental states. A second-order state has a first-order state as its object. Sartre suggests that in self-deceit a first-order state of pretending guides the agent's behavior. So the agent is consciously pretending. However, there is no second-order state which is a representation of this fact. The agent is not conscious that they are consciously pretending. This account is supposed to establish that self-deceit is not an unconscious process. Instead, it is a conscious process that we are not reflective about.

Sartre's account simply misunderstands what unconscious mental processes are. Consider David Armstrong's famous example of "coming to" at the wheel on a long drive (Armstrong 1980). Behavioral evidence persuades us that the driver's behavior before they "came to" was guided by a representation of the road. The driver adjusted the wheel to stay on course. In this sense the driver was "conscious of" or "aware of" the road. But they were not aware of this awareness, nor can they recall it. So in another sense, the driver was unconscious of their environment and of their decision making. The point of this example is that there is a sense in which a person is "conscious" or "aware" of any fact that is represented in a state that helps to guide their behavior. They have first-order consciousness of all such facts. But to have an unconscious thought is not to lack firstorder consciousness. If a thought lacks first-order consciousness it just

doesn't exist! To say that a thought is unconscious actually means that the person has no second-order consciousness of that thought. They are not conscious of being conscious. It is this second-order consciousness which the long-distance driver briefly loses. This is what makes their thoughts about the road unconscious thoughts. So the states of conscious pretense without consciousness of pretending which Sartre makes so much of are paradigmatic unconscious thoughts. Sartre's claim that they are conscious states fails to distinguish the first-order sense of conscious from the secondorder sense.

Sartre's account of self-deception has been endorsed and elaborated by contemporary social constructionists. C. Terry Warner uses such an account in his analysis of anger (Warner 1986). He argues that it is of the essence of anger for it to be disproportionate and exaggerated. The prime drive of an angry person is to deceive themselves about how unreasonable they are being. Like Sartre, Warner is extremely hostile to unconscious processes. He tells us that they are self-contradictory and involve conceptual confusions, although these contradictions and confusions are not spelled out in detail. Having rejected the unconscious, Warner tells us that "on the agentive view, her self-deception is not a matter of concealing a belief, but a matter, we might say, of believing perversely" (1986, 164). The self-deceiver does not have unconscious processes in which they decide that it would be to their advantage to believe the opposite of what the evidence suggests. Instead, they simply form a "perverse belief" given the evidence at their disposal. A similar account is endorsed by Rom Harré (1988). But none of these accounts even begins to explain self-deception. They make a complete mystery of the fact that self-deceiving beliefs serve the interests of the agent, or reduce their psychological stress, or in some other way are not random with respect to the agent's circumstances. If no information is

processed in order to form the belief, or to decide which "perverse" rules of evidence are to be used, then the fact that the selfdeceptive belief fits the agent's circumstances is magical. The need to explain this fact cannot be sidestepped merely by announcing that the agent "believes perversely" or in Harré's phrase that they "choose an alternative scheme of rhetoric." Some sort of process must control these activities and agents are not conscious of any such processes. So there are unconscious processes involved.

It is a mystery to me why the belief that unconscious mental states are

somehow problematic persists. We know that it is impossible to account for the operation of the visual system or the balance system without the idea that these systems contain representations of states of affairs and information transformations that are not accessible to introspection and verbal report. If this idea is unproblematic here, why should it be problematic for a case like self-deception? One reply, albeit a feeble one, is that there is some different between these mechanical or biological processes and cognition proper. But the "confabulation" studies of Nisbett and Wilson (1977) and others have provided documented empirical evidence of very complex reasoning which is unavailable for report. A split-brain subject is presented with a cue that determines their choice of one of a range of actions. The cue is presented to sensory apparatus connected to the hemisphere that lacks connections to the speech areas. The cue might be a word flashed on a screen. The subject will respond to the cue, perhaps by choosing the object named by the word from a selection in front of them. But when asked why they chose that particular object, they tell an implausible story unconnected with the cue. The subject's response to the cue was mediated by a process of reasoning that they cannot introspect or report.

This sort of result has given rise to a philosophical discussion of the "computational unconscious" (e.g., Dennett 1982). The computational unconscious consists of mental states and processes that the agent cannot introspect or verbally report because information about them is not available to the mechanisms underlying introspection and verbal report. The concept of the computational unconscious has obvious relevance to the debates over emotion and self-deception. Georges Rey (1988) has discussed how the distinction between reportable and unreportable mental representations can be built into a computational account of the undamaged human mind and how this can be used to explain phenomena like self-deception and weakness of the will. Unfortunately, the social constructionist literature seems to have taken no account either of philosophical discussion of the computational unconscious or of the empirical findings on which it is based.

The computational unconscious can be used to give a relatively unproblematic account of the sincerity of disclaimed action emotions. An emotion of this kind is sincere simply when the subject is unaware that it is a disclaimed action. The motivation and planning underlying the response is not accessible to introspection or verbal report. The agent's belief

that the state is natural and inevitable is sincere, because they have no access to the evidence against this view. This definition has the nice property of automatically making all the relatively automatic responses that conform to the "reinforcement" variant of social role theory sincere as well.

One of the advantages of this computational conception of the unconscious is that it does not make the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes too rigid. A process which is perfectly capable of being consciously monitored may proceed unconsciously because of an unconscious, or even a conscious, decision not to monitor it. A failure to monitor of this sort can happen whenever we direct our attention to a task or have it compelled by some striking feature of the environment. Other mental activity, such as reception of sensory information irrelevant to the object of attention, goes unnoticed, although it may still be playing a vital role in such important activities as navigating our way around the room. Disclaimed action emotions can therefore be more or less sincere, depending on the extent to which the subject realizes that his responses are voluntarily initiated or exaggerated. It is possible to distinguish a whole range of possibilities, such as straightforward pretending, mere inattention to one's motivation, self-deceit, and real deep-seated inability to get at one's motivation. At least this many ways for emotion construction to be hidden are recognizable, and it is a considerable virtue of an account to be able to fit them all in.

In cases of straight pretending, all or most of the processes leading to the constructed emotion are monitored by consciousness. In cases of mere inattention, the subject is unaware of the process of emotion construction simply because their attention is directed elsewhere. Minor interventions, such as another person's pointing their motive out to them, or a moment's reflection, may be enough to make them give up the emotion or change to pretense or self-deceit. The term *self-deceit* itself probably covers a number of very different processes. There will be cases in which the subject would have been conscious of the processes leading to the emotion if they had not been consciously motivated to direct their awareness elsewhere. Critics of the use of unconscious processes to analyze self-deceit (such as Sartre and Harré) have focused on the apparent regress involved in talking of decisions to engage in self-deceit. They

argue that a further decision is needed to deceive oneself about this decision, and so on ad infinitum. But

there are a whole range of options which this objection ignores. In some cases, the subjects' unawareness of their intention to deceive themselves may be merely due to inattention, as described above. In other cases, the initial decision to engage in self-deceit may itself be unconscious. The final category of unconsciousness listed above is deep-seated unconsciousness. Here I have in mind cases in which the emotional response is akin to multiple personality disorder as described by Hacking (1995). There is no need for the agent to engage in any decision to hide the construction of the emotion from consciousness, as it never had any tendency to manifest itself consciously. Mental effort is needed to bring the underlying processes to consciousness, not to suppress them. It may not even be possible to become conscious of some processes. The cognitive mechanisms that produce the response may be firmly informationally isolated from those serving introspection and verbal report.

This account of the unconscious production of emotions fits disclaimed action into the framework of conventional cognitive psychology. The disclaimed action version of the social role model of social construction can take its place alongside the reinforcement version.

6.4 Social Construction and Heterogeneous Construction

Two important options for explaining emotion emerge from the social constructionist literature. They are the two versions of the social role model of social construction. In the reinforcement version the social role is embodied in social practices in such a way that it produces a pattern of reinforcement. This leads the adult to produce behavior that fits the social role. It is not necessary for the adult to have any mental representation of that social role or to have any motive for conforming to it. In the disclaimed action version the social role that constitutes the emotion is produced as "strategic behavior." The agent has a representation of the social role and conforms their behavior to the role in order to achieve certain rewards. In some cases these are rewards in a straightforward sense, such as being excused for an act of violence. In other cases the reward may be the minimal one of having some sort of guidelines for action in an otherwise baffling situation. The importance of this sort of reward should not be underestimated. It may be the prime reason for the production of something like the "Rambo" behavior syndrome in Western males which I described above.

I suggested in the last chapter that many of the insights of social constructionism could be incorporated into a general model of the "heterogeneous construction" of the emotional phenotype. I also suggested at the beginning of this chapter that social constructionism reveals that some emotions are mythical. The two versions of the social role model lend themselves to these two very different fates. The idea that some emotions are disclaimed action leads to the conclusion that these emotions are mythical. The idea that some emotional responses develop because of reinforcement by the surrounding culture fits in with the idea of heterogeneous construction.

The idea of reinforcement by the local culture fits the heterogeneous construction model because this sort of developmental influence can interact with traditional "biological" processes to determine the adult emotional phenotype. Interactions of this sort can even affect the expression of the affect programs. Paul Ekman (1971, 1972) has discussed this phenomenon under the heading of "display rules." These are rules dictating when the effects of affect programs should be suppressed or accompanied by other displays. They are inculcated during a person's upbringing and, like many other motor skills, they become automatic and involuntary in the adult. In studies of facial expression in Japanese and American students Ekman and his collaborators found that the Japanese suppressed their facial expressions in the presence of authority figures. They superimposed voluntary muscle movements so as to produce a polite smile. These voluntary movements were initiated so quickly that the initial emotional expressions could be detected only by using frame-by-frame analysis of videotapes. The output side of the affect program responses appears to be deeply developmentally entrenched. Their emergence in the infant conforms to the classic biological determinist model, in which almost any environment that supports survival to adulthood supports development of the trait. This means that the effects of different developmental environments take the form of supplementary elements, designed to either suppress or enhance the effects of the program. The Japanese students give us an example of a supplementary element designed to suppress the response. Darwin's (1872) claim that Europeans supplement the pancultural elements of anger with involuntary fist clenching provides an example of enhancement.

I argued in chapter 5 that there are likely to be more developmentally plastic emotions. I described research suggesting that these might take the

form of irruptive patterns of motivation affecting the higher cognitive processes which control long-term, planned actions. The effects of reinforcement by the local culture on these emotions may be more profound than its effect on the

affect programs. Rather than the local culture producing additional, supplementary elements that accompany universal responses, it may produce variants of a common ancestral response. Frank (1988) suggests that humans have evolved a sense of fairness which causes them to bear costs rather than accept grossly unfair divisions of the economic product of a transaction. The idea of heterogeneous construction suggests that this disposition need be neither universal nor uniform for Frank to be correct. Some cultures may have developed in a direction that modifies or even eliminates this disposition during development. So heterogeneous constructionism alerts researchers to look for variation across cultures in the emotions suggested by evolutionary theorists. Conversely, the idea of heterogeneous construction suggests the search for cross-cultural resemblances in the emotions described by social constructionists. European culture makes a strong connection between guilt and responsibility. Other cultures have emotions that resemble guilt (Harré 1986) but lack the strong connection to responsibility. People experience these guiltlike emotions simply because they have been a part of some event that is regarded as a bad thing. The social constructionist claims that these emotions are not the same emotion as guilt. From the viewpoint of heterogeneous construction the resemblance is as interesting as the difference. It suggests that both emotions may be variants of a response to situations in which a social norm has been violated and that they may share important developmental resources. Obvious topics for research would include both the age at which the emotional phenotypes of these cultures diverge from one another and the inputs that produce this divergence. If experiences of punishment play a key role in the ontogeny of guilt, then the occasions on which punishment is meted out might be critical.

Emotional responses that owe their form to patterns of reinforcement produced by the local culture can be smoothly integrated into the heterogeneous construction program for studying emotion. But emotional responses that are disclaimed actions cannot. This is not because their development does not fit the heterogeneous constructionist model. Disclaimed actions will fit the heterogeneous construction model in the general sense that their development depends on the co-occurrence of factors tradition-

ally regarded as biological and those traditionally regarded as cultural. Darwinian psychologists have written at length about the possible adaptive advantages of self-deception (Nesse and Lloyd 1992). Producing strategic behaviors that are interpreted as natural and involuntary may be an ancient human trait. The nature of the strategic behaviors people produce and of the interpretations put upon them are likely to vary with the local culture.

Disclaimed action emotions will reflect the local conception of emotion in the same way that multiple personality syndrome reflects local conceptions of that illness. This pattern would also resemble the pattern of variation in schizophrenic delusions, which typically reflect the local religious culture. So in this general sense, disclaimed action emotions are the products of a process of heterogeneous construction, just like "reinforced" emotions. The problem with disclaimed actions is not how they are constructed, but how they are implemented. Emotional responses which are disclaimed actions are essentially pretenses. They can be sincere only in the way that abnormal illness behavior or ghost possession can be sincere. The subject does not have conscious access to the causes of their behavior and provides an erroneous explanation of their behavior that masquerades as an introspective report. The reason that disclaimed action emotions cannot be smoothly integrated into the heterogeneous construction program for studying emotion is that they are attempts to mimic other emotional responses. There is a whole layer of mechanism in their production that is absent in other instances of emotion. This makes it inappropriate to try to explain them in the same way as other emotional responses. It would be like trying to explain ghost possession using conventional models of parasitic disease.

Both culturally reinforced and disclaimed action responses are represented in the local cultural milieu as universal and natural responses that are not actions to be explained by the agent's goals and intentions. In the case of culturally reinforced responses, only the first half of this interpretation is false. The responses are not universal and natural. Contrary to local belief, they reflect the local culture. But the local culture is right to insist that they are not actions. Culturally reinforced responses are not pretenses. The psychological processes that produce them do not have the "hidden layer" seen in disclaimed action. A well-enculturated agent does not have an intention to experience guilt or to manifest its symptoms. In the case of disclaimed actions both elements of the local interpretation are false.

-158-

These emotions are reflections of the local culture *and* they are actions which can be illuminated by looking at the agent's goals and intentions.

6.5 The Limits of Social Constructionism

Social constructionism about emotion has been taken up enthusiastically by a number of philosophers, notably Rom Harré. These authors have argued that all or most emotions are socially constructed. While I am sympathetic to the idea that social constructionism can illuminate an important class of emotional phenomena, Harré and others have greatly exaggerated the range of phenomena that it can explain. They have argued that "naturalistic" accounts, such as those

canvassed in the earlier chapters of this book, have no important role in explaining emotion. Harré (1986) claims that the extent of cultural variation in emotions suggests that most emotional phenomena are to be understood in the light of the local culture: "There can be little doubt that, even if there are some universal emotions, the bulk of mankind live within systems of thought and feeling that bear little but superficial resemblances to one another" (1986, 12). He supports this contention with examples of "cultural variation among emotion systems." Harré's strategy is to show that emotion has the pattern of betweengroup difference and within-group similarity that has traditionally been thought to require a cultural explanation, as opposed to biological explanation. However, the idea that this pattern precludes biological explanations is problematic. I discussed in chapter 5 the attempt of evolutionary psychologists to explain some instances of this pattern as "evoked culture" (Tooby and Cosmides 1992). These psychologists suggest that a flexible genetic program may produce characteristically different outcomes in different cultural circumstances. I also outlined my preferred "developmental systems" approach. I suggested that psychological phenotypes are heterogeneously constructed through the interaction of stereotypically biological resources like genes, stereotypically cultural resources like moral norms, and resources that are hard to classify in terms of that dichotomy, like experiences of play. Any of these resources may "mutate" in a way that causes the change to be replicated in the next generation and thus leads to heritable change in the resultant phenotype. The developmental systems approach suggests that emotional phenotypes will diverge across human populations due to the incorporation of different extragenetic resources into the developmental system. This leads to a rejection of the idea that

the emotional phenotype should be divided into universals to be explained by biological evolution and variable features to be explained by cultural evolution. Instead, emotional phenomena should be grouped together at various levels of generality in a way that reflects patterns of descent. This system of classification will extend from very broad homologies ranging across species to very narrow homologies ranging across human populations. These narrow homologies will reflect recent events of human microevolution, such as changes in "cultural" elements of the developmental system. A nested, genealogical classification of this sort will allow the formulation of whatever evolutionary explanations are available. An *evolutionary* explanation is one that explains the possession of a trait by certain individuals as a result of its inheritance from a common ancestor and suggests that the form of that trait can be illuminated by considering the historical process that produced it (see section 3.3).

Harré's strategy is based on the mistaken idea that variation in a psychological trait across cultures shows that this trait is "cultural" and hence precludes evolutionary explanation. In furtherance of this strategy he adopts a sort of holistic essentialism about emotions. Two psychological traits cannot be identified on the basis of any degree of resemblance short of being completely identical. He claims, for example, that if the moral connotations of emotion words differ across cultures, the emotions referred to must be different. Catherine Lutz (1986) shows that a state called metagu (usually translated as "fear") is praised in the Ifaluk atoll culture, while fear is usually condemned in our culture. Harré argues that these two psychological states cannot be the same emotion because they have different moral connotations for those who possess them. It would be "gross mistranslation" to equate them. His second example of cultural variation is that a "strong" form of an emotion can exist in one culture while only a "weak" form exists in another. He alleges that Spaniards more readily and acutely feel embarrassment at the social ineptitude of others. They have a special, albeit phrasal, name for this feeling. This point relates to Heelas's extremely useful notion of *hypercognition*. Heelas (1986) argues that emotions may be hyper- or hypocognized by cultures. Roughly, this means that people talk about them more, or talk about them less. As a result, it is claimed, they classify more or less of their emotional life in those terms, and attribute and self-attribute those emotions more or less often. Love, for example, may be hypercognized in our culture when com-

pared to some others. Harré's third example of cultural variation is more substantial. He claims that emotions go in and out of existence within a single culture. His example is *accidie*, a form of depression and boredom found among early Christian hermits and medieval monks. Harré, with Finlay-Jones, has written a paper on this emotion (1986). This paper, however, suggests that accidie is a state found in many modern subjects but nowadays not distinguished from other varieties of depression. This doesn't fit very well with the claim that emotions come and go with the flow of history. It suggests that what's going on is hyper- and hypocognition.

I find Harré's summary of the evidence for cultural variation in emotions unimpressive. It's supposed to support the thesis that the elements in emotion that are common to all cultures are trivially small. If anything, it does the opposite. Even when a culture ultrahypocognizes an emotion, as it were, observers who retain the appropriate concept seem to be able to find the phenomenon. The phenomena do not disappear, as they should do if wholly dependent on the culture's ideas about them. The immediate cause of these very different interpretations of the evidence is simple. I am assuming that an

emotion can be "the same" in some important sense despite differences in some of its properties. Emotions, like other biological traits, can be classified at various levels of generality. Philosophers of social construction like Harré, Claire Armon-Jones (1986a, 1986b), and Carl Ratner (1989) attempt to deny that there is any "essence" to an emotion that can be reidentified across time and culture. Change in any aspect of an emotion changes its identity. They have devoted a great deal of effort to showing that there are no legitimate ways of classifying emotions that would allow them to be identified across cultural contexts. They have looked at proposed essences for emotions and argued that they do not have the potential to explain most of what interests us about emotion. If this were true, then it would be possible only to produce explanations of the emotions found in a particular culture. But the philosophers of social construction have simply not looked at the strong candidates for emotional essences. They have consistently chosen to attack straw persons. The brunt of their attack has been borne by a straw person called "naturalism."

The naturalist theory of emotions which Harré, Armon-Jones, and other philosophers of social construction combat is supposed to represent a central tendency in the work of theorists who stress the evolutionary

-161-

roots of emotional responses. Paul Ekman, Carroll Izard, Robert Plutchik, and R. B. Zajonc are obvious candidate naturalists. According to ArmonJones, the naturalist argues that emotions are "universal and natural dispositions" (1986b, 64) to respond in a certain way to certain stimuli. Fear of the dark might be such a natural disposition. Constructionism supposedly has the advantage over naturalism of being able explain fear in situations that "do not naturally warrant fear" (65). Armon-Jones's example at this point is a tribe whose children fear their elders and the neighboring tribes. It is a problem for her "naturalist" that

while actions such as "fleeing" take the same form whether culturally or naturally determined, they are not identical in respect of the attitudes which give rise to them . . . members of these societies, in prescribing "fear", are endorsing a response which, in so far as it is related to cultural beliefs and moral values, is distinct from, and not strictly derivable from, natural "fear". While this distinction is compatible with the existence of natural "fear", it does call into question the naturalists' account of socialised "fear" as explainable in terms of natural "fear" in virtue of their sharing the same qualitative features and causal conditions. (1986b, 66)

While not exactly transparent, this passage gives important clues to what is going on in Harré's and Armon-Jones's work. They want to classify emotions in terms of what causes them. If an emotion output is caused by spiders and

exposed electric wires in one culture, but by scorpions and witch doctors in another, then it's a manifestation of different emotions. The "naturalist," who maintains that emotions are the same across cultures, is then forced to argue that emotions have the same causes in all cultures, which is implausible. Unfortunately, other theorists don't classify emotions by what causes them, so this argument never gets off the ground. The candidate "naturalists" listed above all believe that people are afraid of different things in different cultures. These differences reflect differences in beliefs and learning history. Most "naturalists" give broad, functional definitions of appropriate elicitors. Fear should be elicited by dangers. These broad definitions get filled in in the light of local conditions. Contact with exposed electrical wires will be recognized as a danger in New Zealand; it may not be recognized on Ifaluk atoll.

To get their argument against naturalism off the ground, Harré and

Armon-Jones need a further argument to establish that there can be no taxonomy of emotions which abstracts away from the particular causes of an emotion. I have been able to find only one argument for the view that there is nothing to an emotion over and above the things which cause it and the behavior it causes. In this argument Armon-Jones proceeds by assuming that "inner essences" identifiable across cultures would have to be feelings and then attacking the feeling theory of emotion with neo-Wittgensteinian ideas:

Emotion feeling is constituted by those attitudes appropriate to the emotion . . . "fear feeling" would not remain unchanged [*across cultures*], but rather would be qualitatively different to the extent that the attitudes constitutive of the emotion feeling are specifically cultural. (1986b, 66; see also 1986a, 40-41)

But the feeling theory is another straw person. The main candidates for the "essences" of emotions which remain constant across cultures are behavioral syndromes, neural structures, and sets of beliefs and desires. The first of these taxonomizes emotions on the basis of their effects alone. The second and third postulate some sort of "inner essence." All three will do the job of giving identity across cultures to emotions while allowing them to have different particular causes.

The view that the essence of an emotion is a set of beliefs and desires is, of course, the traditional propositional attitude theory. Armon-Jones does discuss the propositional attitude theory but never seems to notice the threat it poses to her own view. Like Solomon, she sees it as the first step towards the "social concept" model of emotion described earlier in this chapter:

The attitudes regarded by contemporary theorists as constituting emotions share the feature [*of constructionism*] that they can in principle be acquired by training. While we regard some attitudes as natural (e.g.: the desire to eat; the evaluation of wild beasts as dangerous), we regard other attitudes as dependent on training and the introduction to custom (e.g.: the desire to be polite; the evaluation of a Matisse as delicate; the belief that theft is a crime). (1986a, 43-44)

What Armon-Jones does not seem to appreciate is the use of abstraction to create cross-cultural definitions of emotion. The propositional atti-

tude theorist says that fear is the belief that something is dangerous and the desire to avoid harm. As I showed in section 2.7, this is an abstract scheme intended to capture all the different sets of beliefs and desires that might, in different cultural contexts, constitute fear. This is precisely the sort of cross-cultural essence that Armon-Jones wants to deny is possible. Fear in all cultures is some set of attitudes that amounts to the belief that one is in danger and the desire to avoid the danger. Envy in all cultures is some set of attitudes that amounts to "wishing to have what someone else has and which is important for the subject's self-definition" (Ben-Zeev 1990, 489). The propositional attitude theorist can predict that an emotion will look very different in another culture, either because of differences in the specific local attitudes that fit the general schema or because of the other propositional attitudes common in that culture. The causal relations of propositional attitude systems are, after all, holistic. Which experiences cause and what action results from certain propositional attitudes vary as a function of the other attitudes the agent holds. So even if an emotion schema was filled in by similar propositional attitudes in two cultures, the similarity might be unrecognizable without a comprehensive grasp of local conditions and the culture of the inhabitants.

The other candidate cross-cultural "essences" are behavioral syndromes and neural programs. Armon-Jones does not discuss these, but it can be assumed that she would take the usual constructionist line. Authors like Ratner (1989) admit that a few innate, universal elements of emotional responses can be found but argue that these either disappear with socialization or become an insignificant part of more complex, learned responses: "The vestigial elements of animal emotionality which we have inherited are empty shells which become subsumed under social-psychological processes" (1989, 218-19). In a similar vein Averill remarks that "biologically determined reactions form a relatively small class of emotional reactions. Their primary importance is that they may be incorporated as elements into other kinds of emotion" (Averill 1980b, 39). There are two

main problems with this way of dismissing "biological" perspectives on emotion. First, there is the cluster of confusions caused by subscribing to the traditional concept of innateness. Ratner seems to think that an evolved emotional response must be present at birth and cannot need social inputs to construct it or sustain it. Averill's talk of "biologically determined" responses suggests a similarly narrow conception of evolved responses. I dis-

cussed in section 3.3 and in chapter 5 the way in which the notion of innateness allows people to slide back and forth between a trait's having an evolutionary explanation and its being insensitive to environmental variation. Ratner uses this slide to move from the fact that a trait depends on the environment to the conclusion that it has no evolutionary explanation. But in fact, evolved traits are heterogeneously constructed. Normal psychological development in humans includes nurturing, a speech community, and many other elements of culture. An impoverished view of psychological development, obsessed with untenably rigid distinctions between biology and culture and between innateness and learning, makes it very hard for Ratner to appreciate the explanatory potential of "naturalistic" theories.

The second problem with the constructionists' dismissal of this sort of naturalism is their apparent lack of interest in putting emotions into general categories of any sort whatever. It is all very well to insist on the diversity of emotions across times and cultures, but if there is to be any explanation at all emotions will have to be categorized in a way that abstracts away from detail. If most of the interesting features of a particular emotion depend on some cultural model that plays a role in its construction, then emotions of that sort may have to be classified in terms of their descent from a common cultural origin. Thus, although love in Western teenagers is a unique phenomenon, it can be understood as derived from cultural models that go back to the Middle Ages. There may even be more general explanations of the tendency of societies to generate emotions of a particular sort to fulfill social functions. These explanations will require suitably general categories of emotions drawn from some future sociology. Abstracting away from detail is an essential step in giving explanations. "Naturalism" is just another way of doing this. It suggests that emotions in different times and cultures might usefully be grouped together on the basis of patterns of resemblance among them. Such groupings make it possible to offer explanations. For example, they make it possible to explain why fear and *metagu* in Harré's own example have so much in common despite the radically different social roles they play. This explanation cannot be rejected on the grounds that the two differ from one another in respects outside the scope of the explanation.

The extreme holism about emotion favored by Harré and ArmonJones cannot be sustained for long even in their own writings. Armon-

Jones quickly finds herself recognizing the same emotion in quite different cultural settings. This happens when she considers "inappropriate emotions." Cases in which an emotion occurs in a socially inappropriate situation are of two basic kinds (Armon-Jones 1986b, 71). In the first kind, an inappropriate emotion occurs because the subject has false beliefs. This is no problem for the constructionist. The emotion is not culturally appropriate to the situation the agent actually faces, but it is appropriate to the situation the agent *thinks* they are facing. The second kind of inappropriate emotion occurs when the agent perceives the situation correctly, but still behaves strangely. Armon-Jones argues that in these cases the inappropriate response is either a response which was culturally prescribed in childhood and has been inappropriately retained or the result of a deviant upbringing which may have inculcated emotions that were not culturally prescribed at any stage. She remarks that "the second case in which an emotion involves culturally inappropriate attitudes can be explained by the constructionist as non-paradigmatic, and as liable to deprive the agent of his status as someone in possession of normal sensibilities" (1986b, 71).

Armon-Jones is treading on very thin ice here. She has been trying to show that the identity of an emotion depends on the class of situations which elicits it. But if this were the case, then people who had the sort of abnormal social training she suggests would not have recognizable emotions with abnormal elicitors; they would have emotions which their compatriots would be at a loss to identify. Yet Armon-Jones seems to accept that recognizable emotions can exist in deviant contexts. From a theoretically uncommitted viewpoint this is the right thing to say. Pedophiles find sexual relations between adults and children delightful and pleasant to contemplate. What is strange about them is that they feel *these* emotions rather then those an average person would feel. We do not contemplate them like Mr. Spock observing the earthlings, unable to comprehend these strange "emotions." But although this seems to be the right account of the inappropriate emotions, by giving it Armon-Jones is saying something radically at odds with the rest of her theory. She is admitting that an emotion can retain its identity even if it occurs apart from the culturally appropriate situations which she says give the emotion its identity.

Harré and Armon-Jones do not provide any effective argument against a propositional attitude account of the identity of emotions across cultures and have not even deigned to produce arguments against the various bio-

logically and physiologically based accounts described in chapters 2 and 3. Ramer and Averill do argue against such views but these arguments rest on crude conceptualizations of development which I have already rejected in earlier chapters. The extreme holism which rejects all cross-cultural identities is unsustainable even in the work of those who subscribe to it. There is no compelling reason to think that social constructionism is the sole or main illuminating perspective on emotion. The heterogeneous construction program, which gives due weight to biological factors, gives a far more promising account of most developmentally variable emotions.

II
The Nature of Psychological Categories

7
Natural Kinds and Theoretical Concepts
7.1 Emotions as Natural Kinds

This second part of the book looks at emotion and emotions as "natural kinds"-- categories that supposedly correspond to some real distinctions in nature and around which theories are structured. My starting point is that emotions are the referents of the kind terms of theories that deal with emotional phenomena. Anger is the thing referred to in theories that successfully explain the phenomena associated with the vernacular use of the term "anger." The theories considered in part one each focused on a different portion of the pretheoretic domain of emotion. Each has its successes in its chosen area and faces obvious problems in others. In order to successfully explain emotion it may be necessary to reconceptualize both emotion and individual emotions like love and anger. The aim of this reconceptualization will be to put like with like. Phenomena with the same explanation should be placed together and phenomena with different explanations drawn apart. In some cases there is no good reason to put the things that fall under a traditional concept together in one category. Aristotelian physics placed all objects outside the orbit of the moon in a single category of superlunary things. We now know that this is as arbitrary a way of grouping objects together as one could hope to devise. Nothing follows from the fact that an object is superlunary other than the fact that it is superlunary and trivial transformations of this (e.g., it is not sublunary). There is no epistemic payoff to be had by using this category.

The need for reconceptualization as new information comes to light should come as no surprise. Conceptual change of this kind has been a major concern of