An earlier episode, on Happiness, aired November 26, 2011, and can be heard here. In this show, I’m paired with my colleague and good friend Timothy O’Leary, also of HKU.

The whole series is highly recommended. An episode about Confucianism with Sungmoon Kim and P. J. Ivanhoe of City University of HK can be heard here.

This essay examines the theory of ritual propriety presented in the Xunzi and criticisms of Xunzi-like views found in the classical Daoist anthology Zhuangzi. To highlight the respects in which the Zhuangzi can be read as posing a critical response to a Xunzian view of ritual propriety, the essay juxtaposes the two texts’ view of language, since Xunzi’s theory of ritual propriety is intertwined with his theory of language. I argue that a Zhuangist critique of the presuppositions of Xunzi’s stance on language also undermines his stance on ritual propriety. Xunzi contends that state promulgation of an elaborate code of ritual propriety is a key to good social order (zhi) and that state regulation of language is a key to smooth communication and thus also good order. The Zhuangzi provides grounds for doubting both contentions. Claiming that ritual propriety causally produces social order is analogous to claiming that grammar causally produces smooth linguistic communication, when in fact it is more likely our ability to communicate that allows us to develop shared rules of grammar. Humans have fundamental social and communicative capacities that undergird our abilities to speak a language or engage in shared ritual performances. It is these more fundamental capacities, not their manifestation in a particular system of grammar or ritual norms, that provides the root explanation of our ability to communicate or to live together harmoniously. The Xunzi-Zhuangzi dialectic suggests that ritual is indispensable, but normatively justified rituals will be less rigid, less comprehensive, less fastidious, and more spontaneous than a Xunzian theorist would allow.

The paper will probably appear around June 2012. A preprint is available here.

The paper critiques Chad Hansen’s “mass noun hypothesis,” arguing that though most Classical Chinese nouns do function as mass nouns, this fact does not support the claim that pre-Qín thinkers treat the extensions of common nouns as mereological wholes, nor does it explain why they adopt nominalist semantic theories. The paper shows that early texts explain the use of common nouns by appeal to similarity relations, not mereological relations. However, it further argues that some early texts do characterize the relation between individuals and collections as a mereological relation. It includes a detailed review of the literature on the mass noun hypothesis up to 2005.

For an abstract and full-text preprint, see this page.

Later this month I’ll be attending an international workshop in Singapore called “Global Themes in Ethical Naturalism,” hosted by the Department of Philosophy of the National University of Singapore, June 27–28. My talk will be entitled “Chinese Naturalism and the Limits of Ethics.” An abstract follows.

Chinese Naturalism and the Limits of Ethics

Chris Fraser

University of Hong Kong

Early Chinese ethics is distinctive in its focus on the concept of dao (way, path, course), a normative or action-guiding notion that is explicitly naturalistic, being grounded in natural structures, patterns, and processes. Ethical theorizing centered on dao might point the way toward a defensible, non-reductive ethical naturalism. I will argue that the dialectic of early Chinese thought from Mozi through Xunzi to Zhuangzi partly fulfills this promise, by showing how natural features can provide agents with action guidance. At the same time, however, I contend that plausible versions of early Chinese naturalism do not generate the distinctive normative force—objective, universally binding obligation—often identified as specifically moral. Instead, they yield only evaluations of conduct as more or less fitting and blur the boundaries between morality, prudence, aesthetics, and etiquette. I will suggest that these results are virtues, not defects, however, as they reflect the genuine limits of ethical norms and ethical theory.

Semester 1: PHIL2420 Chinese Philosophy: Metaphysics

Semester 2: PHIL1034 Introduction to Philosophy: Ethics and Politics, East and West

A postgraduate reading group will be arranged for PHIL2420.

UPDATE: Anyone who would like the text of my remarks is welcome to contact me.

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Hong Kong will be holding a workshop entitled “Happiness and the Dao: Ancient Greek and Chinese Approaches to Ethics,” March 25–26, 20111. The workshop is organized by Patrick Hawley, Chair of the Department of Philosophy. Presenters will include A. A. Long, Nicholas D. Smith, Lisa Raphals, Yong Huang, Chad Hansen, Siu-fu Tang, Timothy O’Leary, and myself. My talk will be entitled “Rational Souls or Virtuoso Performers? λόγος versus Dào-dé 道德 in Ancient Greek and Chinese Thought.”

The workshop announcement follows.

Happiness and the Dao: Ancient Greek and Chinese Approaches to Ethics

Ancient Greek ethics focuses largely on the theory and practice of eudaimonia, the happy or flourishing life. Classical Chinese ethics similarly focuses on the theory and practice of the dao, the proper way of life. The workshop will inquire into how these two ethical orientations compare and contrast with each other. How might the two central concepts of eudaimonia and dao relate to each other? What conception of a flourishing life is implied by various Chinese views of the dao? What conception of a practical, normative way is implied by various Greek views of eudaimonia? What insights into contemporary ethical life might be provided by reflection on these ancient ethical themes? These are among the questions that the workshop will address.